De arrogantia multitudinis imperitae ; et qualiter
The Vanity of Intellectual Pride
The author critiques those who cling stubbornly to the opinions of masters and engage in empty, circular debates rather than seeking true wisdom.
We must read about things that can help us and things that can harm us; and we must understand that wisdom doesn't come from mere talent or practice without grace. Yet few are willing to imitate the Academics, since everyone chooses what to follow based on their own whims rather than on reason. For some are pulled away by their own opinions, others by the opinions of teachers, and still others by the company of the crowd. What doubt can there be for someone who, having sworn by the words of a master, pays attention not to what is said, but to who is saying it? They shout out anything at all with intensity, and they think that whatever they were taught in childhood has been drawn from the deepest, hidden secrets of philosophy. They're ready to argue over goat's wool, believing it impossible if they hear something unknown to their ears, and they won't yield to reason once a teacher's opinion has captured them. Whatever that teacher has put forward is, for them, authentic and sacred. Yet such a person contradicts and resists all the more stubbornly if they've spent their life learning only a few things and are so constrained by a narrow vocabulary that, if you take away one or two words, they become speechless and quieter than any statue. You'd think they had learned the necessity of silence—not just its usefulness—in the lecture halls of Pythagoras or a monastery. If one of these people happens to come to you for instruction, you'd be right to do what Quintilian reports in his 'Institutes of Oratory' that Timotheus, the flute master, used to do. He would demand and accept double the fee from those who had been poorly trained compared to those who came to him as complete beginners. Error requires double the work, since the seeds of a bad education must be rooted out, and good ones must be planted more faithfully. Look at the philosophy leaders of our time—those who proclaim themselves the loudest and are surrounded by a clamoring crowd of listeners. Watch them closely: you'll find them occupied with a single rule, or perhaps two or a few words, or at most they choose a few questions suited for bickering, in which they exercise their wit and waste their lives. Yet they aren't able to untie these knots; instead, they pass the knot and all the ambiguity, along with its complexity, through their students to future generations to solve. They invite you to that place to engage in debate; they insist and demand a conflict. If you hesitate to join the fray, if you delay even a little, they pounce. If you approach, if you finally engage them against your will, if you press them, they seek hiding places, change their faces, twist their words, and conform themselves to tricks. You will marvel that the slippery and shifting Proteus has returned, except that he can be held more easily if you persist in this: that wherever their words flow and tumble, you understand what they want and what they mean amidst such a variety of words. Eventually, they will be defeated by their own sense and caught in the words of their own mouths, provided you reach the substance of what is being said and hold it firmly. Yet the things they argue about most are actually the most useless and worthless once they're brought to light. If you push forward, and if you're ashamed and tired of being occupied with such nonsense for so long, the argument slips back into its own side-tracks, and like Antaeus returning to his mother's breast, it tries to regain its strength from the very place where it was born and fed. It circles around and makes so many twists and turns just to end up back where it started, as if it were navigating a labyrinth. A stork feeds its young with snakes and lizards found in remote fields; once the young have their wings, they go looking for those same creatures themselves. A vulture, leaving behind the carcasses of cattle and dogs, hurries to its young and brings them a piece of the corpse; this, then, is the food of the great vulture itself, and of the one feeding, once it has built its nest in its own tree. But birds of noble breed hunt hares or deer in the woods, and then the prey is placed in the nest; later, however, when the mature offspring takes flight, driven by hunger, it hastens to the very prey it first tasted when it broke from the egg. If, therefore, you stop them from using their own words, you'll be able to pity them for their near-total lack of substance. There are those who seem to excel in individual parts, and there are those who claim the whole of philosophy for themselves, yet they are no less lacking in the true substance of philosophy in those individual parts.
Discernment in Reading and Learning
True wisdom requires a balanced approach to study, prioritizing what is useful for the soul and the political life over mere accumulation of knowledge.
