Quod alia sensus, alia rationis, alia religionis
The Foundations of Certainty
Certain truths are self-evident to the senses and reason, and to deny them is a sign of intellectual or moral failure.
These things are proven by authority: the fact that every field of study claims some stable starting point that shouldn't be questioned; that some things are self-evident to the learned while others are to the uninitiated; the extent to which one should doubt; and that stubbornness is a major obstacle to the search for truth. After all, there are some things that the authority of sense, reason, or religion persuades us of. To doubt these things is a sign of weakness, error, or even crime. Asking whether the sun shines, whether snow is white, or whether fire is hot is a sign of someone lacking common sense. But questioning whether three is greater than two and contains the whole and its half, or whether four is double two, is the mark of someone who is either foolish or whose reason is completely idle or missing. Anyone who calls into question whether God exists, or whether that same God is powerful, wise, or good, is not only irreligious but faithless, and deserves to be taught by suffering. In every philosophical discipline, there are certain primary—or, to use Cratinus’s word, primitive—principles that one isn't permitted to doubt, unless they are someone dedicated to knowing nothing. Just as some things present themselves to the physical senses so that they can't escape those who are sensible, while other things are more subtle and aren't perceived unless they're closely examined, studied, and observed, so too are there things so clear by their own light that they can't escape the gaze of reason but are commonly seen by everyone—though more or less so depending on each person's capacity and strength. Indeed, there are others that require a kind of scrutiny and, because they are consequences of the former, can't escape someone who examines them more diligently.
Reason, Faith, and First Principles
Just as geometry relies on postulates, all fields of study and religious life require stable starting points to progress toward truth.
Yet for both these groups, certain things seem to come first, which philosophical logic establishes as if on the foundation of faith, asking that they be granted freely in the hope of making progress. In the same way, geometers first lay down certain postulates as the foundations of the entire art, then add common notions of the mind, and thus, as if with an ordered battle line, proceed toward the things they need to demonstrate. But these postulates themselves are so agreeable to reason that anyone who wouldn't grant them, even to an enemy, would seem stubborn. Here, however, we aren't dealing with things that pertain to the practice of religious life, since even there, some things are requested in a way that exceeds the experience of reason so that faith may earn more; but these very things, even if reason doesn't demand them, are owed to piety. For Christ, through many benefits and great miracles, has earned that faith be applied to the Sacraments where reason fails—and it is impious not to believe Him, just as it is stubborn to dissent persistently from what is probable. For who, unless he is insane or stubborn, would deny that a straight line can be drawn from every point to every opposite point? For just as in buildings it's necessary for something to be fixed and stable so that the structure to be erected can rest upon it, so in every field of study, the necessity of the most prudent reason demands some stable starting point for proceeding. Otherwise, whatever the builder adds wavers, as if someone were building on slippery sand or bitumen, or writing in the flow of a river. For more certain things give faith to uncertain ones. If nothing follows unless something else comes first, and if all motion starts from rest, how can anyone prove anything if they never rest or settle on a single point? After all, for someone who finds everything equally probable, nothing can ever be proven. As for what is clear, some things are known to everyone, while others are known only to the more learned, depending on their individual capacity. For it is so publicly known that every number is either even or odd that it doesn't escape even children, who are allowed by the freedom of their age to play at 'even or odd,' to ride on a long reed, to build little houses, or to harness mice to a toy cart. However, the fact that every multiple number, no matter its distance from unity, precedes as many superparticular numbers of its own kind—this is known only to those who have dedicated themselves to the study of numbers. A more advanced mathematician, though, knows that what a thing is and the actual being of that thing are different. So, in every discipline, there are certain things known to the experts that remain hidden not only from the general public but even from other philosophers. Every religion also has its own principles, which either common reason or piety has persuaded, by which it advances in the worship of God and the practice of morals toward the attainment of blessedness.
The Academic Pursuit of Truth
While foundational principles must be held firmly, the Academic tradition encourages diligent inquiry and openness to probability until truth is revealed.
