Liber I, Pars II — Quod diversi sunt gradus bonorum et malorum, et in quo gradu reges, et principes esse decet. Cap. XXXII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod diversi sunt gradus bonorum et malorum, et in quo gradu reges, et principes esse decet. Cap. XXXII.

If the words of the Philosopher are considered in 7. In ethics, we can more carefully consider and distinguish four degrees of evil and four degrees of good. Evil men are in a fourfold degree: some are soft, some are incontinent, some are intemperate, and some are bestial. Likewise, good people are in a fourfold degree: for some are persevering, some are continent, some are temperate, and some are truly divine. Those who are soft are those who fall easily under slight passion or small temptation. This very name designates them. For according to the Philosopher in the Meteora, that which yields easily is soft. Therefore, those who are soft, according to the Philosopher, are those who do not want to work and are excessively delicate. For, as it is written in the Ethics, the Ethics. It is written that there is a certain delight in softness. Such people find it impossible to endure anything difficult; as soon as they are troubled or tempted, they fall. In another degree, they are called incontinents. These people, however, argue from the beginning. For the soft cannot endure any struggle, nor can they bear anything difficult. In contrast, the incontinent can endure a struggle, but they fail in sustaining it. To continue, as the very name indicates, is to hold oneself against something else. Therefore, to be incontinent is to engage in battle but to be unable to hold one's ground in the fight, instead failing. In the third degree, there are the intemperate. For someone is called intemperate when not only does he fall due to passion, and is cast down by temptations, but it is also delightful for him to do evil. Incontinent people and the soft do not take pleasure in doing evil; rather, they choose one thing and do another, for they exist outside of passions, both incontinent and soft, and they choose to do good and propose the best laws. The passionate, however, fall and do not observe any of those laws. Such people, the Philosopher compares to the paralyzed, who, choosing to go to the right because of the dissolution of the body, and being unable to control their body, go to the left. Thus, the soft and incontinent propose to do good and choose to go to the right; however, because they have the powers of the soul dissolved, and do not have them well regulated and ordered according to the order of reason, they do not go to the right, but fall and tend to the left. In a different way, the soft-hearted fall, and in a different way, the incontinent fall. The soft-hearted fall in minor battles, but the incontinent succumb to greater battles. Therefore, the intemperate are worse than the incontinent and the soft-hearted, because they are so accustomed to evil that it is delightful for them to do wrong. In the fourth degree, however, there are the bestial. These are worse than the intemperate. They are called bestial because they commit evils beyond the measure of humanity. They are indeed bestial, performing acts that nature itself abhors, such as certain barbarians who eat human flesh and drink human blood. Such things can only arise from bestiality. The philosopher narrates this. In the Ethics, many such bestialities are recounted. For it is said that when a certain woman was pregnant and could not give birth, she conceived such pain that she turned to bestiality, so that she would bear no more children. Because she could not give birth, she wanted to bear no more children from then on. Likewise, at that time, around a certain island in the sea, there existed certain completely bestial peoples, who ate raw flesh, devoured human flesh, and, worse still, offered their own children in feasts. For when someone wanted to feast with others, if his own son was not at home, he would borrow a son from his neighbor and prepare him for the feast, promising that whenever he wanted to hold a feast, he would return his own son to him. So too, many bestial acts of Phalaris are recounted. Certain other bestial peoples also sacrificed their own mothers and ate the livers of men. Therefore, those are bestial who act beyond the limits of humanity. Having spoken about the four kinds of evils, it remains to discuss the four kinds of goods. For just as some evildoers are soft, who fall with only a slight temptation, so some good people are said to be persevering. Such are those who stand firm and do not fall under slight temptation. Therefore, when speaking of perseverance, as the philosopher says, it is nothing other than a certain good disposition opposed to softness. Thus, in the first degree, they are said to be persevering. In the second degree, however, there are those who are continent. For to be continent is greater than merely to persevere. For if someone is not tempted at all, or only slightly tempted and does not fall, they are said to persevere; but they are not said to be self-controlled unless they firmly overcome strong passions. For no one is self-controlled unless they hold themselves against their passions. Therefore, it is said in Ethics 7. It is said in Ethics that self-control is more desirable than perseverance. In the third degree of goodness, there are the self-controlled. Those who are self-controlled are said to be those who not only persevere with slight passions, which the persevering do, but also hold themselves against strong passions, which the self-controlled do; yet they are so disciplined against their appetites that they have such moderate passions that they hardly feel a struggle, and it is delightful for them to do good. Just as the persevering oppose the soft, and the self-controlled oppose the incontinent, so the self-controlled oppose the intemperate. For just as it is delightful for the intemperate to do evil, so it is delightful for the self-controlled to do good. In the fourth and highest degree of goodness are divine men. For just as some men are beastly and are evil beyond the measure of humanity, so some are almost divine and are good beyond the measure of humanity. Hence, the philosopher speaks about the principle. The Ethics states that Homer refers to Hector, saying that King Priam, his father, said of him that he was very good; for which reason it did not seem that there existed a boy of a moral man, but of God. That virtue, by which one ought to be good beyond the measure of humanity, is called by the philosopher heroic, that is, commanding and dominating. From this, it is clear that kings and princes, if they are to rule rightly, must not only flee all degrees of evil, but they must not be soft, nor incontinent, nor intemperate, nor beastly; rather, they must be in the highest degree of goodness: for those who desire to rule over others must possess that virtue which is dominant and commanding in relation to others, and they must be good beyond the measure of others, and be like divine men. In this degree, therefore, kings and princes ought to be. And if it is fitting for good and perfect secular princes to be in such a degree, let it be left to the prudent judgment of what kind they ought to be as ecclesiastical leaders.