SR
Policraticus/Book 7 · Liber Septimus
Chapter 8Polic.7.8

Quod uirtus unica uia est philosophandi et eundi

The Royal Highway of Virtue

Virtue is the essential path and merit for achieving true happiness, which serves as the ultimate end of all human desire.

On happiness, the three stages of those who approach it, and the three schools of philosophers. However, because not everyone is capable of everything, and the Spirit blows where He wills, and it's common for the vast number of interpretations offered by teachers to be complex, many schools have emerged from the words of Socrates and Plato; yet all of them are hurrying toward the same goal, though along different paths. True happiness is the goal toward which all rational beings lean. There isn't anyone who doesn't want to be happy, but not everyone walks the same path toward what they desire. Yet there is one path set before everyone, like a royal highway that splits into many smaller paths. This path is virtue; for no one proceeds to happiness except through virtue. Someone might perhaps be drawn toward happiness without the works of virtue, but no one reaches it except by the steps of virtue. Virtue, therefore, is the merit of happiness, and happiness is the reward of virtue. These are truly the highest goods: one for our journey, the other for our true home. Nothing is more excellent than virtue while we are exiles traveling away from the Lord, and nothing is better than happiness while we are citizens reigning and rejoicing with the Lord. These are superior to all other things because virtue encompasses everything we must do, while happiness encompasses everything we could desire. Happiness, however, excels virtue, because in all things, the 'end' is superior to that which is merely a 'means' to an end. After all, a person isn't happy so that they might act rightly; rather, they act rightly so that they might live happily. Hence that Socratic remark in the book of the Saturnalia is praised: that many people want to live just to eat and drink, but they eat and drink so that they might live. Happiness, then, is the one and singular highest of all goods; yet, in a sense, there is another good that some compare to it, which is superior to other things because it approaches more familiarly that which is truly, singularly, and uniquely the highest good. Otherwise, human weakness can't recover enough to grasp either one without philosophy as its guide.

The Three Orders of Seekers

Humanity is divided into three ranks—the wise, the philosophers, and the aspirants—all of whom must seek wisdom to avoid the blindness of vice.

Anyone who heads toward the path of beatitude without it is like a blind man walking on slippery ground; he falls because he is presumptuous in reaching for the heights. Chrysippus asserted that it makes one master of divine and human affairs and that it can never be praised enough, for it drives out vices, reveals and bestows virtues, and in a way repairs the divine integrity within our human weakness. To express his meaning more clearly, he says that all who don't keep watch by it or for it—even though it comes from it—are like brute animals; in fact, he calls it a staggering miracle against nature that there are brute men in human bodies. He asserted that there are three types of men who are human (for he calls others brutes). Some already enjoy the joy of wisdom, and these are the wise; others are approaching so that they may enjoy it, and these are the philosophers; others aspire to approach it, namely those who aren't yet philosophers but desire to be. It's clear that there are many who aren't yet philosophers but who emulate the life of philosophers, if not in deed, then at least in desire. I approve of his opinion all the more securely because I seem to see it supported by the authority of the Holy Spirit, as the prophet says: My soul has longed to desire your justifications at all times. In this, he seems to me to have clearly expressed the three orders mentioned above. Since Plato says that a wise person is a worshiper of God, who else should be considered wise but the one who dwells in the Lord’s commands, and whose conscience, soothed by good works, already tastes and senses the flavor of true happiness with the full longing of the mind? Without a doubt, the person who finds known happiness sweet is in no way lacking it; and the fullness of all desirable things is present to the one who, in this life, tastes and sees how good the Lord is. But the philosopher, whose intention is directed toward gaining wisdom, is by that same Author a lover of God; he subdues his vices and applies his mind to understanding things, so that once they are known, he may be able to approach true happiness. These things make a person blessed, provided that the chains of vice are broken, and it is granted to them to visit the bright and unfailing fountain of goodness by way of certain steps of contemplation. For happy is the one who has been able to know the causes of things; and, as the poet says (for to us, wherever they come from, the incentives to virtue are pleasing): Happy are the souls for whom it was a care to know these things first and to climb to the heavenly homes. It is believable that they have lifted their heads equally above human vices and amusements. Neither Venus nor wine has broken their noble hearts, nor the duty of the forum or the labor of military service; neither light ambition, nor glory stained with pretense, nor the hunger for great wealth has troubled them. They have brought the distant stars before our eyes and have placed the heavens under their own intellect. This is how heaven is sought—not by Olympus piling Ossa upon it, or Peliacus reaching the stars with its highest peak. Yet there is no duty, whether in military service or at home, that philosophy doesn't address; in fact, it alone casts out vices, and without it, nothing can be done rightly among men. Just as dwelling in the Lord’s statutes—that is, in the fulfillment of His commandments—makes one wise (for the prophet says, 'I have gained understanding from your commandments'), so too, training the mind to fulfill them is the truest philosophy. But there are those who don't yet fulfill them, or aren't yet ready to do so, yet they approve of what they admire in others and desire, with God as their guide, to be conformed to them. There is, therefore, the highest rank of those who are occupied with the statutes; a middle rank whose mind is freed from vices so that it may be occupied in them through love; and the lowest rank of those who desire to be set free so that they might be able to long for this very thing—those who, even if they aren't yet philosophers, still desire to be. The prophet took on the persona of these people when he said: 'My soul has longed to desire your statutes at all times.' For its beauty is so great that if, as Plato says, it could be seen with the eyes of the body, it would miraculously inflame men with a love of wisdom, to such an extent that at first sight it would be necessary for everyone to fall in love with it. The faithful soul loves and seeks this from its youth—a soul whose old age consists in the gravity of its character, and whose childhood consists in ignorance and the slipperiness of vices. 'Above health,' he says, 'and all beauty I loved wisdom, and I chose to have her instead of light; all good things came to me together with her.'

