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Chapter 43GilesRP.1.43

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est veritas, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges et principes esse veraces. Cap. XXIX.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est veritas, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges et principes esse veraces. Cap. XXIX.

Just as in life, it often happens that people either overindulge or fall short in their conversations, so it is with truth. For truth consists in a certain balance. However, anyone who speaks more than what is true deviates from the truth due to excess; and anyone who denies what is true and admits to lesser things deviates from the truth due to deficiency. Therefore, since lying is always to be avoided, as it is said, those who are not truthful, neither open nor showing themselves as they are, are considered reprehensible. For what else is it to lie, except not to be open and not to show oneself as one truly is? Therefore, from this truth, by which one presents oneself as truthful and manifest, some deviate by excess, showing in words or actions more than they truly are. And such people are called boastful. Some, however, deviate from this truth through deficiency, pretending to possess some worthless qualities that are not actually in them. Those whom the philosopher calls 'mockers,' that is, those who ridicule and scorn. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a certain middle virtue through which diminished qualities may be moderated and excesses may be restrained. This, however, is commonly referred to as Truth. It is clear, then, what truth is: it is the virtue that moderates contempt and restrains boasting. Having seen what truth is, it remains to consider what it ought to be. It should be noted, therefore, that while it is possible to affirm that something exists which does not, or to deny that something exists which does, this is to lie; however, it is possible to not state everything that is true without committing a lie. Therefore, wishing to be truthful, one should not pretend to possess a goodness that one does not have, nor should one concede the existence of evil within oneself that one does not believe exists. However, one should not claim to possess all the goodness that one knows one does not have; for although no one should lie, not every truth must be spoken at all times and in every place. In fact, according to reason, we can sometimes remain silent about the truth, depending on the situation and time. Therefore, the truth pertains to the repression of boastfulness and the moderation of contempt; however, it is not equally principal regarding these matters. But primarily, truth stands opposed to boastfulness and aims to repress it. Consequently, it stands opposed to contempt and intends to moderate it. Therefore, the philosopher states in Book 4. In the Ethics, chapter. Regarding the truth, it is said that to lean towards the lesser and to say of oneself things that are less than what they are is the work of a wise person. Therefore, it is fitting for a truthful person to never claim to be greater than they are. Some people boast about their great virtues, yet they often lack those very qualities; they promise great goods and assistance to friends and acquaintances, but they deliver little or nothing. However, it is clear that such people are boastful and insincere, and they should not exceed the truth in their claims, but rather should understate them; as long as they do not lie, they should not stray too far from the middle ground, because if they stray too far from the middle, they will not appear truthful but rather ridiculous. If someone were so strong and vigorous that it was clear to others that they could fight against a hundred opponents, but they only claimed to be able to fight against one weak opponent, everyone would recognize that they were speaking in a derisive manner. Therefore, the term 'irony' and 'derision' is derived from when someone notably concedes less about themselves than is true. Thus, it is important to moderate such derisions and to suppress boastfulness. However, it is more important to suppress boastfulness than to moderate derisions, because (as has been said) in such matters it is better to understate oneself than to claim more than is true. We can assign two reasons why it is always better to understate rather than overstate in such matters. The first reason comes from self-reflection. The second reason comes from the perspective of others. For everyone is naturally inclined to believe that their own good is greater than it really is. Therefore, people are often deceived about themselves, believing they are more capable than they actually are. Thus, when discussing one's own goods, one should always lean towards humility, because we must recognize that our own goods often seem greater to us than they truly are. This reasoning is addressed by the philosopher in his writings. He states that it is wise to lean towards humility. For it is a mark of great wisdom to know oneself and to understand that one's own goods are always perceived as greater than they are. The second reason is drawn from the perspective of others. For those who do not humble themselves are their own admirers, boasting about the good things they possess. And because people generally recoil from those who praise themselves, it is fitting to downplay one's own merits in such matters, so that one does not become burdensome to others. This reasoning is addressed by the philosopher in the same work. The Ethics states that one should downplay oneself to avoid being burdensome due to excessive boasting. Having shown what truth is that we speak of, and concerning what it must be: it is clear that it is fitting for kings and princes to be truthful. For those who notably downplay themselves and speak of themselves in a notably lesser and more trivial way than they are, seem to be ridiculous and contemptible. On the other hand, those who excessively elevate themselves and claim to be greater than they are seem to be boastful and burdensome. Therefore, if it is fitting for kings to be not contemptible but reverend, and not burdensome but gracious and lovable, they should not be boastful or ridiculous, but open and truthful, not showing or boasting about themselves as greater than they are, or promising others more than they can deliver. On the contrary, it is even more fitting for kings and princes to avoid boasting, especially when they have many who incite them to boastfulness and could boast about many things.

Read the original Latin

Sicut circa conversationem in vita contingit superabundare, et deficere: sic circa veritatem contingit superabundare, et deficere. Veritas enim in quadam adaequatione consistit. Qui vero plus dicit quam sit, a veritate recedit ratione abundantiae: qui vero quae sunt negat, et minora confitetur, a veritate recedit ratione defectus. Quare cum mendacium sit semper fugiendum, ut dicitur 4. Ethicorum, qui non sunt veraces nec aperti, nec ostendunt se tales, quales sunt, reprehensibiles existunt. Quid enim aliud est mentiri, nisi non esse apertum, et non ostendere se talem, qualis est. Ab hac ergo veritate, per quam quis reddit se veracem et manifestum, aliqui deviant per superabundantiam, ostendentes de se verbis aut facits maiora quam sint. et tales vocatur iactatores.

