Liber I, Pars III — Quot sunt passiones animae, et quomodo acicpiendus est earum numerus. Cap. I.
Liber I, Pars III — Quot sunt passiones animae, et quomodo acicpiendus est earum numerus. Cap. I.
It is necessary to address two parts of this work, since it has been shown where kings and princes should set their goals and how they ought to be virtuous. Now, we must proceed to the third part of this first book, showing which passions and which movements of the soul kings and princes should imitate. But since this cannot be known unless we first understand how many such passions there are, which of them are more principal, which are commendable, and which are blameworthy, we will first discuss these. Considering the number of passions, as we said there are twelve virtues, we can also say that there are twelve passions. These are: love, hatred, desire, aversion, delight, sadness, hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger, and gentleness. Gentleness is indeed compared to the virtues, but this is due to a lack of vocabulary, as the philosopher states. Ethic. For gentleness seems to properly name the passion opposed to anger. But since there is a certain virtue between anger and gentleness, and we don't know how to name that virtue properly, we call it by the name of gentleness, because that virtue shares more in common with gentleness than with anger. Gentleness will therefore be an equivalent term for virtue and for the passion that is opposed to anger. If anyone wanted to work at it, they could find a proper name for it. But when it comes to matters, there is no need to worry about words at all. Therefore, once the passions have been enumerated, we can understand their number, because passions do not properly exist except in the sensitive appetite. The intellectual appetite is removed from such passions because it is not a virtue in the body, nor is it a virtue attached to an organ. Therefore, every passion (as we are speaking of passion here) will be in the sensitive appetite. The sensitive appetite, as we have said more broadly above, is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. Thus, the aforementioned passions are distinguished in this way. For the first six, namely, love, hatred, desire, aversion, delight, and sadness, pertain to the appetitive part of the soul. The remaining six, however, pertain to the irascible part. The number of appetitive passions can be understood in this way: every passion and every movement of the soul that pertains to the appetitive part is either taken in relation to good or in relation to evil. If it is in relation to good, this is understood in three ways. For we are moved toward good through the appetitive part in three ways. For the good, when apprehended, first pleases us. Secondly, we tend toward it; thirdly, when we attain it, we find peace in it. As we find something good pleasing, there arises in us a desire; and as we find rest in it, joy and delight exist in us. Therefore, love, desire, and delight are taken in relation to the good. On the other hand, hatred, aversion, and sadness are taken in relation to evil. The number of passions related to desire can be understood this way: every passion and every movement of the soul related to desire is taken either with respect to the good or with respect to the evil. If it is with respect to the good, this can happen in three ways. For we are moved in three ways toward the good through desire. First, the good that is grasped pleases us. Second, we tend toward it; and third, having attained it, we find rest in it. Hope is nothing other than striving toward some difficult good. Regarding good things taken absolutely, there can be love, desire, or delight; however, hope concerning any good only exists if it has the character of being difficult. Therefore, if we strive for a difficult good, it is called hope. But if we fall away from such a good, it becomes despair. Hope and despair are thus understood in relation to good. Other passions, however, are understood in relation to evil. For evil can be considered in two ways: either as future or as present. If it is considered as future, this is done in two ways. Whether we approach it boldly, this is audacity; or whether we flee from it, this is fear. If evil is present, it can also be considered in two ways: either we rise up to take vengeance, and this is anger; or we turn away from such vengeance, and this is meekness. Since our movements and affections cannot vary in many ways, there will be twelve passions in total. Six pertain to the appetitive part, and six to the irascible part. We have discussed all these matters more extensively in the Rhetoric. However, these should suffice to pass through superficially.
Read the original Latin
Expeditis duabus partibus huius operis, quia ostensum est in quo reges et principes suum finem ponere debeant, et quomodo oportet eos virtuosos esse. Restat exequi de tertia parte huius primi libri, ostendendo quas passiones, et quos motus animi reges et principes debeant imitari. Sed cum hac sciri non possit, nisi prius sciverimus quot sunt huiusmodi passiones, et quae illarum sunt magis principales, et quae sunt laudabiles, et quae vituperabiles: ideo de his primo tractabimus. Accipiendo autem numerum passionum, sicut dicebamus esse duodecim virtutes, sic dicere possumus quod sunt duodecim passiones. videlicet, amor, odium, desiderium, abominatio, delectatio, tristitia, spes, desperatio, timor, audacia, ira, et mansuetudo. Comparabatur enim supra mansuetudo inter virtutes: sed hoc est propter vocabulorum penuriam, ut ait Philosophus 4. Ethic. Mansuetudo enim proprie nominare videtur passionem oppositam irae.