There are those who hope for perfection from a single thing; there are others who keep watch over everything, yet are destitute of any one thing. Still, I wouldn't easily say which group is more mistaken, since perfection doesn't consist of just one thing, and no one can faithfully master everything. Yet, the person who seeks everything from one source is foolish, and the one who claims to know everything is arrogant. To be occupied with everything in one place is the mark of the lazy, but to run around everywhere is the mark of someone who is fastidious and making no progress. However, the person who looks through many things to choose what is most worth pursuing is circumspect; having examined others, they serve their own chosen path more faithfully. Perhaps the instruction to read the books of an ethical teacher points toward this. In the little book where children are initiated—so that the instruction in virtue and the habits instilled in their tender souls might not easily be erased (since a jar keeps the scent of what it was first filled with when new)—Cato, or whoever the uncertain author may be, says: 'Make sure you read many things; once you have read them, read many things again.' I wouldn't easily believe that anything is more useful for someone aspiring to knowledge than the observance of God's commandments, in which there is, without a doubt, the one and only true progress in philosophy. Still, you should read everything in such a way that you set some things aside once read, reject others, and only glance at some in passing so they aren't entirely unknown. Above all, though, you should apply yourself with greater diligence to those things that establish a political life—whether in civil law or other ethical precepts—or that promote the health of body or soul. Since even the chief of the liberal arts—without which no one can rightly teach or be taught—is to be treated as something to glance at in passing, as if from the threshold, who would think it worth lingering over other things that are either difficult to understand or useless and harmful, and which don't make a person better? Even those things that are necessary are most harmful if they occupy a person too excessively. S, precept, etc. : v. Cat. Dist. coll. vulg. (Baehrens Poet. Lat. Min. iii. p. 215). quoque'.
The Dangers of Worldly Literature
While literature can provide examples of virtue, it often serves as a vehicle for moral corruption and the passions of the crowd.
Our John seems to distinguish the author of the distichs known as Cato’s—which include the verse he’s about to quote—from the author of the brief precepts usually placed before them. Look at what he says about the collection of Distichs, the poets, historians, orators, and mathematicians: who would doubt that these should be read, especially since people can’t be, or usually aren’t, literate without them? After all, those who are ignorant of these things are called illiterate, even if they know their letters. Yet, while they claim the soul as if it were their own property, and even though they promise knowledge of things, they still unteach and strip away the cultivation of virtue. Hence Cicero, when he was dealing with the poets, exclaims so that he might be heard more carefully: 'The clamor and approval of the people, as if it were some great and wise teacher, and one sufficient for recommendation, makes those it wants authentic by its applause.' But those who are carried away by such great praises—what darkness they cast, what fears they bring in, what desires they inflame! They encourage lewdness and adultery, they restore various arts of deceit, they teach theft, robbery, and arson; they propose to the eyes of the unskilled multitude examples of evils that are or have been, or rather, that can be imagined. What fires from a burning sky, floods of the sea, or openings of the earth have caused as much slaughter of peoples as these cause in morals? The comic poet who is favored above others relates in the Eunuch the inflamed lust of a young man who saw a painting depicting how the god who shakes the temples of the sky with his thunder corrupted Danae—who was locked in a tower and guarded by sentries—by sending gold through the roof. The crowd looks at, marvels at, and praises the likenesses in every picture. For the rare spectator pays attention to what actually stirs up virtue. Here, where a thing has in itself neither counsel nor any measure, you cannot govern it with counsel. In love, all these vices are present: injuries, suspicions, enmities, truces, war, and peace again. If you demand that these uncertain things be handled with certain reason, you'll accomplish no more than if you tried to be insane with reason. And what you're now thinking to yourself in anger: 'Should I really take her?' 'Which one for him, which for me, which not at all?' 'Without measure, I would rather die; he'll find out what kind of man I am.' By heaven, a single little tear—which she barely managed to force out by rubbing her eyes—will extinguish these words; she'll even accuse you herself, and you'll offer her satisfaction of your own accord. The reason a servant gives for defending the insults of prostitutes is clear enough; but whatever they say on this point is taken just as if a servant were trying to call back a man madly in love. Yet, elsewhere, that same Cicero praises them highly, saying: 'The only person who finds poets and various writers of arts or history contemptible is the one who isn't afraid of being held in contempt himself.' They provide both a practical use for virtue and material for philosophizing; they note vices, they don't teach them, and they are welcome either for their utility or for the pleasure they bring. They pass through the various trials of character in such a way that they make room for virtue. Ulysses passed through spears, fire, the various storms of the sea, and so many movements, seditions, and traps of nations—passing through Scylla and Charybdis—so that he might return to his homeland, at least in his old age. He lost his companions to the various accidents of exile, but it was the violence of fortune, the frailty of nature, or the pleasure of the mind that consumed them. Yet the account of all these things is pleasant.
Grace as the Foundation of Wisdom
Examples from history and literature serve as warnings, but ultimately, true wisdom is found only through grace, not through the mere possession of books.
