Liber I, Pars II — Quid est amicabilitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo reges, et principes debet esse amicabiles. Cap. XXVIII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est amicabilitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo reges, et principes debet esse amicabiles. Cap. XXVIII.

As the present matter requires, we have sufficiently discussed the virtues concerning good things in themselves, and those concerning external evils. Next, we need to talk about the virtues that concern external goods, so that we can communicate with others. We communicate with others through words and deeds. Words and deeds, through which we communicate, serve us in three ways. These are, namely, friendliness, which can also be called affability; truth, which is known as openness; and proper cheerfulness, which is called eutrapelia. Therefore, when we want to interact well with others, we should be appropriately cheerful, truthful, and friendly. Now, let’s first discuss friendliness. We see that in conversing with others, some people go too far by being overly friendly, like flatterers and sycophants. Truth, which we intend to discuss here, is nothing other than that a person should not be a braggart, showing through words or deeds more than they are, nor should they be a mocker or a despiser of others, revealing themselves to be contemptible beyond what reason dictates. Thirdly, words and actions can be directed toward joyful delights, so that a person may be appropriately cheerful. Therefore, as was said above, there is a threefold virtue concerning the words and actions through which we communicate with others. Namely, friendliness, which can also be called affability; truth, which is called openness; and appropriate cheerfulness, which is referred to as wit. Thus, when we communicate with others, if we want to converse well, we must be appropriately cheerful, truthful, and friendly. About all these things, it must be said. But first, let’s talk about friendliness. For we see that in conversing with others, some are excessive, as they present themselves as overly friendly, such as those who are flatterers and placid. For they show themselves to be so sociable and friendly that they don't want anyone to feel sad; instead, they praise everything that others say and do. Some, on the other hand, fall too short in this kind of conversation. For they are rude and unsociable, unable to engage with others. Both, however, fall short of proper reason, because no one should present themselves so socially that they appear overly pleasant and flattering, nor should they withdraw from society to the point of seeming rude and contentious. Therefore, since virtue is the mean between excess and deficiency in human interaction, where it can happen that one overindulges or falls short, we must provide some virtue that restrains excesses and moderates deficiencies. This kind of friendliness, or affability, is a virtue. Affability, as a virtue, is nothing other than having a balanced demeanor in human interaction, so that we do not overindulge in such conversations as the contentious and rude do. Now, to understand what friendliness is, as we speak of it here, it is the virtue that restrains disputes and moderates flattery, as can be found in the philosopher. Thus, it is necessary to consider how one should engage in conversation with others. One can see how the principles of ethics can apply to the way we conduct ourselves, as they relate to our actions and words, which should be ordered towards a proper way of living. If indeed a person is naturally a social being, as can be demonstrated, It is necessary to consider how one should speak and act in a way that engages with others, providing some virtue that maintains proper conduct. Therefore, since reason dictates that one should engage differently according to the diversity of persons, while all people who wish to live politically should be friendly and approachable, not everyone should be friendly in the same way. For excessive familiarity breeds contempt; therefore, kings and princes should conduct themselves with greater decorum than others, so that they may be held in reverence and not lose their royal dignity. Hence, the philosopher states that In the context of political philosophy, it is said that kings and princes ought to appear as revered figures, so that they are not regarded with contempt. Just as right reason dictates in consumption and in other matters that things should be done differently according to the diversity of persons—because what is abundant food for the sick might be moderate for the healthy—so it is in human interaction. For a certain kind of familiarity is regarded as virtuous for a king, and it is said to be friendly because if a common person were to participate in familiarity beyond a certain point, it would be seen as a flaw, not a virtue, and they would not be called friendly, but wild.