Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo decet reges et principes se habere ad odium, et ad amorem. Cap. III.

Liber I, Pars III — Quomodo decet reges et principes se habere ad odium, et ad amorem. Cap. III.

Since passions diversify our kingdom and our life, it's necessary to show how we should relate to them. Therefore, we should enumerate all the passions so that we can know their number and determine how we ought to address them. We also need to show the order of these passions so that we can understand how to address each one. Since love and hatred are primary passions, we must first see how it is fitting for kings and princes to be loving and to hate. And to demonstrate the nature of love, we must show that it is not only a passion taken in its own right, but also that it is found in both the sensitive and intellectual appetites: we can say that the object of love is always good. Wherever the reason for goodness is found more, there it should be more principal. And love should be more intense. In divine goods and in common goods, the reason for goodness is found more than in private good. Therefore, the way in which everyone should be loving is that they first and foremost love the divine and common good. For in the divine good, the goodness of each individual has more being than it does in itself. For the divine good is the preservative of our good. Indeed, even if our good were annihilated, God could restore it if He wished. Therefore, since no person can do good for themselves or preserve themselves in goodness without divine help, natural reason dictates that one should love God more than oneself: because the good of each individual primarily comes from God and is reserved more excellently in God than in oneself. And because the common good is more divine than the individual good, as is said in I. Ethic. And because the common good includes the private good, the common good must always be preferred over the private good. Naturally, we see that a part exposes itself for the whole, just as an arm exposes itself to danger for the body: from natural instinct, when someone wants to be struck, the arm exposes itself to prevent the limbs from being wounded, since the safety of the body depends primarily on them, and to keep the whole body from perishing, the arm puts itself in danger. So also, in ancient times, if we observed a city ruling and holding a monarchy, it was because the citizens were willing to do so. They did not hesitate to expose themselves to death. For the Romans had a love for their Republic. This made Rome a leader and a monarch. Therefore, in this way, it is fitting for all people to be loving, that they should first and foremost love the divine and common good; consequently, they should love their own private good as well, but this is especially true for kings and princes. This we can declare in three ways. For the dignity of a king (as far as the present is concerned) can be compared to three things: namely, to tyranny, which it opposes; to the virtues by which it should be adorned; and to the vices which it should flee. The first way is clear. For as was said above, and as the Philosopher states in the Politics, the difference between a king and a tyrant is this: a king primarily intends the common good, and in intending the common good, he also intends his own good, for when the kingdom is preserved, the king is preserved. On the other hand, a tyrant primarily intends his own private good; consequently, and almost incidentally, he intends the common good, inasmuch as from the common good something private may arise for himself. If, therefore, they act in opposite ways, the kingdom and tyranny are distinct: since the mode of tyrannical love is to prioritize private good over the common good, the mode of royal love must be to prioritize the common good over private good. Indeed, because in a special way the king and any ruler is a minister of God and a public and common person, it particularly pertains to kings and rulers to prioritize the divine and common good over any private good. Secondly, this is also evident if we consider the virtues that kings ought to possess. For just as it is more detestable for a teacher to lack knowledge than for a student to do so, because a teacher is in a position where he must impart knowledge to others, so it is more detestable for a king to lack virtues than for his subjects, because the royal status requires him to lead others to virtue. Among other things, what can lead others to virtue is that they should primarily love the divine and common good. For if a king primarily intends the common good, he will strive to remember the past and provide for the future, so that he may be experienced, cautious, and have all that is required for prudence, by which he can better govern his people. Indeed, if he prioritizes the common good over private good, he will strive all the more for prudence, as greater prudence is required to safeguard the common good than his own; therefore, he is wise if he is also just, because the common good is primarily preserved through justice. He will be magnanimous, for the common goods are indeed the most challenging and worthy of great honor, toward which the magnanimous strives. He will be magnificent, for according to the Philosopher. Ethic. Magnificence primarily pertains to the divine and the common good. He will be strong, for when he prioritizes the common good over private good, he will not hesitate to expose himself if he sees that it benefits the kingdom. He will be temperate; because if his intention is primarily focused on the good of the kingdom, he will reject excessive physical pleasures so that he is not hindered in his proper care of the kingdom. Therefore, to sum it up, the love of the divine good and the common good is the primary motivation for individual virtues. Considering, then, the virtues that kings and princes should embody, they must primarily love the divine and common good. Thirdly, this is evident if we consider the vices that they should avoid. For just as divine love and the love of the common good lead to every virtue, so disordered love of self leads to every vice; for such are tyrants, eager to fulfill their own desires and seeking singular excellence. Because of this, they become wrongdoers against others, plundering the sacred, robbing the people, and committing every injustice. Hence, Valerius Maximus recounts about Dionysius the Sicilian, who, being a tyrant, was a lover of his own advantage, devastating cities, plundering states, and robbing the sacred. Seeing how kings and princes should relate to love, because they must primarily love the divine and common good, it can easily be understood how they should relate to hatred. For love is the primary movement and the first passion, from which every other passion originates: so if a person loves justice and truth, they hate thieves who oppose justice, and detractors who oppose truth. And whoever loves the physical life fears the sword that takes it away. Fear, therefore, is linked to hatred. And briefly, every passion or movement of the soul originates from love. Therefore, in the intention of anyone, there must be something to love. It has been shown how kings and princes should especially love the divine and common good, and in a special way they should oppose what is contrary to the divine and common good: such things are unjust and contemptuous actions, and universally all vices. Therefore, since it is the nature of hatred to exterminate, one can never be satisfied unless they exterminate, as it is said. Thus, it is fitting for kings and princes to love justice and to hate vices, so that they will not be satisfied unless they root them out and exterminate them. People shouldn't be exterminated or hated for their own sake; rather, vices should be uprooted and hated. If vices can't be uprooted in any other way, and if the common good can't endure otherwise, then wicked people must be exterminated so that the common good doesn't perish. Therefore, loving the common good and hating the wicked who oppose it is all the more fitting for kings and princes, especially since they are public figures and representatives of the common good.