Liber II, Pars I — Quod communitas domus est aliquo modo communitas prima, et quod est naturalis, et quod reges et principes, et univeraliter omnes cives hoc ignorare non debent. Cap. III.

Liber II, Pars I — Quod communitas domus est aliquo modo communitas prima, et quod est naturalis, et quod reges et principes, et univeraliter omnes cives hoc ignorare non debent. Cap. III.

Let's not get confused when we talk about a house; it's important to know that a house can be named as a building made of walls, a roof, and a foundation, or it can refer to the family contained within it. Just as a city sometimes refers to its walls and the area it encompasses, it can also refer to the people living within it. We sometimes say that a city has done something, not because the walls or buildings have acted, but because the inhabitants of the city have done it. In this way, some have come to say that their houses are built, not because the stones have acted, but because their ancestors have done so; thus, just as the communication of citizens names a city, so the society and communication of the people living in one house can also be called a house. Therefore, the house that is primarily intended in moral matters is not the building itself, but the communication of the household members. For it pertains to the moral philosopher to determine about the buildings of houses, because it is fitting for people to have decent inhabitants according to their possible means; however, it does not primarily concern him to determine about the house as if naming the constructed building, but he should determine about the house, which is a building, as it relates to the house that is the community of persons. Just as it pertains to the political philosopher to determine about the order of houses, the construction of neighborhoods, and the fabric of the city, so that they are arranged towards community and the governance of citizens. Therefore, we intend to show about the house, which is the community of household members, how it is the primary community. It should be noted, therefore, that the first principle can be distinguished in many ways. For it is first in action, first in intention, first in the way of generation and time, and first in the way of perfection and completion. We see that those things which are directed toward an end precede the end in action and execution, but the end precedes them according to the intention of the agent. For the agent first and primarily intends the end. However, it cannot have an end unless through those things that are directed toward the end; the manner of execution and action is contrary to intention and will. For we intend and desire those things that are directed toward the end, intending and wanting the end, so that the end is first desired and intended; but in acting and executing, it is the opposite. For through action the end is achieved, by doing those things that are directed toward the end, so that those things which are directed toward the end, although they are more important in will and intention, are nevertheless prior in execution and action; for if the end were something first done, when the attainment of the end ceases, the operation would never be carried out regarding those things that are directed toward the end. One way, therefore, to distinguish priority is that something is first in will and intention, while something else is first in execution and action. Another way to distinguish priorities can be: some priorities exist in the realm of generation and time, while others exist in the realm of perfection and completion. For example, a child is prior to a man in terms of generation and time, since a child is generated and becomes a man before he becomes a man; however, a man is prior to a child in terms of perfection and completion, because the use of reason and other things required for human perfection are reserved more fully and perfectly in a man than in a child. Thus, distinguishing these priorities: it is clear how the community of the household relates to the community of the city and to other communities. In execution and action, the household precedes the village, the city, and the kingdom; but in will and intention, those communities precede the household community. Again, in the realm of generation and time, the household community precedes other communities; but in the realm of perfection and completion, other communities precede it. It seems that the household community relates to other communities in two ways. First, because this kind of community is imperfect in relation to others; indeed, all other communities are perfections of it. For when every other community includes the household community and adds something above it, all other communities are more perfect than it. Therefore, the household community relates to other communities as the imperfect relates to the perfect, and as a part relates to the whole. Again, this kind of community relates to others as something that is directed toward an end relates to that very end. For the household is ordered toward the village, the village toward the city, and the city toward the kingdom. Indeed, the household exists for the village, the village for the city, and the city for the kingdom. Thus, the community of the village is the end of the household community, the community of the city is the end of the community of the village; but the community of the kingdom is the end of all the aforementioned. Therefore, since the imperfect precedes the perfect in the way of generation and imperfection, while the perfect precedes the imperfect in the way of perfection and complement: it is rightly said that the household community is prior to others in time and generation; however, it is posterior to them in perfection and complement. Hence, the Philosopher states. Comparing the city to the village and the household, the Philosopher says that the primary community is the community of the city. It should not be understood that the priority is about generation or time, since he himself states that the city arises from the multiplication of the village, just as the village arises from the multiplication of houses; rather, this should be understood in terms of the priority of perfection and completion. Furthermore, the community of the household relates to other communities not only as the imperfect relates to the perfect, but also as that which is directed toward an end relates to the end itself: the household, in relation to other communities, is not only prior in time and posterior in perfection, as the imperfect relates to the perfect, but it is also prior in action and posterior in intention; for that which is directed toward an end relates in this way to the end itself. It can be seen how the community of the household is in some way prior to other communities; it can be seen in a minor way how this kind of community is natural. For nature does not presuppose art, but art presupposes nature: whatever is presupposed by natural art will not properly be something artificial, but it must be natural according to the way it is. Therefore, if a person is naturally a communicative and social animal, since every community presupposes the community of the household, it is necessary for the domestic community or household to be something natural. Thus, it is fitting for kings and princes to know how to govern their households and manage their families, not only inasmuch as they ought to be social and political men, for knowing how to govern the household pertains to all citizens; but it especially pertains to kings and princes, because just as a kingdom or city presupposes the existence of a household, so the governance of a kingdom and city presupposes knowledge of household management and personal affairs: for no one can become a proper ruler of a kingdom or city unless he knows how to govern himself and his family properly. Therefore, if it particularly pertains to kings and princes to govern the kingdom and cities, it especially pertains to them to know how to manage their own households, and to understand what kind of community the household is in relation to the kingdom and city, as is declared in the present chapter: for through this, they have a great means to investigate the governance of the city and kingdom. However, it should be noted carefully that although it pertains in a certain special and excellent way to kings and princes to intend the good of the kingdom and principality, yet this kind of good pertains to every citizen and to every inhabitant of the city; because the good of the kingdom is the good of all citizens and of all who exist in the kingdom. Therefore, everyone should strive to be worthy of governing and leading, since it also concerns all citizens to seek the good of the kingdom: each citizen should know how to manage their own household, not only because such governance is a personal good, but also as it is ordered toward the common good, which includes the good of the kingdom and the city.