Liber I, Pars II — Quod bonarum dispositionum quaedam sunt virtutes, quaedam supra virtutes, quaedam annexae virtutibus, quaedam disponentes ad virtutem. Cap. XXXIV.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod bonarum dispositionum quaedam sunt virtutes, quaedam supra virtutes, quaedam annexae virtutibus, quaedam disponentes ad virtutem. Cap. XXXIV.

It was said above that while, in a broad sense, any good disposition of the mind can be called a virtue, some of these dispositions are more closely related to virtues and assist them in leading to virtue than the virtues themselves. Thus, certain good dispositions should be considered more as superior to virtues than as virtues themselves. But how this would be is not proven, because those things through which all this becomes evident have not yet been declared. However, once these things are seen, it is not difficult to show how they are so. For eubulia, synesis, whether deliberative or judgmental, are virtues, broadly understood as receiving virtue. Hence, the philosopher also states. In the Ethics, he calls these virtues. Receiving virtue, however, as we speak of virtue here, in some way falls short of the reason of virtue. For it is said that, broadly speaking, any good disposition of the mind can be called a kind of virtue. However, some good dispositions are more closely related to virtues than are virtues themselves. But how this is so has not yet been proven, because those things through which all this becomes clear have not yet been declared. However, once the preceding points are seen, it is not difficult to show how these things are so. For eubulia, synesis, or counsel, and judgment are virtues, when virtue is understood broadly. Hence, the Philosopher calls them virtues. However, when we speak of virtue as we are here, they somewhat fall short of the nature of virtue. Therefore, while temperance can be called a virtue when understood broadly, it seems more like a disposition toward virtue than a virtue itself. Therefore, while continence can be called a virtue, broadly accepted as a virtue, it seems more like a disposition toward virtue than a virtue itself. But since continence is stronger than perseverance (taking perseverance as the Philosopher speaks of it), it falls short of the reason of virtue. For this reason, it is not a virtue, but rather a disposition toward virtue, and in some way a condition that follows virtue. Thus, to declare how perseverance is a disposition toward virtue, and how it is a condition that follows virtue, is not a matter of present speculation. However, it suffices for the present to know that when speaking of perseverance, as was said above, and as the Philosopher speaks of it, it is a certain disposition toward virtue. Heroic virtue, which we can call divine, is more above virtue than virtue itself. From this, the Philosopher says. Speaking of this virtue, the Philosopher says that it is not a virtue, but something more honorable than virtue. Since wisdom, justice, and other virtues we've discussed are indeed virtues, the advisory and judicial virtues are attached to them because they support and are linked to wisdom. However, temperance and perseverance are dispositions toward virtue, while heroic virtue stands above virtue. It is rightly said that some of the good dispositions are virtues, some are attached to virtues, some prepare for virtues, and some are above virtues. So that kings and princes can have good dispositions of the mind. It is fitting for them to know these kinds of dispositions.