Liber II, Pars II — Quod amor, qui debet esse inter Patrem et filium, sufficienter inducat patres debere filios regere, et filios debere patribus obedire. Cap. IIII.
Liber II, Pars II — Quod amor, qui debet esse inter Patrem et filium, sufficienter inducat patres debere filios regere, et filios debere patribus obedire. Cap. IIII.
It was said in the previous chapter that paternal authority takes its origin from love. Therefore, we need to see how great the love of fathers is for their children, and the love of children for their fathers, so that it may be clear to us how fathers should govern their children and how children should obey their fathers. It should be noted, then, according to the Philosopher. The Ethics proves, through three reasons, that parents love their children more than the reverse. The first reason is drawn from the duration of time. The second reason comes from the certainty of offspring. The third reason is based on the union of parents with their children. The first way is thus evident. For the longer love lasts, the more intense it becomes: the love of parents for their children is longer-lasting than that of children for their parents. For as soon as children are born, parents love them; however, children do not immediately begin to love their parents, because they are not yet capable of such understanding to discern what should be loved. Indeed, because children, once born, do not know how to distinguish their parents from others, they do not immediately develop love for them; but over time, when they can discern their parents from others, they begin to love them. The love of parents for their children is therefore longer-lasting than the reverse: hence it is stronger and more intense. The second way to investigate this same point is taken from the certainty of offspring. For parents are more certain about their offspring than the offspring are about their parents: for the offspring cannot be certain who their parents are, except through certain signs, such as when a child sees some people showing more affection toward them than others, they deduce that those are their parents, or by hearing, because they hear this from others, and thus they think it must be so. At the beginning of their birth, however, they do not have the understanding to know from which mother they come, or from which father. Parents, however, immediately have knowledge of their own offspring: therefore, they can be more certain about them than vice versa. For this reason, they love it more intensely. For if there is a natural love between parents and children, such love is stronger in proportion to the greater certainty parents have about their offspring. However, it can be shown that mothers love their children more than fathers do, because they are more certain about them. The third way to prove this is taken from the union of parents with their children. For children are more closely related and more united to their parents than vice versa; therefore, since love implies a certain union, children, being more united and closer to their parents, are loved more by them than the other way around. Thus, the philosopher imagines that children are like a part of their parents: for children are a part cut off from their parents. A part is more united to the whole because it is apprehended by it than the whole is united to the part, which cannot be comprehended by it. For in the whole, it is possible to assign something that is very different from a part; but there is nothing in a part that is very different from the whole, so if a part is moved to love the whole, it does not love it as fervently because it sees in the whole things that are very different from itself. But if the whole were moved by the love of the part, it would love it more intensely; because it would see nothing in the part that was not in the whole. Therefore, the son, who is a certain part descending from the parents, and because he is a part of them; there is nothing in the son that is not in some way related to the parents, and that does not pertain to them in some manner. However, the children are not so strongly moved to love their parents: because what belongs to the parents does not pertain to the children in the same way, and consequently is not so united to them; but what belongs to the children pertains to the parents. From these ways, philosophers (as it seems) can sufficiently argue that it pertains to parents to be concerned about the governance of their children, because everyone ought to be solicitous about what they love with great affection. It indeed pertains to children to obey their parents: because everyone ought to obey those whom they know love them deeply, and not to intend anything but their good. Thus, from the ways of the philosophers, we can prove what was said at the beginning of this chapter. Yet, to make the intention more evident, it should be noted that although parents are more affected regarding their children, and wish for the good of their children more than vice versa, it is not, however, inappropriate for children to love their parents more in relation to some good than vice versa. For as it is said. Parents love their children as if they are something of their own; children, however, love their parents because they come from them. Therefore, the love of parents for their children arises from a cause to an act of being, and from the higher to the lower; but the love of children for their parents proceeds from the effect to the cause, and from the lower to the higher. It is natural, however, that the higher influences the lower and preserves it; not the other way around. Therefore, parents are naturally inclined toward their children, so that they may influence them and gather good things for them, such as possessions and money, through which they can provide for their lives and be sustained in existence. Parents therefore gather for their children, not the other way around; rather, children, when they can, steal and take the goods of their parents. The lower, indeed, reveres and is subject to the higher, not the other way around. Therefore, children naturally honor and revere their parents more than the other way around. If it is asked whether parents love more than the other way around; since to love someone is the same as to wish them good, it must be distinguished regarding the good itself. If you're talking about something useful, like money or other things that contribute to a good life, then parents love their children more than the other way around; because they gather resources for them, not the other way around. But if you're talking about the good that is honor and respect, then children love their parents more than the other way around. For parents endure insults and contempt from their children more than the other way around. It is natural that they cannot even bear to hear the insults directed at them by their children. For parents are indignant about the insults from their children more than the other way around. As I live, such is the love between a father and a son, because parents are inclined toward their children to provide them with good things: and to gather good things for others, and to care for their lives, is to govern and guide them; from the love that fathers have for their children, they ought to govern and guide them. But when children are inclined toward their parents, as to those whom they wish to honor and respect: since to honor and respect another is in a way to submit to them; just as from the love that fathers have for their children they ought to govern and guide them, so from the affection that children have for their parents, they ought to obey them and be subject to them. Therefore, as far as the good that is useful is concerned, fathers love their children more than children love them. However, when it comes to the good that is honor and respect, children love their parents more than the other way around. Yet, parents are said to love their children more than the children love them, because parents are more concerned and think more often about their children's well-being than children do about their parents' honor and respect.
