Liber I, Pars II — Quid est iocunditas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo decet reges, et principes esse iocundos. Cap. XXX.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est iocunditas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo decet reges, et principes esse iocundos. Cap. XXX.

Some people believe that all words or actions related to play are idle, but that's not the case. For that which lacks a proper purpose is indeed idle. Therefore, whatever can be arranged toward a proper end is not idle. However, if play is liberal, honorable, and modest, it has a good purpose: because it is somewhat necessary in life. Thus it is said in the Ethics. It seems that rest and play are something necessary in life. Just as the bodily senses, like sight and hearing, because they work in perception, nature has ordained sleep for their rest, and sleep is necessary in life. So, because we continually labor in studying, or in the affairs of the kingdom, or in doing other things, some pleasures, if they are playful, moderate, and honorable, not idle, are interposed among our cares and labors. Therefore, since it can happen that one might sin or do good in such matters, we must have some virtue regarding these amusements, through which we can properly engage in games. In these very amusements, some people are excessively eager to make others laugh. In the Ethics, it is said that some people try harder to make others laugh than to say something appropriate. Such people are the jesters whom the philosopher calls buffoons. For such jesters, the philosopher compares them to birds that snatch at prey. They snatch at the prey offered in the temples of the pagans. Just as those birds do not care how they might catch something from that prey, so those who want to make others laugh and provoke them to laughter do not care how they might capture the words or actions of others and turn them into a game and laughter. Therefore, they are excessive in their amusements. Some, however, are lacking: these are called harsh and uncouth. Such people do not support any game, nor do they say anything funny; rather, they are bothersome to those who do. Therefore, it is clear what joy or amusement is, as it is a virtue that moderates the excesses of play and tempers harshness. This kind of virtue pertains both to moderating harshness and to repressing excesses in play; however, it is not equally principal regarding these matters, because virtue is always more fundamentally concerned with the more difficult. However, repressing the excesses of games is more difficult than moderating defects. For the game itself has a certain pleasure attached to it, because of which we are more inclined to pursue enjoyable pastimes than to flee from them. It remains to see what amusement is without joy, and regarding what it should be, because it is more fundamentally about repressing the excesses of play, and consequently about moderating defects. Therefore, it remains to see how kings and princes ought to be joyful. As can be seen, extremes are always criticized; the middle ground, however, is praised. However, this middle ground, which lies in the virtues that restrain passions and movements, should not be taken literally, but rather as it applies to us. For, as was said in the previous chapters, what is excessive for one may be moderate for another, and vice versa. Therefore, it is fitting for people to restrain the excesses of games, but it is even more fitting for kings and princes to do so; indeed, kings and princes ought to use playful amusements so moderately that if common people were to do the same, they would seem harsh and uncouth. Thus, it is not entirely forbidden for kings and princes to enjoy some recreation or amusement, but rather because the games we should engage in, according to the Philosopher, must be appropriate. For, from early childhood, it seems natural for children to take pleasure in games. Therefore, if a game is not moderate and honest, it seems to carry some childishness with it. Thus, it is fitting for kings and princes to use the amusements of games moderately, just as it is more detestable for them to appear childish. Furthermore, as is clear from habits, this joyful delight is not idle and is directed toward a good end, because it provides us with a certain recreation amidst our cares, by which we rise more ardently to engage in good works, for which we must take care. Therefore, when an immoderate or dishonorable jest distracts us from good works and from our rightful duties, it is all the more detestable for kings and princes to use games and amusements immoderately or dishonorably, as the care for the common good, which pertains to the prince, is of greater importance than the care for any particular good. Therefore, we should not entirely prohibit joyful words or actions, as long as they are honest and moderate; and this should be more or less so, depending on the diversity of persons.