For even the foreseen downfall of a friend, however bitter it may be, serves as a warning; and the more familiar the bond was with the one who has fallen, the more that downfall frightens everyone, since we often learn more from examples than from precepts. For evils are avoided more easily the more faithfully they have been known beforehand. Ulysses escaped only with difficulty and in a certain sense alone, but fewer people escape to the joy of philosophy and to what are, as it were, the pleasures of home. Flaccus (or, if you prefer, Horace) agrees with him—if you care to listen to the lyric poet when his lyre is silent—for he rejoices that he found more honesty and utility in Homer than can be expressed by the precepts of many Stoics. He says: 'While you, noble Lollius, are declaiming at Rome, I have been rereading at Praeneste the writer of the Trojan war, who tells us what is beautiful, what is shameful, what is useful, and what is not, more clearly and better than Chrysippus and Crantor.' The story, in which Greece is described as clashing with the barbarian world in a long war because of Paris's love, contains the passions of foolish kings and peoples. Antenor advises cutting off the causes of the war. What about Paris? He denies that anyone can be forced to reign safely and live happily. Sedition, deceit, wickedness, lust, and anger cause sin both inside and outside the walls of Troy. Whatever madness the kings commit, the Greeks pay the price. I, however, easily agree with those who don't believe a person can become truly learned without reading the authors. Yet a wealth of books doesn't by any means make a philosopher; it is grace alone that leads to wisdom. For in the greatest abundance of books, there is sometimes either ignorance or a neglect of the truth, without which it's impossible for anyone to become wise. Hence, that doctor of the Church whom no one can ever sufficiently remember, Augustine, argues against Varro—though he acknowledges him to have been most learned, saying after other things for which he is commended with singular praise: 'Finally, even Tullius himself bears such testimony to him that in his Academic books he says that the discussion which is carried on there...'
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legenda sunt ea quae prodesse poterunt et obesse; et quod ingenio uel eocercitio sine gratia sapientia non contingit. Pauci tamen sunt qui Achademicorum imitatores esse dignentur, cum unusquisque pro libitu potius quam ratione eligat quid sequatur. Alii namque propriis, alii doctorum opinionibus, ahi multitudinis consortio distrahuntur. Quid enim dubitat qui iuratus in uerba magistri non quid sed a quo quid dicatur attendit? Quiduis enim elatrat acriter et quo imbuta est puerilis etas, de intimis philosophiae abditis erutum putat. Paratus et de lana caprina contendere, credens inopinabile si quid ignotum auribus eius insonuit, nec rationibus adquiescit quem doctoris captiuauit opinio. Quicquid enim ille protulit, autenticum et sacrosanctum est. IUe tamcn citius contradicit et pertinacius reluctatur a qui in paucitate rerum addiscenda consumpsit etatem et tanta uerborum angustia premitur ut, si uerbum unum aut duo subduxeris, elinguis fiat et quauis statua taciturnior.
Marmoreum putes et in auditorio Pithagorae aut monachorum claustro non tam usum quani necessitatem silentii didicisse. Si quis istorum in manus tuas forte erudiendus inciderit, merito facies quod Thimotheum, qui in arte tibiarum excellebat, fecisse refert Quintilianus in libro de Institutione Oratoris. Hic quidem duplas mercedes exigebat et accipiebat ab his qui fuerant male praeinstituti quam si omnino rudes accederent. Error enim dupplicem laborem exigit, cum et delenda sint peruersae institutionis semina et bonae sint fidelius inserenda. Suspice ad moderatores philosophorum temporis nostri, illos qui altius praeconantur, quos auditorum multitudo circumstrepit; diligenter adtende eos; in regula una aut duobus aut pauculis uerbis inuenies occupatos, aut ut multum pauculas quaestiones aptas iurgiis elegemnt, in quibus ingenium suum exerceant et consumant etatem. Eas tamen non sufficiunt enodare, sed nodum et totam ambiguitatem cum intricatione sua per auditores suos transmittunt posteris dissoluendum. Eo loco ut congrediaris inuitant, instant postulantque conflictum; si difiers manum conserere, si paululum moraris, insiliunt. Si accedis, si tandem inuitus congrederis, si premis, latebras quaerunt, uariant faciem, uerba distorquent, praestigiis conformantur, lubricum et uolubilem Prothea miraberis rediisse, nisi quod teneri facilius potest, si in eo perstiteris, ut quocumque uerba defluant et uoluantur, quid uelit intelligas et quid sentiat in tanta uarietate uerboram, et tandem uincietur sensu suo et capietur in uerbo oris sui, si substantiam eorum quae dicuntur attigeris firmiterque tenueris.
