Liber II, Pars I — Quod homo est naturaliter animal coniugale. et quod nolentes nubere, non vivunt ut homines, sed vel vivunt ut bestia, vel vivunt ut dii. Cap. VII.

Liber II, Pars I — Quod homo est naturaliter animal coniugale. et quod nolentes nubere, non vivunt ut homines, sed vel vivunt ut bestia, vel vivunt ut dii. Cap. VII.

It was said in the previous chapter that there are three things to be determined in this second book, which deals with the governance of the household, according to the three types of governance that can exist within the household. These are: the governance of marriage, paternal governance, and dominative governance. Among these forms of governance, we will first address the governance of marriage, because according to the Philosopher, it is the most fundamental. It is indeed a political matter. In a domestic community, the first step is to bring together a man and a woman. This order is indeed reasonable. For first, something is generated; second, it is preserved in existence; third, it is perfected and can produce something similar. Therefore, the community of man and woman, which exists for the purpose of generation, is the first part of the household, and it precedes the community of lord and servant, which exists for the sake of salvation and preservation; it also precedes the community of father and son, which does not pertain to the first household, or to any household taken in any way, but to a household that is perfect. First, we need to discuss the governance of marriage, which concerns the community of husband and wife, before addressing the governance of the master and servant. In determining the governance of marriage, we will follow this order: first, we will discuss what marriage itself is, and what kind of wives, citizens, and especially kings and princes should take. Next, we will show how men should govern their wives and to what virtues and works they should direct them. In showing what marriage is, it first needs to be declared that marriage is something according to nature, and that man is naturally a marital being. Therefore, it should be noted that the Philosopher states in Book 8. Ethics. Willing to show what kind of friendship exists between a man and his wife, he proves that this friendship is according to nature, presenting a threefold reason that man is naturally a marital being. The first reason is taken from the nature of human society. Secondly, from the perspective of procreation. Thirdly, from the perspective of actions. It has been established in the first chapter of this second book that man is naturally a social and communicative animal. However, in human life (as mentioned above), community is divided into four types: there is the community of the household, of the village, of the city, and of the kingdom. All these communities presuppose the domestic community. Since the household is prior to the village, city, and kingdom, man is naturally more a domestic animal than a civil one, and the community of the household seems to be more natural to man than the community of the village, city, and kingdom. For if we consider the purposes for which the domestic community is organized, there seems to be no doubt that the community of the household is more natural to man than that of the village, city, and kingdom. For the household is organized for nourishment, which is most necessary for the individual, and which is most beneficial for one's own good; it is also organized for procreation, which is most beneficial for the conservation of the species and for the common good. However, a village, city, and kingdom are not so directly ordered toward nourishment for the good of the individual person, or toward generation for the preservation of the species, as is the community of the household. For if the aforementioned communities are ordered toward nourishment and generation, this is because the goodness of the household arises from their goodness: for the household itself is better than a good village, city, or kingdom. Therefore, if a person is more naturally a domestic animal than a political one, since the primary community of the household is the union of husband and wife, it follows that, in terms of human community, a person is more of a marital animal than a political one; and that a person is more communicative in the marital community than in the community of a village, city, or kingdom, because the household, whose primary governance is marital, precedes the village, kingdom, and city. This reasoning is addressed by the Philosopher. Ethics. For it is said: A person is more naturally a marital animal than a political one, as much as the household is prior and more necessary than the city. Secondly, a person is naturally a marital animal in terms of procreation. For that which seems most natural is what a person has a natural impulse toward: therefore, since a person and all animals naturally incline to produce something similar to themselves, and this is rightly done among humans through marriage, a person is naturally a marital animal. This reasoning is addressed by the Philosopher. In the Politics, and also in the Ethics. In the Ethics, he proves that marriage is natural for humans and all animals, as it is natural for them to have an instinct to produce offspring similar to themselves. The third reason is taken from the actions of individuals: because (as it is said). In the Ethics, it is immediately evident that the works of a man and a wife are divided. For the works of a man are seen to be in action, which are to be done outside the home; while the works of a wife are in preserving the household items or in doing something within the home. Therefore, those who contribute their own to the common good, when a wife organizes for the benefit of her husband or the entire household, and when a husband organizes for the good of the household and his wife, are sufficient for their life, as it is said. In the Ethics. For this reason, ordering one's own affairs for the common good leads to a certain sufficiency in life. Therefore, if it is natural for a person to have an impulse toward a sufficient life, it is also natural for them to desire to be a marital being. But if marriage is something natural, it follows that fornication, which contradicts marriage, should universally be avoided by citizens as something contrary to natural law; indeed, it is especially fitting for kings and leaders to flee fornication and any illicit use of sexuality, as they ought to be better and more virtuous. Having seen this, a certain doubt seems to arise from what has been said. For if marriage is natural for a person, then anyone who does not strive to enter into marriage is blameworthy. But this doubt, if the previously mentioned points are considered, is easily refuted. For if it is natural for a person to be a marital being, anyone who refuses to take a spouse does not live as a human. However, not living as a human can happen in two ways. Or he doesn't live like a human, because he chooses a life above that of a human, and he wants to remain free for contemplation of truth and divine works. Or he doesn't live like a human, because he chooses a life below that of a human, and he lives like a beast. Therefore, as we were saying about political society, namely that one who chooses solitude and does not want to live civilly is either a beast or a god. Thus we can also speak about marriage. For he who does not want to live in marriage. Or this means that he wants to fornicate more freely. For he chooses for himself a life below that of a human, and is like a beast; or this means that he wants to dedicate himself to the contemplation of truth and divine works: therefore he chooses for himself a life above that of a human, and is like God. Therefore, those who do not marry, if they dedicate themselves to better goods than the goods of marriage, although they do not live like humans, do not act badly for this reason: because they are like gods, and they are better than humans.