Sed cum sit quaedam virtus inter iram et mansuetudinem, quia virtutem illam proprio nomine nominare nescimus, nominamus eam nomine mansuetudinis, eo quod illa virtus plus communicat cum mansuetudine, quam cum ira. Erit mansuetudo aequivocum ad virtutem, et ad passionem oppositam irae. Si quis autem laborare vellet, cuilibet posset invenire nomen proprium. Sed cum constat de re, de verbis minime est curandum. Enumeratis ergo passionibus, sic potest accipi earum numerus quia passiones proprie esse non habent nisi in appetitu sensitivo. Appetitus enim intellectivus quia non est virtus in corpore, sive non est virtus affixa organo, ab huiusmodi passionibus est semotus. Erit ergo omnis passio (ut hic de passione loquimur) in appetitu sensitivo. Sensitivus autem appetitus (ut supra diffusius diximus) dividitur in irascibilem, et concupiscibilem.
Praedictae ergo passiones sic distinguuntur. quia primae sex videlicet, amor, odium, desiderium, abominatio, delectatio, et tristitia, pertinent ad concupiscibilem. reliquae vero sex ad irascibilem spectant. Numerus autem passionum concupiscibilis sic accipi potest: quia omnis passio et omnis motus animae pertinens ad concupiscibilem, vel sumitur respectu boni, vel respectu mali. Si respectu boni, hoc est tripliciter. Nam erga bonum per concupiscibilem tripliciter passionamur. Nam bonum apprehensum primo nobis placet. secundo tendimus in ipsum: tertio adepto quietamur in eo.
Prout ergo nobis bonum aliquod placet, est in nobis desiderium: prout vero quietamur in eo, existit in nobis gaudium et delectatio. Amor ergo, desiderium, et delectatio sumuntur respectu boni. Odium vero, abominatio, et tristitia, sumuntur respectu mali. Nam prout malum nobis displicet, est odium: prout vero ipsum fugimus, est abominatio: sed prout eo adepto dolemus, habet esse tristitia. Viso quomodo accipiuntur passiones concupiscibiles: restat videre, quomodo sumendae sunt passiones irascibiles. Differunt autem hae passiones ab illis, quia passiones concupiscibiles respiciunt bonum et malum absolute sumptum: sed passiones irascibiles respiciunt bonum vel malum in eo quod arduum. Huiusmodi ergo passiones vel sumuntur respectu boni, vel respectu mali. Si respectu boni, hoc est dupliciter: quia vel ut in ipsum tendimus, et sic est spes.
nihil est enim aliud spes quam tendere in aliquod bonum arduum. Circa enim bona absolute sumpta potest esse amor, vel desiderium, vel delectatio: non tamen est spes circa aliqua bona, nisi habeant rationem ardui. quare si tendimus in bonum arduum, dicitur esse spes. Sed si a tali bono deficimus, habet esse desperatio. Spes ergo, et desperatio sumuntur respectu boni. Aliae vero passiones irascibiles sumuntur respectu mali. Nam malum dupliciter potest considerari, vel ut futurum, vel ut praesens. Si consideretur ut futurum, hoc est dupliciter.
Vel ut ipsum aggredimur, et sic est audacia: vel ut ab eo refugimus, et sic est timor. Si vero malum sit praesens, hoc etiam est dupliciter: quia vel ex hoc consurgimus ad faciendam vindictam, et sic est ira: vel a tali vindicta deficimus, et sic est mansuetudo. Cum ergo non possint pluribus modis variari nostri motus et nostrae affectiones, in universo duodecim erunt passiones. sex pertinentes ad concupiscibilem, et sex ad irascibilem. De quibus omnibus in Rhetoricis diffusius diximus. haec autem sufficiant superficialiter pertransire.
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