Liber II, Pars II — Quod regimen paternale sumit originem ex amore; et quod non eodem regimine regendi sunt filii, quo regendi sunt servi. Cap. III.

Liber II, Pars II — Quod regimen paternale sumit originem ex amore; et quod non eodem regimine regendi sunt filii, quo regendi sunt servi. Cap. III.

Since we have discussed the governance of marriage, we must now address paternal governance: we need to see where paternal authority originates and how it should govern children. Therefore, it must be understood that there are three types of governance. For every ruler governs others, either according to certain laws or according to specific agreements. And such governance (as was mentioned earlier) is called political or civil. Or it governs them according to discretion. This can happen in two ways: either the ruler intends their own good, and thus it is called despotic or dominative governance; or they intend the good of their subjects, and such governance is called regal. These three forms of governance, as we see some ruling in cities and camps, are analogous to the three types of governance found within a single household. For the governance of marriage is likened to political governance: because a husband (as was mentioned earlier) should not simply rule over his wife at his discretion, but should govern her according to the requirements of marital law, and preferably through legitimate and honorable agreements that exist between husband and wife. The paternal rule, however, is similar to the royal rule. For a father governs his children by his own discretion, not according to agreements and contracts. For agreements and contracts do not intervene between a subordinate and a superior, unless the subordinate has the power to choose a leader for himself; however, it is not in the power of children to choose a father if they proceed from their parents by natural origin. For children do not choose their fathers in the same way that wives choose their husbands. Therefore, since the rule of children is by discretion and for the good of the children themselves, such a rule is not similar to the political rule, but to the royal one. Hence, the Philosopher says. The Politician states that a man should govern a woman and children as if they were his own. Therefore, while the governance of children is by discretion and for their own good, such governance is not similar to the political rule, but rather to the royal one. The third kind of rule, which exists in the household or the rule by which the family and others are governed, is similar to a dominative rule. Therefore, since these things have been shown, it is clear that what was proposed at the beginning of the chapter is true. For if a father ought to rule his children in a regal manner and for their good, since to love someone is the same as wanting good for them, a father must rule his children for their advancement and because he desires their good. It is therefore evident that such a rule takes its origin from love. From this, it is clearly shown that children should not be governed in the same way as servants are governed. For a master rules over servants for his own benefit, not for the good of the servants. This is indeed according to the philosopher, who states that some rule dominatively, not intending the good of those under them, but their own; however, a father ought to rule his children for the good of his children. From this very distinction of rules, it is clear that paternal rule is not the same as dominative rule, but takes its origin from love; thus, it becomes more evident what is said, that we can pursue, through two ways, that paternal rule draws its origin from love. The first way is derived from the natural order. The second comes from the very perfection of the father. The first way is thus clear. For according to the Philosopher, nature has given a generative force to things so that those which cannot perpetuate themselves may be perpetuated in their like. Therefore, if paternal rule takes its origin from this, because the son is naturally a certain likeness proceeding from the father, and since according to nature there is a love for such likenesses, we can argue from the very natural order that paternal rule is founded in love and arises from love. Just as there is a natural impulse in humans to produce something similar to themselves and to procreate children, so there is a natural impulse in them to love those children, and consequently to govern and rule them, and to have concern for them. Therefore, there is a natural order here, that the kingdom and paternal concern should take their origin from love. The second way to investigate this same matter is derived from the very perfection of the father. For everything perfect is, according to the Philosopher, when it can generate something similar to itself. Therefore, since everyone loves their own perfection, the father naturally loves the son, since the son is properly a witness to his perfection. Since, therefore, the father has a natural love for the son, he is moved by this love to govern and guide him; which would not be the case if paternal governance did not arise from love. It is clear that since paternal governance arises from love, it follows that a father must care for his children for their own good. Therefore, children should not be governed in the same way as servants, because who presides over servants does so for their own benefit. If, therefore, it happens that someone treats children as if they were servants, this is due to the imperfection of the household. So that, because perhaps he is so poor that he cannot have the resources of servants. Hence, the Philosopher says. He says. He says that the poor must use women and children as if they were servants.