Liber I, Pars III — Quod harum passionum quaedam magis principales, et quaedam minus. Cap. IX.

Liber I, Pars III — Quod harum passionum quaedam magis principales, et quaedam minus. Cap. IX.

Just as the twelve virtues were listed above, of which four were principal and eight were considered secondary, so among these twelve passions that we enumerate, following the teachings of our predecessors, we can say that there are four principal ones: hope, fear, joy, and sadness. We can pursue the understanding that these are more principal through three different approaches. First, by comparing them to other passions. Second, by comparing them to their respective objects or the material they concern. Third, by comparing them to the powers of the soul, specifically the irascible and the appetitive, in which they exist. The first way is clear. For all other passions seem to be ordered to these; passions taken with respect to good seem to be ordered to hope and joy, while those taken with respect to evil seem to be ordered to fear and sadness. For a passion taken with respect to good begins first with love, then moves to desire, and culminates in hope, as long as that good is future; ultimately, it ends in joy and delight when that good is present and attained. Fear and sadness are the main passions because other passions are directed toward them in relation to evil, just as hope and joy are directed toward other passions in relation to good. The second way to investigate these passions as principal is from the perspective of the matter they concern. For every passion is either taken in relation to good or in relation to evil. Moreover, good or evil can be considered either as future or as already present. Therefore, these four passions can be understood as follows: hope is about future good, joy is about present good, fear is about future evil, and sadness is about present evil. Thirdly, these passions can be understood in relation to the powers of the soul. This is in relation to the irascible and concupiscible aspects of the soul, in which they exist. It is said that the concupiscible aspect tends toward good and evil according to its nature, while the irascible aspect tends toward what is difficult. Therefore, when something is truly good, and it is already attained, there is delight and joy; and when something is truly bad, and it is already attained, there is pain and sorrow. Thus, delight and sorrow must be considered the principal passions regarding the appetitive part of the soul. Hope and fear are the principal passions concerning the irascible part of the soul. For when the irascible part tends toward good and evil in what is difficult, it is considered that the greatest good is something difficult that is hoped for in the future, and the greatest evil is something difficult that is feared in the future; thus, hope and fear are the principal passions regarding the irascible part. However, since our actions can be diversified by the passions, it is fitting for us to diligently consider what we delight in, what we grieve over, what we hope for, and what we fear. But this is all the more fitting for kings and princes, as their actions are significant because they consider the good of their people. How kings and princes ought to conduct themselves regarding delight and sorrow, and regarding hope and fear, has been made clear in the chapters mentioned above.