There is, however, one principle common to all religions that piety grants freely and without any need for proof: namely, that God is powerful, wise, good, and worthy of reverence, and that all things are lovable. The view of the Epicureans—who denied that God exists and attributed everything to chance—was long ago debunked by those who hold that God is the author of humanity. Therefore, it’s the mark of a fool, a madman, or—what’s worse—a criminal to oppose principles or things that are self-evident, or to harbor doubts about them. Yet one shouldn't doubt things that follow from these principles, provided it’s clear that they do; in the meantime, however, they must be debated through questions until their coherence with the principles or their consequences becomes clear. It isn't useless to doubt each of these things; indeed, the debate of the Academic skeptics revolved around such matters until they could grasp the truth. For what does it matter, or who cares, if those who were always searching for everything remained learners and never arrived at the knowledge of the truth, because they had known nothing certain? Cicero therefore prescribes this rule of the Academics: anyone who has set out to philosophize should keep searching while the matter is obscure, but should rest content once the truth shines forth with probability. For he says: 'We who follow what is probable, and cannot progress beyond what is probable, are prepared both to refute others without anger and to be refuted ourselves without stubbornness.'
The Obstacles of Anger and Stubbornness
Anger and stubbornness are the primary barriers to truth, as evidenced by those who resisted the incarnate Truth and remain blinded by their own pride.
There are two major obstacles to finding the truth: getting angry at the person who speaks it, or stubbornly trying to defend what is false. For as the ethicist says: Anger hinders the mind so that it cannot see the truth. And Truth itself, incarnate, withdrew from those in Chorazin and Bethsaida who stubbornly resisted the Holy Spirit. Stubbornness has also blinded the Jews, so that the veil of the temple still covers their eyes—even though it was torn from top to bottom when the Lord suffered.
Read the original Latin
audoritate probantur; et quodjldesin omni doctrina aliquod stabile initlum uendicat quod probari non debet; et quod alia per se doctioribus inTwtescunt, alia rudibus; et quatenus dubitandum sit; et quod pertinacia ueritatis inquisitionem plurimum impedit. Sunt enim nonnulla quae sensus rationis aut religionis persuadet auctoritas. Horum dubitatio infirmitatis erroris notam habet aut criminis. Quaerere enim an sol splendeat, albeat nix, ignis caleat, hominis est sensu indigentis. At uero an ternarius binario maior sit ipsumque totum et medietatem eius contineat quaerere et an quaternarius sit duplus binario, indiscreti est et cui est ratio otiosa aut deest omnino. Qui uero an Deus sit dedueit in quaestionem et an idem potens sapiens sit an bonus, non modo irreligiosus sed perfidus est, et pena docente dignus est instrui. Sunt enim in omnibus philosophicis disciplinis quaedam prima et, ut ita dicatur Cratini uerbo, primitiua principia de quibus eodem auctore dubitare non licet nisi his quorum labor in eo uersatur ne quid sciant. Nam, sicut quaedam se corporeis sensibus ingerunt ut apud sensatos latere non possint; quaedam subtiliora sunt ut, nisi familiarius adhibita et prospecta diligentius et pertractata sint, non sentiantur; sic sunt aliqua tanta sui luce perspicua ut latere non possint rationis aspectum sed communiter uideantur ab omnibus, magis tamen et minus pro capacitate et uiribus singulorum; alia quidem sunt quae quasi quodam scrutinio indigent et, quia istorum consecutiua sunt, diligentius perscrutantem latere non possunt.
Et his tamen et illis quaedam uidentur anteriora esse quae ratio philosophiae quasi in fidei fundamento constituit, petens ut in spe proficiendi ea sibi gratuito concedantur. Sic et geometrae primo petitiones quasdam quasi totius artis iaciunt fundamenta, deinde communes animi conceptiones adiciunt et sic quasi acie ordinata ad ea quae sibi sunt demonstranda procedunt. Sed et petitiones ipsae adeo consentiunt rationi ut proteruire uideatur quisquis eas uel hosti non concedit. Hic tamen nequaquam agitur de his quae ad cultum religionis pertinent, quoniam et ibi nonnulla quodammodo petuntur quae, ut fides amplius mereatur, experientiam rationis excedunt; sed haec ipsa, etsi ratio non urgeat, debentur pietati. Vt enim sacramentis, ubi ratio deficit, adhibeatur fides, multis beneficiis magnisque miraculis promeruit Christus cui non credi impium est, sicut a probabilibus dissentire pertinaciter est proteruum, Quis enim nisi insanus aut proteruus negauerit quin ab omni puncto ad omne punctum oppositum possit a linea recta protendi? Nam sicut in edificiis necesse est aliquid fixum esse et stabile cui erigenda structura possit inniti, sic in omni doctrina aliquod stabile initium procedendi necessitas consultissimae rationis exposcit. Alioquin quicquid opifex adicit, nutat ac si in lubrico arenae aut bituminis quis edificet aut scribat in fluminis lapsu. Nam incertis certiora faciunt fidem.