The Pursuit of Truth

Philosophy is the study of wisdom that leads to blessedness, and while various schools offer different paths, the truth emerges through careful inquiry and comparison.

If all good things are merely accessories to wisdom, and philosophy is the study of wisdom, it follows that to despise philosophy is to exclude all good things. From this we gather that the more diligently a person pursues philosophy, the more faithfully and rightly they advance toward blessedness. For it is wisdom that dispenses the virtues by which we walk in every duty. But because the ancients—even though they believed in part that souls were immortal—had not yet received instruction regarding the eternal life to come, they placed the highest good in virtue; and there is clearly nothing better than that, except to enjoy Him who is supremely good and is the highest good Himself. For the best use of virtue is to enjoy God Himself as its fruit. Since, then, virtue alone makes one blessed, they have attempted to ascend to its throne by taking occasion from the traditions of the more learned to travel along various paths. The Stoic, to teach contempt for worldly things, dwells on the meditation of death; the Peripatetic dwells on the inquiry into truth; Epicurus wallows in pleasures. Although they all tend toward one goal, they open up various opinions to their students as if they were paths to blessedness. It's fine to doubt and inquire about these things until, from a comparison of the proposals—as if from a collision of arguments—the truth shines forth. But more will be said about these matters later on. For now, it's enough to have shown the ways in which it's permissible to imitate the wavering Academics.

Read the original Latin

ad beatitudinem; et de tribus gradibus accedentium, et de tribus sectis philosophorum. Verumtamen, quia non omnes omnia possunt, et Spiritus ubi uult spirat, et frequens est ut eorum, quae a doetoribus proferuntur, multitudinis sit multiplex intellectus, ex uerbis Socratis et Platonis sectae multae profluxerunt, omnes tamen ad unum sed quasi per uarias semitas properantes. IUud autem quo omnium rationabilium uergit intentio uera beatitudo est. Nemo etenim est qui non uelit esse beatus; sed ad hoc quod desiderant non una uia omnes incedunt. Vna tamen est omnibus uia proposita sed quasi strata regia scinditur in semitas multas. Haec autem uirtus est; nam nisi per uirtutem nemo ad beatitudinem pergit. Citra uirtutis opera forte quis et proculdubio sine operibus ad beatitudinem trahitur, sed eo nullus nisi uirtutis passibus pergit. Virtus ergo felicitatis meritum est, felicitas uirtutis praemium.

Et haec quidem bona sunt summa, alterum uiae, alterum patriae. Nichil enim uirtute praestantius, dum exul peregrinatur a Domino, nichil felicitate melius, dum ciuis regnat et gaudet cum Domino. Sunt autem haec omnibus aliis praestantiora quia uirtus omnia agenda, felicitas omnia optanda complectitur. FeHcitas tamen uirtuti praestat quia in omnibus praestantius est propter quod aliquid quam quod propter aliquid. Non enim felix est quis ut recte agat, sed recte agit ut feliciter uiuat. Vnde et Socraticum illud in Saturnaliorum libro laudatur: Multos homines propterea uelle uiuere ut ederent et biberent; se bibere atque esse ut uiueret. Vnum igitur et singulare summum omnium bonorum beatitudo est, sed ab eo est aliud quodammodo quorundam eollatione summum et eo ipso superius aliis quod ad illud, quod uere singulariter et unice summum est, familiarius accedit. Ceterum ad neutrius apprehensionem nisi philosophia duce humana infirmitas conualescit.

Quisquis enim sine ea ad beatitudinis uiam tendit, quasi cecus in lubrico tendens ad alta praesumptuosus cadit. Vnde eam diuinarum et humanarum rerum compotem esse Crisippus asseruit, nec umquam satis posse laudari quae uitia expellit, uirtutes ostendit et confert, et in humana infirmitate diuinam quodammodo reparat integritatem. Et, ut sensum suum expressius proferat, omnes qui non ab illa uel ad illam uigilant (quod tamen ab illa est) brutis animalibus dicit esse conformes, immo et stupendum contra a naturam miraculum in corporibus humanis brutos homines esse. Tria uero genera hominum qui homines sunt (alios enim brutos dicit) esse asseruit. Alii enim iam iocunditate sapientiae perfruuntur, et hii sapientes sunt; alii accedunt ut fruantur, et hii sunt philosophi; alii adspirant ad accedendum, scilicet qui nondum sunt et esse philosophi concupiscunt. Constat enim esse quam plurimos qui nondum philosophantur et uitam philosophorum si non opere, saltem desiderio emulantur. Ego sententiam eius tanto securius approbo, quanto eam michi uidere uideor sancti Spiritus auctoritate subnixam, dicente propheta: Concupiuit anima mea desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore. In quo michi tres praemissos ordines manif este uidetur expressisse.

