Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo passiones aliae ad passiones praehabitas reducuntur. Cap. X.

Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo passiones aliae ad passiones praehabitas reducuntur. Cap. X.

The twelve passions will be listed above, namely: love, hatred, desire, aversion, delight, sadness, hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger, and gentleness. But besides all these passions, the Philosopher mentions others. 2. Rhetor. It seems that six other passions can be enumerated. Namely: zeal, grace, resentment (which is the same as indignation at the prosperity of the wicked), mercy, envy, and shame without modesty. But all these passions can be reduced to certain previously mentioned passions: because zeal and grace are reduced to love; shame to fear; envy, mercy, and resentment without indignation at the prosperity of the wicked are reduced to sadness. Zeal is reduced to love: because zeal is nothing other than a certain intense love. What we love intensely is either material or spiritual. If they are material, since such things are possessed by one but not by another, jealousy regarding them is commonly defined as intense love that cannot tolerate sharing with the beloved. Therefore, it has become customary to define jealousy in relation to such things as intense love that does not tolerate sharing with the beloved. Thus, intense love for material things seems to be a private and blameworthy love that does not tolerate sharing with the beloved. But in relation to intellectual goods and virtues, if love is intense, it is commendable and almost universal. For no one would ever be virtuous, nor would they properly love the virtues, if they did not want to have a share in them. Therefore, such jealousy regarding honorable goods is defined by the philosopher. Rhetor. The sadness that comes from such goods is not because they are absent from others, but because they are absent from oneself. Therefore, jealousy is reduced to love. In the same way, grace is also reduced to love, because someone becomes gracious through love. For grace (as the philosopher discusses, and as it is a passion) is nothing other than a certain movement of the soul, by which someone is inclined to confer benefits. Thus, both jealousy and grace are reduced to love. But shame is reduced to fear. There are two kinds of fear: one is the fear of losing life and inner goods, which makes someone pale, and the other is the fear of losing glory and honor, which are outer goods, and this makes someone blush. For whoever is afraid of corrupting evils is called timid. But the one who is afraid of shameful and dishonorable things is called timid. Nothing else is timidity but the fear of dishonor or disgrace. Thus, timidity has come to be called shame, because those who are timid commonly blush, just as those who are afraid turn pale. For someone fears because they believe they are losing their inner life, which is a good; but they feel shame because they believe they are losing their glory and honor, which are external goods. In fear, then, the blood rushes inward, and the limbs remain pale, because fear arises from the belief that one is losing their inner goods. But when someone feels shame, the blood flows outward, and the face appears red; thus, the blood rushes outward at that time because shame arises from the belief that one is losing external goods. Therefore, there are two kinds of fear: one is the fear of losing life and inner goods, which causes someone to turn pale, and the other is the fear of losing glory and honor, which are external goods, causing someone to blush. Thus, fear is one thing, the fear of losing inner goods, which does not have a special name, retains a common name for itself. And it is called fear, but the fear of losing glory and honor has a special name, and it is called shame or blushing. Therefore, shame is a certain kind of fear, and it is reduced to fear. Consider how jealousy and grace are reduced to love, and how shame is reduced to fear. It remains to see how envy, mercy, and indignation are reduced to sadness. Therefore, it should be noted that these three are kinds of sadness. For someone can be sad either about the evil of another or about good. If someone is sad about evil, especially if they believe they are suffering that evil unjustly, then that is mercy. For it is said that someone can be sad about evil, as well as about good. Invidia is a kind of pain that arises from the desire for someone else's good. Mercy is nothing other than a certain sadness over an apparent corrupting evil, or the sorrow of one who suffers unjustly from that evil. If, however, the sadness is not about someone else's evil but about a good, this can happen in three ways: either about a good in itself, and thus it is envy. For envy (as it is said in the second book of Rhetoric) is to grieve over someone who seems to prosper unjustly. rhetor.) Nothing else is but a certain sadness over the desired action of some good things concerning similar people, not as if something were desired for oneself, but because of them. For envy is pain over the desired good of someone else. For he does not possess that good, but because another, whom he envies, could possess that good. And especially, envy is directed toward those who are similar. Just as potters envy other potters, and craftsmen envy other craftsmen, so it is with others. However, if the sadness comes from the good of another, not just in any way, but as it is held in disdain by that person, then it is called nemesis or indignation. For, according to the philosopher, in the Rhetoric, nemesis or indignation is the sadness felt about someone who seems to prosper unjustly. Therefore, all these passions diversify all our actions; we should all recognize them, and this is especially true for kings and princes, as they ought to have the most excellent actions.