Liber II, Pars I — Quod in domo perfecta oportet ese tres communitates, quatuor genera personarum, tria regimina: et quod oportet hunc secundum librum dividere in tres partes. Cap. VI.

Liber II, Pars I — Quod in domo perfecta oportet ese tres communitates, quatuor genera personarum, tria regimina: et quod oportet hunc secundum librum dividere in tres partes. Cap. VI.

It was said in the previous chapter that there are two communities, namely, that of husband and wife, and that of master and servant, which make up the first household. But if the household is to be perfect, a third community must also be included, namely, that of father and son. For we always see that a multitude arises from unity, which is why the order of nature that we observe in a household is in some way reserved in a single person. Thus, we see in a single human being that being generated and being saved are part of the nature of the first man; but producing a likeness to oneself is part of the nature of a perfected man. For when a man is first born, nature is immediately concerned for his well-being; however, he cannot produce a likeness to himself unless he is already perfected. Therefore, since the community of father and son originates from the fact that parents produce a likeness to themselves, this community is not said to be part of the nature of the first household, but rather of the perfect household. Thus, salvation is compared to the generated being: for as soon as something is generated, nature is concerned about its well-being. If, therefore, the household is to be understood in terms of natural things, and we want to reduce what we see in the household to natural causes, we will say that there are two communities, namely, that of husband and wife, and that of master and servant, which are part of the nature of the first household, because without them the household cannot properly exist; but we will not say that the third community, which is that of father and son, is part of the nature of the household in any way taken, but it will be of its nature, as it has to be perfect. Just as we see in a single person, so we must also consider the whole household. For a multitude always proceeds from unity, which is why we see in the natural order that what we observe in a domestic multitude is, in a certain way, reserved in a single person. Thus we see in one singular human being that to be generated and to be saved are essential to the nature of the first man; but to produce a likeness of oneself is characteristic of a man who is already perfect. Since the first man must be generated, nature is immediately concerned for his salvation. However, he cannot produce a likeness of himself unless he is already perfect. Therefore, since the community of the father to the son takes its origin from the fact that parents have produced a likeness of themselves, such a community is not said to be of the nature of the first household, but rather of the perfect household. Hence, also in Phil. I. He said, 'Of the community of husband and wife, and of master and servant, the first community is to be formed.' Later, in the following chapter of the aforementioned book, it is stated that a third community is required for a perfect household, namely that of father and son. We can pursue the idea that this third community is necessary for the perfection of the household in three ways. First, we see that the ability to bear fruit and act is more perfect than that which cannot. Again, that which is perpetual is more perfect than that which is not. Thus, the more fortunate are more perfect than the unfortunate. Therefore, we can prove that the third community, which is that of father and son, is required for the perfection of the household, first from the perspective of natural generation and fruitfulness. Secondly, from the perspective of perpetuity. And third, from happiness itself. The first way is clear. For according to the philosopher. Then each thing is perfect when it can produce something similar to itself. For something is considered perfect not if it must produce something similar, but if it can produce something similar: perfection must be considered from the nature and form of a thing, by which something exists in actuality and can act. Therefore, if it is powerless to act, it follows that it lacks some form or perfection that is the principle of action. Something is said to be powerless to act when, with its own passive nature present, it does not produce something similar to itself. For since the active principle of generation is male, and the receptive principle is female: if there is a union of male and female in any house; and yet there is no procreation of offspring, either the male is an imperfect active principle, or the female is an imperfect receptive principle. The sterility of children in political life is either due to the imperfection of the male, the female, or both. But when a man and a woman, husband and wife, form the first part of a household and the first community required in domestic life, the house is said to be imperfect due to the imperfection of its parts, especially the principal ones, where there is no procreation of children. The second way to investigate this same matter is taken from the aspect of natural perpetuity. For since humans cannot perpetuate themselves in life, human life is perpetuated in a certain way through the succession of children: a house where there is a lack of offspring quickly becomes desolate according to the natural order. Indeed, the continuous habitation of a house is natural, as if the house is to be continuously inhabited through the creation of children. In another way, it is somewhat casual, as if a new family inhabits that house after the previous inhabitants have died or departed. Therefore, a natural domestic habitation cannot perpetuate itself naturally unless through generation, which is the work of nature, and unless there is an increase of children present. But if the eternal is more perfect than the non-eternal, then a house is imperfect where children are lacking, through whom domestic habitation naturally continues. Thirdly, it can be declared from the aspect of happiness. For children, civil power, and other such things, while they are not essential to happiness, nonetheless contribute to a certain clarity of political happiness. Hence, the Philosopher states in Book I. Ethics. It is said that some, stripped of certain things, taint happiness. For in a base, ignoble, solitary state, and without children, one cannot be truly happy. For it is said that such a person is not truly happy, because they do not possess political happiness in all its clarity. Therefore, it is clear that for a house to be perfect, there must be three communities present. There is one community of husband and wife, another of master and servant, and a third of father and son. From this, it can be understood that there must be three forms of governance in a perfect household. For it is never possible to establish a well-ordered community unless there is something directing it and something that is directed, or unless there is something leading and something following. Therefore, in the community of husband and wife, the husband should lead, and the wife should follow; in the community of father and son, the father should govern, and the son should obey; in the community of master and servant, the master should command, and the servant should serve and obey, in a perfect household (as the Philosopher states in Book I). In the realm of politics, there are three forms of governance: one is marital, where the husband leads the wife; another is paternal, where the father leads the son; and the third is dominative and despotic, where the master leads the servants. It is evident that in a perfect household there should be three communities and three forms of governance; it can also be understood that there must be four types of persons present. However, it might seem to some that there should be six types of persons present, such that the first person is a man, the second is a wife, the third is a father, the fourth is a son, the fifth is a master, and the sixth is a servant. But the man, the father, and the master name only one person. For the same person who is the husband of a wife is also the father of children and the lord of servants. It is clear, then, how many communities there are in a perfect household, how many forms of governance, and how many types of persons. From this, it can be understood how many parts this second book should have, which deals with the governance of the household. For since there are three forms of governance in a perfect household, this book must have three parts. In the first part, the governance of marriage will be discussed; in the second, paternal governance; and in the third, dominative governance. Moreover, it is especially fitting for kings and princes to know these three forms of governance well; for by diligently examining them, they will have great assistance in knowing how to govern a kingdom and a city well.