Read the original Latin
Dicebatur in praecedenti capitulo, paternale regimen sumere originem ex amore. Videndum est igitur quantus sit amor patrum ad filios, et filiorum ad patres, ut nobis innotescat, quomodo patres debeant regere filios, et filii patribus obedire. Sciendum ergo per Philosophum 8. Ethic, triplici ratione probare, parentes plus diligere filios quam econtra. Prima via sumitur ex diuturnitate temporis. Secunda, ex certitudine prolis. Tertia, ex unione parentum ad filios. Prima via sic patet.
Nam quanto amor magis durat, tanto vehementior efficitur: amor autem parentum ad filios diuturnior est, quam filiorum ad parentes. Nam statim cum filii nascuntur, parentes diligunt eos: non tamen filii statim incipiunt amare parentes, quia statim non sunt tantae cognitionis ut passint discernere quod sit diligendum. immo quia pueri mox nati nesciunt discernere parentes ab aliis, non statim per amorem efficiuntur ad illos; sed per processum temporis, quando possunt discernere parentes ab aliis, incipiunt eos diligere. Diuturnior est ergo amor parentum ad filios, quam econverso: quare fortior et vehementior. Secunda via ad investigandum hoc idem, sumitur ex certitudine prolis. Nam parentes magis sunt certi de sua prole quam proles de suis parentibus: proles enim certificari non potest qui fuerint parentes eius, nisi ex quibusdam signis, ut quia puer videt personas aliquas magis affici ad eum quam alias, arguit illas parentes eius, vel auditu, quia hoc audit ab aliis, ideo sic esse putat. In principio tamen nativitatis eius non est illius cognitionis ut possit cognoscere a qua matre procedit, vel a quo patre. Parentes tamen statim cognitionem habent de ipsa prole: ideo magis possunt certificari de ea, quam econverso.
Propter quod et vehementius diligunt ipsam, quameconverso. nam si inter parentes et filios est amor naturalis, tanto huiusmodi amor est validior, quanto apud parentes est maior certituido de prole. Ex hac autem ratione ostendi potest, quod et matres plus diligunt filios, quam patres: quia de illis certiores existunt. Tertia via probans hoc idem, sumitur ex unione parentum ad filios. Nam filii sunt magis propinqui et magis uniti parentibus, quam econverso, quare cum amor quandam unionem importet, filii tanquam magis uniti et magis propinqui parentibus, magis diliguntur ab ipsis, quam econverso. Sic enim imaginatur Philosophus, quod filii sunt quasi quaedam pars parentum: Nam filii est quaedam pars a parentibus abscisa. Pars autem magis uniatur toti, quia apprehenditur ab ipso; quam totum uniatur parti, quod ab ea comprehendi non potest. In toto enim est assignare aliquid, quiod multum distat a parte: sed nihil est in parte, quod multum distet a toto, quare si pars movetur ad amorem totius, non adeo ferventer diligere ipsum, quia videret in ipso toto aliqua quae multum distarent ab ipsa.
