Liber I, Pars I — Quod maxime expedit regiae maiestati suum finem et suam felicitatem agnoscere. Cap. V.

Liber I, Pars I — Quod maxime expedit regiae maiestati suum finem et suam felicitatem agnoscere. Cap. V.

However, it should be noted carefully that just as matter achieves its perfection and form through proper transformations, so a person attains his own perfection and happiness through right and proper actions. Since it never happens that one acts rightly, as the attainment of the end requires, while being unaware of that very end, it is expedient for one who wishes to achieve his end, or his happiness, to have foreknowledge of that end. We can indeed say that, as it pertains to the present, we can pursue our end in two ways, which is expedient for the king to know. The first is, inasmuch as he cooperates through his works, so that the end may be attainable. The second, indeed, is inasmuch as he is a guide for others. The first way is clear. For this reason, in order for someone to attain an end through his actions, three things are required. First, that he acts well. Second, we must act out of choice. Third, we should act delightfully. For if one does not act well but poorly, they will not achieve their goal, but rather the opposite of their goal: for the goal, as it is said, is 2. Physic. It does not only say what the ultimate goal is, but also what the best goal is. Because of 2. Meta. The philosopher suggests that the goal and the good are the same: and whoever removes the goal removes all good. Therefore, if those who act badly deserve to receive evil, because evil is opposed to good, it follows that those who act badly (insofar as they are such) are not worthy of achieving their goal, but rather the opposite of their goal. Moreover, not only do those who act badly not achieve their goal, but those who are capable of acting well, if they do not act well, are not entitled to a crown, nor are they entitled to a goal or happiness. From this, the Philosopher states in his work. Ethics. It is said that in the Olympic Games, that is, in those contests and struggles, the strongest do not receive crowns, but those who are struggling: for those who are the strongest, capable of struggling, yet if they do not actually struggle, they are not entitled to a crown. Therefore, it is necessary to act well in practice, so that through our works we may deserve to achieve our goal or happiness. Secondly, it is required that we act out of choice. For those who act well by chance or accidentally are not to be praised, nor are they entitled to a goal or happiness: for what is not done out of choice is not voluntary. However, it is clear from involuntary actions (as is evident from the Philosopher). Ethics.) We are neither praised nor blamed for these actions, as stated in the same text. It is said that no one is blessed unless they act willingly. But those actions we do not perform willingly, we do not choose: therefore, by their nature, from such works we do not attain happiness or fulfillment. Rather, since we attain happiness through virtuous actions (because virtue is a habit of choice that consists in moderation, as it is said in Ethics), Ethics.) It is necessary for our actions, through which we attain our end, to proceed from choice. Third, we must act delightfully. For the more someone delights in a particular action, the more willingly and habitually they perform that action. Hence, the Philosopher says. Ethics. It is not enough to do good; we must do it well; nor is it sufficient to act justly; we must act rightly. For it happens that some wicked people do some good deeds, yet because they do not perform them well and delightfully, they cannot achieve their end or happiness through such actions. Therefore, when these three conditions are met—acting well, choosing freely, and doing so delightfully—we are most likely to achieve our end, especially when we know the end. Thus, it is essential to know the end in order to achieve it. We ought to imagine that just as in efficient causes, secondary agents move in the power of the primary agent, so secondary ends move in the power of the ultimate end. Therefore, if there were no primary agent, no agent would act; similarly, if there were no ultimate end, and if we did not apprehend something, like the ultimate good that would move the will, no other good could move the will; for whatever the will desires, it desires in relation to something that it ultimately wants. Therefore, without having apprehended something under the reason of an end, it does not happen that we act well, because once this is posited, all human action ceases. In order for us to act, we must establish some end; but in order for us to act well, we must establish a good and due end, because from the end our works take their form; for it could not be that there would be a good work if it were directed toward an evil end; therefore, foreknowledge of the end is required for us to act well. Secondly, such foreknowledge is required so that we may act from choice. For just as archers who do not see the target, if they hit it, do so by chance and fortune, so those who do not foresee the end, if they act well and attain the end, do so not by choice, but by fortune. Hence, the Philosopher I. Ethics. He wishes to show that the knowledge of the end is necessary, stating that the understanding of the end greatly contributes to our life: for we will achieve the end more effectively from this; just as archers, having a target, will more surely hit what they need. Thirdly, the knowledge of the end not only enables us to act well and by choice, but also with delight. For heavy things become delightful and sweet when considered in light of happiness and joy, which we derive from them. Therefore, for any person to act well, by choice, and with delight, it is essential to recognize their happiness; but this is especially important for royal majesty, because in their actions they must focus on the common good of the people, which is more expedient and divine than any individual good. It is clear, then, that it is especially fitting for royal majesty to know its happiness, so that it may carry out common works, which are in a way divine, well, delightfully, and by choice. Secondly, this is evident from the fact that a king is a guide for others. For if an arrow does not perceive the target, it is not prevented from hitting the target, because it is directed toward the target by the archer. Thus, it is more expedient for the archer to perceive the target than for the arrow, since it is the archer who directs the arrow: similarly, it is more expedient for royal majesty to know happiness and the end than for the people, since it is the guiding force for the people.