Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt gradus virtutis et cuiusmodi virtutes habere debeant reges, et principes. Cap. XXXIII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt gradus virtutis et cuiusmodi virtutes habere debeant reges, et principes. Cap. XXXIII.

Both Macrobius and Plotinus distinguish four levels of virtues. Some are political virtues, some are purgative, some belong to a purified soul, and some are exemplary. However, some say that exemplary virtues exist in God Himself. Political virtues are said to be acquired virtues through which people conduct themselves well in human affairs. But purgative virtues, and those of a purified soul, are said to be infused virtues, through which one conducts oneself well toward the divine. Regarding the divine, they say there are two levels. For some are striving and moving toward the divine likeness, and such are said to possess purgative virtues. However, some have, in a certain way, already attained that likeness, and such are said to possess the virtues of a purified soul. But although these people may speak the truth according to themselves, they don't seem to reach the intention of those who have spoken about virtues in this way. For the philosophers spoke only about acquired virtues. However, they did not mention infused virtues. Therefore, they said that every virtue they mentioned was acquired. Following the path of the philosophers, we can say that just as there are different degrees of goods, so there are different kinds of virtues, such that according to how excellent someone is in goodness, they also have a more excellent degree of virtues. Just as the philosopher indicates four kinds of goods, as is clear from the preceding chapter, who says that some are persevering, some are self-controlled, some are temperate, and some are divine, so we can distinguish four orders of virtues, such that we assign to each kind of good its own order of virtues. Therefore, we will say that the persevering have political virtues; the self-controlled have purgative virtues; the temperate, indeed, have the virtues of the purified soul; but the divine have exemplary virtues. For just as the divine are better than the temperate, the temperate are better than the self-controlled, and the self-controlled are better than the persevering, so exemplary virtues excel the virtues of the purified soul: the virtues of the purified soul excel the purgative virtues; and the purgative virtues excel the political virtues. It is clear that these types of virtues should be adapted to the aforementioned kinds of good, as Plotinus states, that the primary virtues, namely the political ones, soften and bring to a mean. The second, namely the purgative virtues, remove. The third, which are the virtues of the purified soul, forget. But in the fourth, namely the exemplary virtues, it is wrong to name anything shameful. Therefore, it has been rightly said that the political virtues belong to the persevering, because the persevering (as has been said) oppose the soft. And it suffices for someone to persevere if they maintain themselves in the mean. Thus, the political virtues, which soften, that is, dispose the soul to do good, and bring it back to the mean, belong to the persevering. However, such virtues are least among other virtues: and the persevering (speaking of perseverance, as the philosopher speaks of it) hold the lowest rank in the order of goods. Therefore, such virtues are suitable for those who persevere, but purifying virtues are suitable for those who are self-controlled. For this reason, someone is self-controlled because they hold themselves in check and abstain from sensory pleasures. Self-controlled people are those who engage in passions and fight against them. The way to overcome them is to remove oneself from them. For this reason, purifying virtues are said to be suitable for the self-controlled, whose duty is to remove and abstain from immoderate passions. However, the virtues of a purified soul are suitable for the temperate: for these do not remove, but forget. For the temperate person has such a disciplined desire that they feel as if they are not fighting, but forget about immoderate passions, and in a way, it is delightful for them to do good. Therefore, such a person is rightly said to possess the virtues of a purified soul, making them forget those frequent passions, because they now have a purified and disciplined mind, so that they are not concerned about such passions. The fourth virtues, namely, exemplary ones, can be adapted to divine people: for such perfect individuals ought to be a standard and example for others. It has been declared, therefore, that the first point proposed at the beginning of the chapter is this. Namely, that there are various degrees of virtues. It is therefore easy to declare and show what kind of virtues should belong to kings and princes, provided the previously established points are understood. As mentioned above, it is not enough for kings and princes to simply be persevering, self-controlled, and temperate; rather, they should, in some way, be divine. The virtues that are fitting for them can be called exemplary, because they ought to be a rule and example for others. For a prince should possess such great goodness that every subordinate should receive from him a model for living and recognize his own shortcomings, seeing the life and perfection of the prince. Therefore, it should not only be detestable for kings and princes to commit shameful acts, but also to name and hear about such shameful things should be considered a crime. Therefore, it is fitting for them to possess exemplary virtues, which according to Plotinus should not be named as shameful: but since no one can be of such great goodness without the grace of God and His help, the more kings and princes ought to excel others, the more earnestly they should seek divine grace. In this way, the pride of philosophers is dismissed, as if we could avoid all evils and acquire perfect goodness solely from pure nature.