Sed si totum moveretur ad amorem partis, vehementius amaret eam; quia nihil aspiceret in parte, quod non esset in toto. Filius ergo, qui est quaedam gleba a parentibus descendens, et quia est quaedam pars ipsorum; nihil est in filio, quod non sit aliquo modo propinquum parentibus, et quod secundum aliquem modum non pertineat ad illos. Filii tamen non sic vehementer moventur ad dilectionem parentum: quia quod est parentum, non sic pertinet ad filios, et per consequens non est sic unitum eis: sed quod est filiorum, pertinet ad parentes. Ex his autem viis Philosophi (ut videtur) sufficienter arguere possumus, quod ad parentes spectat solicitari circa regimem filiorum, quia quilibet solicitus esse debet circa ea quae vehementi amore diligit. Ad filios vero pertinet obedire parentibus: quia quilibet illis obedire debet, quos scit eum vehmenter diligere, et non intendere nisi ipsius bonum. Sic ergo ex viis Philosophi probare possumus, quae in principio capituli dicebantur. Tamen ut magis specialiter appareat intentum, sciendum quod licet parentes magis afficiantur circa filios, et magis intende velint bonum filiorum quam econverso: non est tamen inconveniens quantum ad aliquo bonum filios magis diligere quam econverso. Nam ut dicitur 8.
Ethicorum parentes diligunt filios ut existentes aliquid ipsorum: filii autem diligunt parentes, quia sunt ab illis. Amor ergo parentum circa filios procedit a causa ad esse actum, et a superiori ad inferius: sed amor filiorum ad eos procedit ab effectu ad causam, et ab inferiori ad superius. Naturale est autem quod superiora influant in inferiora, et conservent ea: non autem econverso. Ideo parentes naturalite afficiuntur ad filios, ut influant in eos, et ut congregent eis bona, ut possesiones et numismata, per quae sufficiant sibi ad vitam, et conserventur in esse. Parentes ergo congregant pro filiis, non autem econverso, immo filii, cum possunt, furantur, et rapint bona parentum. Inferiora vero reverentur, et sunt subiecta superioribus, non econverso. Ideo filii naturaliter magis honorant, et reverentur parentes, quam econverso. Si ergo quaeratur, utrum parentes magis diligant quam econverso; cum diligere aliquem, idem sit quod velle ei bonum, distinguendum est de ipso bono.
Nam si loqueris de bono utili, ut de numismate et de aliis quae ordinantur ad sufficientiam vitae: sic parentes magis diligunt filios, quam econverso; quia congregant pro eis, non ipsi pro illis. Sed si loqueris de bono, quod est honor et reverentia: sic filii magis diligunt parentes, quam econverso. Nam potius parentes sustinent vituperia et contumelias filiorum, quam econverso. Naturale est enim quod etiam usque ad auditum contumelias parentum sustinere non possint. Nam sic indignantur parentes de contumelia filiorum, quam econverso. Vivo, qualis est amor inter patrem et filium, quia parentes afficiuntur ad filios ut congregant eis bona: et congregare aliis bona, et solicitari circa eorum vitam, sit eos regere et gubernare, ex amore quem habent patres ad filios debent eos regere et gubernare. Sed cum filiis afficiantur ad parentes, tanquam ad eos, quos volunt esse in honore et reverentia: cum honorari et revereri alium sit quodammodo subiici illi; sicut ex amore quem habent patres ad filios debent eos regere et gubernare, sic ex dilectione quam filii habent ad patres, debent eis obedire et esse subiecti. Pater igitur quod quantum ad bonum quod est utile, patres magis diligunt filios, quam filii ipsos.
Sed quantum ad bonum, quod est honor et reverentia, filii plus diligunt patres, quam econverso. Simpliciter tamen parentes plus dicuntur diligere filios, quam filii ipsos: quia plus solicitantur, et magis assidue cogitant de utilitate filiorum, quam filii de honore et reverentia ipsorum.
De Regimine Principum (On the Rule of Princes) companion
A prince read his portion daily. So can you.
Chosen Portion delivers a short daily reading from historic works like this one, free on iOS.
Princes were formed by scheduled daily instruction from this manual; Chosen Portion schedules the same kind of daily formation reading for you.
- One daily reading in under 3 minutes, in modern readable English
- Selections from De Regimine Principum and 77 other royal devotional works
- Finish the 10-day course, then keep a daily formation habit without planning it yourself