Cum enim Plato sapientem dicat esse cultorem Dei, quis alius habendus est sapiens quam ille qui moratur in iustificationibus Domini et mulcente se conscientia bonorum operum uerae felicitatis saporem tota mentis auiditate iam praegustat et sentit? Proculdubio nequaquam illius expers est cui agnita beatitudo dulcescit, et ei expetibilium cumulus adest qui in uita gustat et uidet quam suauis est Dominus. Philosophus autem, cuius intentio dirigitur illuc ut sapiat, eodem auctore amator Dei est et uitia subigens rebus agnoscendis applicat animum ut his agnitis ad ueram beatitudinem possit accedere. Haec enim hominem beatum faciunt si et uitiorum soluantur uincula, et quasi quibusdam gradibus contemplationis lucidum et indeficientem fontem boni detur inuisere. Nam felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas; et, ut ait poeta, (nobis enim, undecumque proueniant, placent incitamenta uirtutum): Felices animae quibus has cognoscere primum inque domos superas scandere cura fuit. Credibile est illos pariter uitiisque iocisque altius humanis exeruisse caput. Non Venus et uinum sublimia pectora fregit, officiumque fori militiaeue labor; non leuis ambitio perfusaque gloria fuco magnarumque fames sollicitauit opum. Admouere oculis distantia sidera nostris etheraque ingenio supposuere suo.

Sic petitur celum, non ut ferat Ossan Olimpus summaque Peliacus sidera tangat apex. Nullum tamen officium est militiae aut domi quod non philosophia pertractet, quippe quae sola excludit uitia, et sine qua nichil recte inter homines geri potest. Sicut autem morari in iustificationibus, id est in expletione mandatorum Dei, sapientem facit (nam et propheta dicit: A mandatis tuis intellexi), sic animum explendis aptare ea demum philosophia uerissima est. Sed sunt qui nondum explent aut aptantur explendis, approbant tamen quod suspiciunt in aliis, et illis auctore Deo desiderant conformari, Est ergo gradus eminentissimus eorum qui in iustificationibus occupantur; medius quorum animus exa peditus est a uitiis ut ex amore occupetur in illis; infimus qui desiderant expediri ut hoc ipsum concupiscere possint; qui, etsi non sint, desiderant tamen esse philosophi. Horum personam induerat propheta dicens: Concupiuit anima mea desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni oempore. Eius namque tanta est pulchritudo quod, si, ut ait Plato, uideri posset oculis corporis, amore sapientiae mirabiliter homines inflammaret, adeo quidem ut primo aspectu necesse esset omnes in amorem incidere. Hanc amat et exquirit a iuuentute sua fidelis anima cuius senectus constat in grauitate morum et puerilis etas in ignorantia et lubrico uitiorum. Super salutem, inquit, et omnem pulchritudinem dilexi sapientiam et proposui pro luce habere illam; uenerunt michi omnia bona pariter cum illa.

Si ergo bona omnia sapientiae accessoria sunt, et philosophia studium sapientiae, profecto philosophandi contemptus bonorum omnium exclusio est. Vnde coUigitur quod quanto quis philosophiae diligentius insistit, eo fidelius et rectius ad beatitudinem pergit. Nam uirtutes, quibus itur in singulis ofRciis, illa dispensat. Sed quia ueteres, licet ex parte animas crederent immortales, tiitae etemae, quae post istam futura est, nondum instructionem aeceperant; summum bonum in uirtute constituerunt quo plane nichil melius est nisi frui eo qui summe bonus et summum bonum est. Vsus enim uirtutis optimus est, et utendi Deus ipse est fructus. Cum ergo uirtus sola beatum faciat, ad thronum eius, sumpta occasione ex traditionibus doctiorum, per uarios calles ascendere conati sunt. Stoicus enim, ut rerum contemptum doceat, in mortis meditatione uersatur; Peripatheticus in inquisitione ueri; uolutatur in uoluptatibus Epicurus; et, licet ad unum tendant, uarias sententias quasi uias beatitudinis auditoribus suis aperiunt. De quibus dubitare et quaerere liberum est, donec ex collatione propositorum quasi ex quadam rationum collisione ueritas illucescat.

Sed de his latius in sequentibus dicetur. Nunc sufficiat ostendisse iri quibus Achademicos uacillantes liceat imitari.

Scripture echoes

  1. John.3.8The Spirit blows where it wishes, and you hear its sound, but you do not know where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.

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