Liber I, Pars I — Quod non deceat regiam maiestatem, suam felicitatem ponere in voluptatibus. Cap. VI.

Liber I, Pars I — Quod non deceat regiam maiestatem, suam felicitatem ponere in voluptatibus. Cap. VI.

The common people generally don't perceive anything except for sensible pleasures; and that's why we commonly refer to only the most sensible pleasures, such as those of touch and taste, as pleasures and delights. However, when speaking simply, intelligible and spiritual delights are undoubtedly superior and more excellent than sensible pleasures. In such sensible pleasures, happiness should not be placed. We can pursue happiness in three ways. As far as the present is concerned, happiness seems to involve three things. For happiness signifies a perfect good that is sufficient in itself. For we say that someone is happy when they have attained that in which their perfect good consists. Therefore, the Philosopher says in Book I. Describing happiness in the Ethics, he says, 'Happiness is the end of actions, and it is a perfect good that is sufficient in itself.' From this, it follows first that happiness is something according to reason, as reason dictates. For since the goods according to reason and understanding are good absolutely and perfectly, while the goods according to sense are good in a limited way, if happiness is said to be the perfect good, it must be a good according to understanding and reason; or (which is the same) it must be such a good as right reason would judge to pursue. From these, it follows third that happiness consists in the goods of the soul, not in the goods of the body. For since the body is ordered to the soul, as matter to form, and as the imperfect to its perfection, the goods of the body are imperfect in relation to the goods of the soul; therefore, such goods are not judged by reason to be pursued in the same way as the goods of the soul. Therefore, happiness, as it speaks of the perfect good, speaks of the good according to the soul and according to reason. For in the operation of the soul according to reason, consists the perfect good of human beings, as it has to be declared in the Ethics. Ethics. Since, therefore, the pleasures and sensible delights are not the perfect good, nor the good according to the soul and according to reason, it is clear that happiness should not be placed in such things. However, it's clear that such pleasures are neither the perfect good nor sufficient. For what is truly good satisfies desire; however, such pleasures cannot satisfy desire, as anyone can experience for themselves. Whence the Philosopher says. In the Ethics. Speaking about such delights, he says that the delightful appetite is insatiable. Secondly, happiness should not be placed in such things, because they are not good according to reason, but rather good according to sense; for the greater the goods according to reason, the more they render reason free and unimpeded. For what exists according to reason, it is unfitting for it to hinder reason; but if such sensible delights are intense, they cloud reason, according to that saying. In the Ethics, if such great and intense delights exist, they strike at cognition, that is, at reason. Thirdly, happiness should not be placed in sensible pleasures, because such things are more the goods of the body than of the soul. For the body is directed toward the soul, and not the other way around: if happiness is the final good to which all other goods are directed, then such a good should not be placed in sensible pleasures, which are goods of the body, but rather in the works of virtues, which are goods of the soul. We can indeed say that while there are some lawful and honorable delights, because the very works of virtues bring great delight to a good and virtuous man, no delight is essentially happiness itself, although it can be something that follows happiness; but to declare this is not the matter at hand. Perhaps something about this will be said below. For now, it suffices to know that it is not fitting for any man to place his happiness in sensible delights. Therefore, it is detestable for any man to place his happiness in pleasures. But especially this is detestable to royal majesty, which we can pursue in threefold ways. First, such things are detestable to a king, because they weigh him down the most. Secondly, because it makes him contemptible. Thirdly, because it makes him unworthy to lead. As was said above, those who live a life of pleasure are akin to beasts, and those who desire to live like this choose a life of animals: therefore, the higher one stands in rank, the more he is brought low by such a life. For it is said that a prince ought to be above humanity and wholly divine. For it is said that a prince should be above man and entirely divine. The rule of princes must respond to their greatness and dignity, so that the greater a prince is, the more he should excel others in the dignity of life and the greatness of goodness. In such a high position, it is unworthy for him to choose a life of animals, because through it he is greatly brought low. Secondly, this is detestable for a king, because it makes him contemptible to himself. Whence the Philosopher says. The Politics states that it is especially fitting for princes to be moderate in their bodily pleasures. For he hints there that those who give themselves to such pleasures are like those who are sleeping and drunk; for those devoted to such pleasures lose the use of reason, just as the sleeping and the drunk cannot use reason. Since, therefore, according to the same Philosopher, it is not easily contemptible to be sober, but to be drunk, nor to be watchful, but to be sleeping, it befits royal majesty to flee such immoderate delights, lest it seem contemptible. Thirdly, it befits a prince to detest such things, lest he become unworthy to rule, for no one chooses young men as leaders because it is not established that they are prudent; for it is unworthy for a boy to rule. But (as it is said in Book I. Ethics.) However, nothing differs for a young man according to age or according to manner. Following such sensible pleasures, given that one is an old man in years but a boy in character, he is unworthy to rule. Therefore, it should be noted carefully that just as it doesn't matter to be a boy in age and character, so it doesn't matter to be an old man in character and age; for if an old man in years and a boy in character rules unworthily, then if a boy in age and an old man in character rules, he is worthy to govern. For the philosopher says that no one chooses young men as leaders because it is established that they are not prudent, but because it is established that they are prudent; therefore, if it is established that they have the character of old men and flourish in wisdom, they are worthy to rule. Let it therefore be the conclusion of the chapter that, lest the prince be debased, and lest he be despised, and lest he be unworthy to rule, he ought to despise immoderate pleasures.