Ea tamen, de quibus maxime disceptatur, inutiliora et aliis uiliora sunt, cum patuerint. Si progrederis, si pudet et piget in nugis diutius occupari, ad diuerticula propositae quaestionis relabitur et quasi ad sinum matris recurrens more Antei ab eo, in quo genitus et nutritus est, uires reparare contendit. Sic circuit, tot facit amfractus ut ad usitata recurrat, ac si laberintum oporteat circuiri. Serpente ciconia pullos nutrit et inuenta per deuia rura lacerta; illi eadem sumptis quaerunt animalia pennis. Vultur, iumento et canibus crucibusque relictis, ad fetus properat partemque cadaueris adfert; hic est ergo cibus magni quoque uulturis et se pascentis, propria cum iam facit arbore nidos. Sed leporem aut capream famulae louis et generosae in saltu uenantur aues, tunc praeda cubili ponitur: inde autem, cum se matura leuabit progenies, stimulante fame festinat ad illam quam primam rupto praedam gustauerat ouo. a Si ergo eos a uerbis suis suspenderis, fere in omni facultate inopiae eorum poteris misereri. Sunt enim qui praestare uideantur in singulis; sunt qui partes philosophiae uendicent uniuersas, nec minus tamen sunt in singulis philosophiae copia destituti.
Sunt qui ab una perfectionem sperent; sunt qui uniuersis inuigilent, inopes singularum. Non facile tamen dixerim quos magis credam esse erroneos, cum nec ab una perfectio constet et nemo fideliter queat omnibus inseraire. Qui tamen ab una petit omnes, ineptior est; arrogantior qui omnes profitetur. In uno ad omnia occupari desidis est; sed fastidientis et non proficientis omnia circuire. Ceterum qui multa percurrit ut eligat cui sit potius insistendum, circumspectus est et aliis examinatis praeelectioni suae fidelius seruit. Eo forte spectat praeceptum ethici legere libros praecipientis. In libello quoque quo paruuli initiantur ut uirtutis instructio et usus teneris ebibitus animis facile nequeat aboleri (quoniam et testa diutius seruat odorem eius quo semel est imbuta recens) ait uel Cato uel alius (nam auctor incertus est): Multa legas facito, perlectis perlege multa. Quo quidem aliquid esse utilius ad scientiam aspiranti, facile non crediderim praeter obseruantiam mandatorum Dei, in qua singularis et unicus indubitanter est philosophandi profectus.
Sic tamen omnia legenda simt ut eorum aliqua, cum lecta fuerint, negligantur, reprobentur nonnulla, aliqua uideantur in transitu ne sint omnino incognita; sed prae omnibus maiori diligentia insistendum est quae aut politicam uitam siue in iure ciuili siue in aliis ethicae praeceptis instituunt aut procurant corporis aut animae sanitatem. Cum enim illa quae praecipua est inter liberales disciplinas, sine qua nemo recte docere aut doceri potest, sit in transitu et quasi a limine salutanda, quis in aliis censeat immorandum quae aut intellectu difBciles aut efiectu inutiles et pemiciosae non faciunt hominem meliorem? Nam et ea ipsa quorum usus necessarius est, si hominem immoderatius occupauerint, pemiciosissima sunt. S, praeceptum etc. : v. Cat. Dist. coll.
vulg. (Baehrens Poet. Lat. Min. iii. p. 215). quoque'.
