Liber I, Pars II — Quod Maxime decet reges, et principes omnes virtutes habere, et quod si una careant, nullam habent. Cap. XXXI.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod Maxime decet reges, et principes omnes virtutes habere, et quod si una careant, nullam habent. Cap. XXXI.

Both the saints and philosophers agree on this point: virtues must be interconnected. For they say that whoever possesses one virtue possesses them all, and whoever lacks one lacks them all. Since it is entirely clear that kings and princes ought to possess certain virtues, because, as is evident, they must be wise and just, it must also be clear that they should possess all virtues, since wisdom and justice cannot exist without other virtues. In fact, there is never a single virtue that can be perfectly possessed without all the other virtues. Thus, even the scholars of truth have sensed this, saying that virtues are interconnected. However, it seems to appear otherwise. For we see some who are generous but not temperate, yet they engage in indulgent behaviors. Some, however, are chaste, yet they are still driven by greed. Therefore, just because someone has one virtue doesn’t mean they have them all, nor does it follow that if some virtues are necessary for kings, then all virtues are necessary for them. Again, we see some people being generous, yet they cannot be magnificent because they lack the means to do great things. It should be noted, then, that virtues can be considered in two ways: either as natural and imperfect, or as principal and complete. However, to resolve such objections, it is said that virtues can be considered in two ways: either as natural and imperfect, or as principal and complete. It is clearly demonstrated that virtues are interconnected. Yet, natural and imperfect virtues do not necessarily have to be interconnected. For we see some people naturally possessing a certain industriousness and a certain subtlety of mind, which is why they have a kind of imperfect prudence. Thus, it is evident that virtues can be understood in different ways, depending on whether they are seen as natural and imperfect or as principal and complete. However, those who are not chaste, nor generous, nor possess other moral virtues, are not truly virtuous. We also see some people inclined from their youth to acts of generosity, who are not chaste; while others, on the contrary, have a certain natural modesty, yet they are not generous. Therefore, virtues are not necessarily connected. But the virtues that are called principal and perfect, either in themselves or in a very closely related disposition, must necessarily be connected. We have said that in a closely related disposition, the poor, due to their lack of external goods, according to the Philosopher, should not be called magnificent. Yet it is said that if the poor are truly and perfectly generous according to their means, it is very close for them to be magnificent; for if they had an abundance of external goods, they would immediately perform magnificent deeds. Therefore, to fully understand these statements, it must be declared that no virtue can be perfectly possessed unless all other virtues are also possessed. It should be noted, therefore, that we need virtues in order to rightly and properly aim for good ends. In such matters, one can sin in two ways. First, if we propose an evil end for ourselves, as the wicked do. For the greedy propose to themselves the end of pursuing greed. The intemperate, on the other hand, pursue lust. And so it goes with others. Secondly, one can sin in such matters if we do not properly strive for a good end. Some wish to be distributors of goods and propose to themselves the end of acts of generosity; however, they do not care how they receive those goods, as long as they can give something to others: sometimes through theft, sometimes through manifest oppression, they plunder others to achieve acts of generosity. Therefore, although they may propose a good end for themselves, they do not properly strive toward that end. They don't sin in their goal or intention, but they do sin in the way they pursue it and in the manner of achieving their intended end. Therefore, such people, even if they are generous in some way, cannot be truly generous, because true virtue requires not only proposing a good end but also properly striving toward that end. We need moral virtues because through them we propose a good end for ourselves. We also need prudence, because through it we reason correctly about the things that lead to the end. Moral virtues, therefore, in themselves and primarily, correct the end. For just as the quality of our tongue determines our flavor, if the tongue is greatly infected by bile, it tastes bitter; but if it is greatly infected by sweet phlegm, it seems to partake of a certain sweetness. In the same way, according to our will and desire, we impose a certain end upon ourselves: as the intemperate person proposes to themselves an end of lust. Temperate, chaste; generous, to expend; avaricious, to conserve. Therefore, moral virtues that perfect our desires correct our end: because by having a good desire through those virtues, we propose a good end for ourselves. Prudence, indeed, by itself and primarily corrects those things that are directed toward the end. For by proposing a good end to ourselves through moral virtues, we reason well about those things that relate to the end, and we choose the right path so that we may rightly pursue that end. Therefore, it is said. Ethic. That moral virtues correct the end, indeed, prudence makes us act rightly regarding those things that relate to the end. Thus, speaking primarily and primarily, moral virtue corrects the end: prudence, indeed, corrects the way. But since there is no perfect way unless it is ordered toward a good end and goal, perfect prudence is never attained unless it is joined to moral virtues, through which we propose a good goal and a good end for ourselves. Thus, because a good end is never rightly and perfectly achieved unless we strive toward it through a good path, we will never perfectly possess any moral virtue unless it is joined with prudence. Therefore, the philosopher intends to establish such a rationale regarding the end. Ethics. Having any moral virtue perfectly means possessing perfect prudence; but having perfect prudence means possessing every virtue; therefore, having any virtue means possessing every virtue. Thus, virtues and prudence are interconnected, because no one is good through moral virtues unless they are prudent. For since moral virtue is a good and elective habit that perfects the one who possesses it and produces good works: to choose well and to perform good works, it suffices to propose a good end, unless one travels toward that end by a good path; moral virtue, through which we propose a good end, cannot exist without prudence, by which we rightly strive toward that end. Thus, prudence cannot exist without moral virtue. For prudence differs from industry, which the philosopher calls 'Denoteta.' For he is called wise and industrious who can find ways to achieve any goal without error, so that he can reach that goal more quickly. However, no one is called wise unless he finds good ways to reach a good end. Therefore, wisdom is not the ability to find good ways to a good end without moral virtues, through which we propose a good end. But someone might say that a moral virtue cannot exist without wisdom, and conversely, that every good person is wise, and vice versa; yet it is not necessary that one who perfectly possesses one moral virtue also possesses all moral virtues. For someone can perfectly possess temperance and have wisdom, as long as he does not abandon temperance; yet he will not have other virtues, nor will he have wisdom if he abandons those virtues. Therefore, he will be perfectly temperate, but he will not be strong. But a timid person will neither be generous nor will he be greedy. But this cannot stand. No one can be perfectly temperate unless they are strong and generous, and unless they possess other virtues; moreover, no one can have any virtue unless they have all the virtues. For he is perfectly temperate who does not act in any way contrary to reason. Therefore, if someone is timid, even if they do not desire to engage in immoral acts according to their own nature, they might choose to act immorally to avoid punishment, mutilation, or death. Similarly, if someone were greedy, because they set their goal on acquiring wealth, even if they might find immoral acts distasteful, they would still engage in them if they could gain wealth, which they intended as their end. Thus, it is possible for one virtue to be held imperfectly without the others, but it cannot be held completely and perfectly without all the others. Therefore, it is fitting for kings and princes to be like demigods and to possess perfect virtues; they ought to have all virtues, because one virtue cannot be perfectly held without the others. Indeed, it is essential for kings and princes, when they cannot excuse themselves due to a lack of external goods, to possess all virtues, not only in a proximate disposition but also simply and according to their own nature. For a poor person can be perfect if they do not perform magnificent deeds or great expenditures, because they do not have the means to make great expenditures. A king can never be perfect if he doesn't act magnificently and excel in all virtues.