Liber I, Pars III — Quae praedictarum passionum sunt laudabiles, et quae vituperabiles, et quomodo reges, et principes ad illas debeant se habere. Cap. XI.

Liber I, Pars III — Quae praedictarum passionum sunt laudabiles, et quae vituperabiles, et quomodo reges, et principes ad illas debeant se habere. Cap. XI.

Some of the passions mentioned seem to be praiseworthy: like mercy and modesty. For modesty, according to the Philosopher, although it is not a virtue, is still a praiseworthy passion. Likewise, grace and nemesis seem to be praiseworthy passions. However, some passions are blameworthy. For example, envy and hatred are blameworthy unless they are rooted in a concern for virtue. Other passions seem to have both praiseworthy and blameworthy aspects, as they can be seen as either commendable or condemnable. Therefore, those passions that seem to be praiseworthy carry the importance of moderation. For modesty is the mean between foolishness and shamelessness. For whoever is ashamed of everything is led to foolishness. But whoever is not ashamed of anything is called shameless. None of these, however, is commendable. But the one who behaves in a moderate way, as one who is ashamed as he ought to be and one who is not ashamed as he ought not to be, is called modest. And he is commendable. So too, mercy is a mean between cruelty and softness. For whoever shows no compassion to anyone is cruel, while whoever shows compassion to everyone is soft and effeminate. But whoever shows compassion inappropriately to those who suffer holds the mean, is praised, and is called merciful. Thus, envy is a middle ground between resentment and calm. For the envious person grieves over all prosperity, while the calm person, in contrast, rejoices in all prosperity. Envy holds a middle ground because it rejoices in the prosperity of the good and grieves over the prosperity of the wicked. Likewise, grace, as something praiseworthy, is a middle ground between excess and deficiency. For one who is gracious to all, both the deserving and the undeserving, is blameworthy. But one who is gracious to no one deserves to be blamed. However, one who is gracious to the deserving and not deserving holds a middle ground and is praised. Therefore, praiseworthy passions hold a middle ground, while blameworthy passions hold extremes. For envy holds the extreme position, as it grieves over every prosperity. Likewise, hatred, being blameworthy, also occupies the extreme position. Emotions, however, that relate to both extremes can be either commendable or blameworthy. To be blameworthy, they hold the extreme position. To be commendable, they hold the middle ground. Having seen these, it is necessary to consider how kings and princes should relate to these emotions. For they ought to imitate grace and mercy, as these emotions are commendable. For it is fitting for them to be gracious and merciful. They should be the rightful distributors of both good and evil, whether of benefits or punishments. Benefits are rightly distributed when kings and princes, and those who are to distribute such things, are gracious to the good and deserving. However, bad punishments are rightly inflicted when those who suffer them are always unjustly stirred to mercy. However, while shame and nemesis may seem to be commendable passions, they should not simply and in every way be attributed to kings and princes. For it is not fitting for kings to be ashamed, because it is not proper for them to act in ways that would cause them to feel shame. For this reason, it is said 4. In the Ethics, it is said that we praise young men for their modesty; however, no one will praise an old man if he is modest, because we do not think he should act in ways that involve modesty. Thus, it is also said there that it is not fitting for the studious to be modest, because modesty is found in wrongful things. However, it is not right to act wrongly. Therefore, if it is fitting for kings to be studious. And to be wise in their conduct; it is not fitting for them to be ashamed, except in a hypothetical situation. For if it were to happen that they acted shamefully, they ought to be ashamed. Nemesis also does not seem to be very commendable, nor is one who is overly indignant about the prosperity of the wicked often praised. For the wicked cannot possess the greatest goods, which are virtues; but they can perhaps possess intermediate goods or lesser goods, which are external goods. However, those things which are the least in the category of goods should not be greatly cared for if they are possessed by the wicked, as long as this happens without personal fault. For if someone is to dispense these goods, they should not return them to the unworthy, but to the worthy. Therefore, kings and princes should only be indignant and should be upset about the prosperity of the wicked, so that they do not distribute their goods to the unworthy. Thus, they should relate to the aforementioned passions that seem to be commendable. They should completely flee from envy, which is a blameworthy passion, and also from hatred, unless it is directed against vices. For vices should be hated and should be eradicated as much as possible. In other passions, which can be both commendable and blameworthy, they will behave appropriately if they are adorned with the virtues we mentioned earlier. For through the virtue of gentleness, they will rightly manage their anger and its opposite. For he is called gentle who gets angry when he should, and how he should. Through courage, they will rightly manage their boldness and fear. For he is strong who dares to face what must be faced and fears what must be feared. Through magnanimity and humility, they will rightly handle hope and despair. For magnanimity suppresses despair so that they are not deterred from noble pursuits because of difficulty. Humility, on the other hand, will moderate hope so that they do not overly indulge in it due to the goodness and delight found in it. Through other virtues present in desire, they will rightly handle the passions of desire, so that they love what is to be loved and desire what is to be desired. And they should abhor what is to be abhorred, delight in what is to be delighted in, and grieve over what is to be grieved over, as it is fitting to delight in and to grieve over; and in all these matters, they should act according to the order and rule of reason. These things, then, should suffice for now regarding the passions, for if anything has been omitted here, it will be discussed more thoroughly later. For in the third part, we will address fear, love, mercy, and other matters as the knowledge of the subject requires. Here, we'll show how kings and princes should conduct themselves so that they are feared and loved by the people, how they should be merciful, and how they should be zealous. For many things that are presented here in general will be shown there in detail.