Auctorem distichorum quae Catonis vocantur, inter quae exstat versiculus quem mox citaturus est, ab auctore praeceptorum brevissimorum eis vulgo praefixorum distinguere videtur loannes noster, Vide quae de Distichorum collectionis Poetas, historicos, oratores, mathematicos probabilis mathed maticae quis ambigit esse legendos, maxime cum sine his uiri esse nequeant uel non soleant litterati? Qui enim istorum ignari sunt, illiterati dicuntur, etsi litteras nouerint. Cum tamen quasi in ius suum uendicant animum, etsi polliceantur notitiam rerum, uirtutis tamen dedocent et submouent cultum. Vnde Cicero, cum de poetis ageret, ut diligentius audiatur, exclamat: Clamor et approbatio populi, quasi magni cuiusdam et sapientis magistri et qui ad commendationem sufficiat, plausu suo quos uult facit autenticos. At illi qui tantis laudibus efferuntur quantas obducunt tenebras, quos inuehunt metus, quas inflammant cupiditates! Hi stupra adulteriaque conciliant, uarias doli reparant artes, furta rapinas incendia docent, a quae sunt aut fuerunt, immo quae fingi possunt, malorum exempla proponunt oculis multitudinis imperitae. Quae incendia celi succensi aut maris inundatio aut terrae hiatus tantas fecit populorum strages quantas isti faciunt morum? Comicus qui prae ceteris placet in Eunucho refert adolescentis libidinem inflammatam, cum tabulam pictura uideret continentem quo pacto deus, qui celi templa sonitu concutit, per impluuium auro misso inclusam turre et septam custodibus corruperit Danem.
Similes in singulis picturas uidet, miratur et laudat multitudo. Nam quae uirtutis incitamenta sunt, rarus spectator adtendit. Here, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum habet ullum, eam consiKo regere non potes. In amore liaec omnia insunt uitia: iniuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae, induciae, bellum, pax rursum. Incerta haec si postules ratione certa facere, nichilo plus agas quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias. Et quod nunc tute tecum iratus cogitas: Egone illam? quae illum quae me quae non? sine modo, mori me malim; sentiet qui uir siem.
Haec uerba una mehercule lacrimula, quam oculos terendo misere uix ui expressit, restinguet; et te ultro accusabit, et dabis ei ultro supplicium. Ad depeUendvun meretricum contumeHas ratio euidens est quam seruus inducit; sed quicquid in hanc partem loquuntur, ita accipitur ac si insanum amatorem reuocet seruus. Eos tamen alibi commendat plurimum idem Cicero dicens: Poetas et uarios scriptores artium aut rerum gestanmi solus ille contemptibiles facit qui non ueretur contempni. Nam et uirtutis habent usum et philosophandi materiam praebent; notant enim, non docent uitia, et aut utilitatis causa grata sunt aut uoluptatis. Sic autem per morum discrimina transeunt ut uirtuti faciant locum. Nam per tela, per ignes, per maris uarias procellas, per tot motus seditiones et insidias populorum Scillam pertransiit et Caribdim ut ad patriam suam saltem in senectute Vlixes repedaret. Socios uariis exilii amisit casibus sed eos aut fortunae uiolentia aut naturae infirmitas aut animi uoluptas absumpsit. Horum tamen omnium iocunda relatio est.
Nam uel amici praeuisus casus, etsi amarus sit, proficit ad cautelam; et quo familiarior fuit cum labente societas, eo casus quemque magis absterret; siquidem exemplis saepe magis proficitur quam praeceptis. Mala enim uitantur facilius quo fidelius praecognita fuerint. Vix et quodammodo solus euasit Vlixes, sed ad philosophiae iocunditatem et quasi patrias uoluptates pauciores euadunt. Consonat ei, si liricum conticente lira dignaris audire, Flaccus (aut, si mauis, Oratius), qui plus honestatis et utilitatis se apud Meonidem inuenisse gratulatur quam plurium Stoicorum sit praeceptis expressum. Ait enim: a Troiani belli scriptorem, Maxime LoUi, dum tu declamas Romae, Praeneste relegi, qui quid sit pulcrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, pulcrius et melius Crisippo et Cantore dicit. Fabula, qua propter Paridis narratur amorem Grecia barbariae lento collisa duello, stultorum regum et populorum continet estus. Antenor belli censet praescidere causas. Quid Paris?
ut regnet saluus uiuatque beatus cogi posse negat. Seditione dolis scelere atque libidine et ira Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra. Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achiui. Ego autem in illorum sententiam facillime cedo qui non credunt sine lectione auctorum posse fieri hominem litteb ratum. Litterarum tamen copia nequaquam philosophum facit; gratia siquidem est quae ad sapientiam sola perducit. In summa siquidem copia litterarum aut ignorantia interdum aut negligentia ueritatis est, sine qua impossibile est quemquam fieri sapientem. Vnde et doctor ille Ecclesiae, cuius nemo satis memor esse potest, Augustinus Varronem arguit, quem tamen ut litteratissimum fuisse doceat, ait post cetera quibus singulari praeconio commendatur: Denique et ipse Tullius huic tale testimonium perhibet ut in libris Achademicis dicat eam quae ibi uersatur disputa-
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