Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo reges, et principes se habere debeant circa delectationes, et tristitias. Cap. VIII.

Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo reges, et principes se habere debeant circa delectationes, et tristitias. Cap. VIII.

It was said above that pleasure and sadness hold the highest place in the order of passions, because all other passions end in them, as if they were the ultimate passions: for there is no passion that does not terminate either in sadness or in pleasure. Therefore, concerning all other passions, it remains to say how kings and princes should conduct themselves regarding pleasures and sadness. However, there was a twofold opinion among the ancients regarding pleasures, as is evident from the philosophers. 10. Ethicor. Eudoxus, however, asserted that every pleasure is good, because what is desired by all seems to be the most good and desirable: all things desire to be enjoyed; which would not be the case if pleasure were not simply of the nature of good things. Eudoxus also presented another argument regarding sadness, which is contrary to pleasure. For if any sadness is to be avoided, and it has the nature of evil, then any pleasure is to be pursued, and it has the nature of good. Some, on the other hand, said that every pleasure should be avoided. But those who condemned all pleasure immediately revealed their own reprehensible position, because (according to the philosophers)... No one can live without any pleasure. If, therefore, one who denies speech concedes speech (as is clear from the philosophers)... 4. Metaphysics.) Thus, by asserting that all pleasure should be avoided, one ends up asserting that some pleasure should be pursued. For when speech cannot be denied except through speech, one who denies speech speaks: by speaking, they concede speech; therefore, by denying speech, they concede speech. No one flees from all pleasure unless it is pleasant for them to flee from all pleasure; therefore, if someone is fleeing from all pleasure, they must be pursuing some pleasure. However, among these, there are two completely opposing paths, and there is a middle way of the philosopher, which is that not everything is bad in itself. But some pleasures are good in themselves, some are good in appearance, some are good simply, and some are good in a certain way: some are good for one person, and some are good for another. For just as we can judge taste, so we can also judge desire. Some indeed have a corrupted taste, like the sick. Some have a well-ordered taste, like the healthy. Thus, some have a corrupted desire, like the wicked. Similarly, some have a well-ordered desire, like good and virtuous people. Just as things that seem sweet to the sick and those with a corrupted taste aren't truly sweet, so too are the things that seem sweet to the healthy and those with a well-ordered palate. Therefore, things that are truly delightful and good aren't the same for everyone; some are delightful to the wicked and those with a corrupted appetite, while others are delightful to the good and those with a right will. Thus, some delights will be truly and simply good, while others will be good only in appearance or in a certain context. So, there will be delights that are genuinely and simply good, while others will be good only in appearance and in a certain context. Since delight arises from the connection of what is suitable with what is suitable, some delights will be appropriate for beasts, while others will be appropriate for humans. Intelligible and virtuous delights are suitable for humans, but sensual and carnal delights are suitable for beasts. If humans ought to indulge in such delights, it should not be in themselves and simply, but in accordance with their order and as they serve virtuous actions. Therefore, it is clear how we ought to relate to these delights. For it is detestable for anyone to be vicious and to have bestial habits; therefore, one should not follow what is pleasing to beasts and to vicious people, but rather what is pleasing to those who are rational and virtuous. Therefore, every pleasure is good, as the preceding arguments have shown; but not every pleasure is good for everyone; some are good for beasts, while others are good for humans. Thus, it is more detestable for kings and princes to choose the life of beasts; the more detestable it is for them to follow bestial pleasures. It is clear, then, how kings and princes should relate to pleasures, for they should primarily and fundamentally delight in virtuous deeds. For pleasure always perfects, and it makes an undertaking a fitting action. If, then, kings and princes take delight in prudent actions and in virtuous works, they will be able to accomplish such works in a more efficient and perfect manner. For the more intensely someone delights in virtuous actions, the more excellently they will perform those actions. In sensory pleasures, however, they should not primarily and fundamentally take delight, but should use them moderately and in accordance with their order to virtuous works. For if such intense pleasures are present, they cloud reason and hinder virtuous actions. Now that we’ve seen how kings and princes should conduct themselves regarding pleasures, it remains to consider how they should handle sorrows. However, sorrow should never be embraced, nor is it commendable. Unless it’s in response to some disgraceful act. If someone sees that they have acted disgracefully, they should feel sorrow and grief. Therefore, one should grieve over disgraceful acts, but all other sorrows should be moderated and avoided; so that, in order for such sorrows to be moderated, remedies must be provided through which these sorrows can be avoided. The philosopher seems to touch on three remedies through which sorrow is avoided: namely, virtues, friends, and considerations of truth. For through virtues, sorrow is avoided; because (as the philosopher wants). 9 Ethics.) The wicked and the corrupt do not find joy in themselves. For they do not find anything in themselves that they can take delight in. For the wicked are hostile to themselves and disagree within themselves, as is indicated in that same context. For they judge one thing by reason and act on another by passion. Therefore, since they do not have peace within themselves, they do not find joy in themselves. Thus, a great remedy for us to find delight within ourselves is to flee from vices and to cultivate virtues. Another remedy is the consolation of friends, as is noted in that same context. Ethic. It is said. For it seems that sorrow is a certain weight that burdens the soul. Therefore, just as in physical weight, when many help us to carry it, we are less burdened; so when we see a multitude of friends grieving for us, we are comforted in that sorrow and feel less sadness. This reasoning, although it may be touched upon. Ethics. It is said, however, that this was the view of Plato, but it does not seem to be universally true. For when we must grieve over the pain of our friends, when we ourselves are in sorrow and see our friends grieving, it seems that our pain should not be diminished, but rather increased. Therefore, we can say that when we see them grieving for our pain, it does not lessen our sorrow because they are grieving for our pain, but because we see them in sorrow, a certain firm notion arises in us that they are our friends; and because it is delightful to have friends, we find joy in that, and in finding joy, our sorrow is lessened, for every joy either completely removes sorrow or at least diminishes it. The third remedy is the consideration of truth. For although we should grieve over shameful things, we should not grieve over good fortune or other things that may happen to us without engaging in shameful actions. To this end, the greatest remedy is the consideration of truth. For through such consideration, we recognize that these things are modest goods; therefore, if we lose them, we should not grieve, unless perhaps by accident, inasmuch as we are hindered from virtuous actions by their loss. It is clear, therefore, that we should not grieve except over shameful things, and not over virtuous actions. If, however, pain or sorrow arises from other causes, it should be avoided, either through virtues, or through friends, or through the knowledge of truth. It is also customary to provide a fourth remedy, namely, bodily remedies, such as sleep, bathing, and things like these that tend to drive away sorrow. Since such sorrows hinder virtuous actions, it is even more fitting for kings and princes to moderate such sorrows, as it is more proper for them to excel in virtuous deeds.