Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo differt ira ab odio, et quomodo reges et principes se habere debeant ad iram, et eius oppositum. Cap. VII.

Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo differt ira ab odio, et quomodo reges et principes se habere debeant ad iram, et eius oppositum. Cap. VII.

Since anger seems to have the greatest affinity with hatred, we should first show how kings and princes ought to handle anger and gentleness. We need to see how anger differs from hatred, and which is more detestable: hatred or uncontrolled anger. One principal difference between anger and hatred is that hatred is simply the desire for evil, while anger is not. For hatred is opposed to love; to love someone is to will good for them, while to hate someone is to will evil for them. However, anger is not the same; it is not simply the desire for evil, but is oriented toward vengeance. Anger can be defined as the desire for punishment in response to wrongdoing. From this principal difference between anger and hatred, eight distinctions are drawn, as the philosopher assigns. These distinctions help clarify the nature of anger and hatred in the context of moral philosophy. This is what the rhetor says. The first difference is that anger arises from those things that relate to oneself or pertain to oneself. However, hatred can arise from things that pertain to oneself or to another. For no one becomes angry with someone unless they believe that person has done something wrong to them, whether to themselves, their children, their friends, or others related to them. It has been said that anger is the desire for punishment, not simply, but in relation to vengeance. No one desires to take vengeance unless it is about those who have caused harm, whether to themselves or to others. But to hate, which is to will harm in itself, can arise from things that pertain to oneself. For we can immediately hate someone when we know they are evil, just as we can hate someone when we know they are a thief, even if they have not done anything wrong to us or to others. The second difference is that anger is always directed at a specific individual, while hatred can be more general. However, someone can hate every thief and slanderer in general, but they cannot be angry with someone unless it is directed at a specific person. For when a person is not wronged in general, but rather when an injury is committed by a specific individual, we can hate thieves universally, but we do not get angry unless it is directed at a specific person. The third difference is that hatred is insatiable, while anger can be satisfied; if hatred is simply a desire for evil, then the one we hate could never have enough evil for us to want more. But anger, which is a desire for punishment—not simply, but as it is ordered toward vengeance—is something that can be satisfied; for when someone has suffered enough, it seems that the angry person’s desire for appropriate vengeance is fulfilled, and they can be at peace. The fourth difference is that an angry person desires to cause sorrow, but a hater desires to inflict harm. For an angry person wants to inflict pain and sorrow, but a hater wants to cause damage and harm. The fifth difference is that an angry person wants to be felt, but for a hater, it makes no difference. For an angry person, it’s not enough that someone else suffers; they need to feel it and see clearly that they are inflicting that harm on the other person, because otherwise, it wouldn’t be vengeance. But for someone who hates, it doesn’t matter at all: for since hatred is an evil in itself and absolutely, it’s enough for the hater that another suffers evil, no matter how that evil comes about. The sixth difference is that anger is always accompanied by sadness: for the anxiety of the angry person is so great that it leads to vengeance, and as long as vengeance is not executed, they are almost continuously in sadness. But hatred can exist without sadness. For hatred is valid in relation to something in general. For we can universally hate all thieves; however, it’s not necessary that sadness be involved in such hatred. The seventh difference is that mercy seems to be attached to anger, but not to hatred. For when anger is satisfied, if many evils are inflicted on another, the angry person will have compassion for them. But hatred has no compassion for anyone, since it is something insatiable. The eighth distinction is that anger desires to inflict harm: it suffices for the angry person that another suffers harm until a fitting revenge is taken. But hatred destroys and wishes for the other to cease to exist; for the hater, it is not enough that another suffers, but they want that person to be eliminated and to no longer exist. Since, therefore, the conditions of hatred are much worse than those of anger, hatred must be avoided more than anger. Indeed, according to Augustine, to let anger turn into hatred is to make a beam out of a splinter. Therefore, such hatred must be avoided by everyone. Moreover, kings and princes must be more cautious, because they can inflict harm on many. Thus, it must be understood that hatred and anger are different: for hatred is more detestable than anger. However, if anger is disordered, it is detestable. Therefore, to understand how kings and princes should handle anger and gentleness, it must be noted that anger sometimes precedes reason, and then it is disordered and to be avoided. Sometimes it follows the order of reason, and then it can be disordered and worthy of imitation. If anger precedes reason, it must be avoided in two ways. First, because it does not perfectly heed reason. Second, because it obscures it. For anger precedes reason according to the Philosopher. 7. Ethicor. It is likened to dogs, or it is likened to swift servants. For swift servants immediately run when they hear the word of the Lord, before they fully grasp His command, so that they may carry out His mandate. This happens because they fail to execute it perfectly, as they do not fully understand how that command should be carried out. So too, dogs immediately bark when they hear the sound of someone approaching, not distinguishing whether the one coming is a friend or an enemy. So it is with anger: for when reason says that vengeance should be taken, it immediately wants to run to execute vengeance, not waiting for the judgment of reason on how that vengeance should be carried out. Therefore, inordinate anger must be avoided, because it does not listen to reason perfectly. Secondly, it must be avoided because it obscures reason. For when the body is not properly tempered, we are hindered from using reason. Because when blood is stirred up by anger around the heart, the body becomes ungoverned, so we cannot properly use reason. For reason, or intellect, although it is not a bodily virtue, still uses bodily organs in its action. Therefore, when the body is disordered, it cannot freely use its action. Thus, if in any person it is necessary to have a clouded reason and not to fully obey reason, it is necessary for everyone to avoid disordered anger. However, it is especially necessary for kings and princes to avoid it, because they ought to follow the command of reason most of all. Therefore, disordered anger and that which precedes reason must be avoided. But if it follows the command of reason, it can be ordered and imitable. For anger is an instrument of reason, and when it acts according to the command of reason, we can carry out virtuous actions more effectively. Therefore, 3. Ethic. It is approved that a person should direct their virtue towards controlling anger. Then, indeed, virtue is directed towards anger, or to anger in a proper way, and as it should be, when anger is an instrument of virtue and reason. Therefore, it is clear how we should regard anger and gentleness: because anger should be restrained by gentleness, so that it does not precede the judgment of reason, and gentleness should be restrained by anger, so that it does not impede the virtue of actions and the act of reason. Therefore, before we fully judge through reason what we should do, we must be gentle. But once it has been fully considered what we are going to do, we can take up anger as a servant and handmaid of reason, so that through it we can act more effectively, as reason will judge. Therefore, it is all the more fitting for kings and princes to conduct themselves regarding anger and gentleness, as it is fitting for them not to be hindered in the use of reason and to act decisively in accordance with what reason will judge.