Si ergo nichil sequitur nisi aliud antecedat, si motus omnis a quiete procedit, quis potest ei probationis esse processus qui nusquam quiescit aut nuUi adquiescit? Ei namque cui omnia aeque probabilia sunt nichil probari potest. Sed eorum quae perspicua sunt alia sunt omnibus nota, alia doctioribus tantum unicuique secundum propriam facultatem. Nam numerum omnem parem esse uel imparem ita publice notum est ut nec pueros lateat quibus licentia etatis indulget ludere par impar, equitare in arundine longa, edificare casas, plostello adiungere mures. Hoc autem, quod omnis multiplex quoto loco distat ab unitate, tot superparticulares sui generis antecedit, his dumtaxat innotuit qui numeris operam impenderunt. Mathematicus autem consultior nouit quia diuersa sunt id quod est et esse rei. Et sic in singulis disciplinis quaedam suis opificibus innotescunt quae non modo uulgo sed aliis philosophis occultantur. Habet et religio quaelibet principia sua quae aut ratio communis aut pietas persuasit quibus proficit in cultu Dei et morum exercitio ad beatitudinem optinendam.
Est autem unum omnium religionum principium quod pietas gratis et sine ulla probatione concedit, Deum scilicet potentem, sapientem, bonum, uenerabilem I, proteruum est M eque omnia A plestello et amabilem esse. Nam Epicureorum Deum esse negantium et casui subicientium omnia iam pridem auctore Deo homine explosa sententia est. Obuiare ergo principiis aut rebus per se notis siue de his ambigere insensati est aut uecordis siue (quod deterius est) criminosi. Sed nec de his dubitare licet quae ex principiis consequuntur, dum ea tamen sequi planum sit; interim namque sunt quaestionibus agitanda, dum illorum ad principia uel consecutiua eorum coherentia pateat. Nam de singulis istorum dubitare non est inutile; et quidem in talibus, donec apprehended rent ueritatem, Achademicorum probabilium disceptatio uertebatur. Quid enim refert aut quorum interest, si qui semper et omnia quaerebant, discentes et numquam ad scientiam ueritatis peruenientes, quia nichil certum habere isnouerant? Hanc ergo legem Achademicorum praescribit Cicero ut cui philosophandi propositum est, dum res obscura est, quaerat; dum probabiliter elucescit ueritas, adquiescat. Ait enim: Nos, qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra id quod probabile occun-it progredi possumus, et refellere sine iracundia et refeUi sine pertinacia parati sumus.
Haec enim duo inuentioni ueritatis plurimum aduersantur, si aut uera dicenti quis succenseat aut pertinaciter in falsitatis a def ensione laboret. Nam ut ait ethicus: Impedit ira animum ne possit cemere uerum. Et Veritas ipsa incamata recessit ab eis qui in Corozaim et Bethsaida Spiritui sancto pertinacius restiterunt. Sed et ludeos pertinacia excecauit ut adhuc oculos eomm uelum templi teneat, quod Domino patiente scissum est a summo usque deorsum.
Policraticus companion
Study the argument weekly; pray the tradition daily
Pair the outline with the Chosen Portion app, which serves short daily portions from the same royal devotional tradition — free on iOS.
John of Salisbury argued that rulers must keep the law of God before their eyes daily; Chosen Portion gives modern readers that same daily discipline in five minutes a morning.
- 8 weeks, one book per week, with the 3-4 key chapters flagged in each
- Discussion questions usable for a reading group from week one
- A daily 5-minute companion portion in the app alongside your weekly study