Aliqui vero ah hac veritate declinant per defectum, fingentes de se aliqua vilia quae in ipsis non sunt. quos Philosophus vocat irones, idest irrisores, et despectores. Oportet ergo dare aliquam virtutem mediam, per quam moderentur diminuta, et reprimentur superflua. haec autem communi nomine Veritas nuncupatur. Patet ergo quid est veritas: quia est virtus moderans despectiones, et reprimens iactantias. Viso quid est veritas, restat videre circa quae habet esse. Sciendum ergo quod licet affirmare in se esse quod non est, vel negare quod est, sit mentiri: tamen non dicere totum quod est, absque mendacio fieri potest. Volens igitur esse verax, non debet de se fingere habere bonitatem quam non habet, nec debet concedere in se esse malitiam, quam sibi inesse non credit.

Non tamen oportet quod de se dicat totam bonitatem, quam sibi inesse cognoscit: quia licet nullus mentiri debeat, non tamen semper et ubique quaelibet veritas est dicenda: loco enim et tempore secundum dictamen rationis possumus veritatem tacere. Est igitur veritas circa repressionem iactantiarum, et circa moderationem despectionum: non tamen est circa haec aeque principaliter. Sed principalius veritas opponitur iactantiae, et intendit iactantias reprimere. Ex consequenti autem opponitur despectioni, et intendit despectiones moderare. Ideo Philosophus 4. Ethicorum cap. de veritate ait, quod declinare ad minus, et dicere de se minora quam sint, est opus prudentis. Spectat igitur ad veracem nullo modo dicere de se maiora, quam sint.

quod multi faciunt. Concedunt enim de se aliqui magnas bonitates, cum tamen illis careant: et promittunt amicis et notis magna bona et magna auxilia, de quibus modicum, aut nihil opere implent. Tales autem quia patet esse iactatores et albos, non apertos et veraces, nullo modo in talibus est excedendum in plus, sed magis declinandum in minus: dum tamen sine mendacio fiat, et non notabiliter recedat a medio: quia si notabiliter a medio recederet, non in hoc appareret verax, sed derisor. Ut si aliquis adeo esset fortis et strenuus, quod constaret aliis quod contra centum bellare posset: si ille non plus de se concederet, nisi quod contra unicum et debilem bellaret, omnes intra se cognoscerent quod derisorie loqueretur. Inde igitur sumptum est nomen ironiae et derisionis, quando aliquis notabiliter de se minora concedit quam sint. Ad veritatem ergo spectat moderare huiusmodi derisiones, et reprimere iactantias. principalius tamen spectat ad ipsum iactantias reprimere, quam derisiones moderare: quia (ut dictum est) in talibus magis est declinandum in minus dicendo de se minora quam sint, quam sit excercendum in plus asserendo de se maiora. Possumus autem duplicem causam assignare quare in talibus semper est declinandum in minus.

Prima sumitur ex parte sui. Secunda ex parte aliorum. Quilibet enim ita naturaliter afficitur ad proprium bonum, ut ipsum semper plus credat esse quam sit. Ideo communiter homines decipiuntur de se ipsis, plus credentes se plus valere, quam valeant. In narrando ergo propria bona, semper delcinandum est in minus: quia aestimare debemus quod affecti ad propria bona, videntur nobis illa esse maiora, quam sint. Hanc autem rationem tangit Philosophus in cap. praetacto, cum ait, quod prudentis est declinare in minus. Nam magnae prudentiae est, cognoscere seipsum, et sciri quod propria bona semper aestimantur maiora quam sint.

Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte aliorum. Nam non declinantes in minus sunt laudatores sui, iactantes se de bonis quae habent. Et quia homines communiter horrent, laudantes seipsos, ideo etiam ex parte aliorum decet in talibus declinare in minus, ne homines sint aliis onerosi. Hanc autem rationem tangit Philosophus in eodem 4. Ethicorum dicens, declinandum esse in minus propter onerosas esse superabundantias. Ostenso quid est veritas de qua loquimur, et circa quae habet esse: de levi patet quod decet reges et principes esse veraces. Nam declinantes notabiliter in minus, et dicentes de se notabiliter minora et viliora, quam sint, videntur esse derisiores, et contemptibiles. Excedentes vero in plus, et dicentes maiora quam sint, videntur esse iactatores, et onerosi.

Quare si reges decet esse non contemptibiles, sed reverendos: nec onerosos, sed gratiosos et amabiles: decet eos non esse iactatores vel derisiores, sed apertos et veraces, non ostendendo, vel iactando de se maiora quam sint, vel promittendo aliis maiora quam faciant. Immo tanto magis decet reges et principes cavere iactantiam, quamto plures habent incitantes ipsos ad iactantiam, et de pluribus se iactare possent.

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