Liber I, Pars II — Quod est mansuetudo, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges et principes esse mansuetos. Cap. XXVII.
Liber I, Pars II — Quod est mansuetudo, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges et principes esse mansuetos. Cap. XXVII.
After we have discussed the virtues that pertain to external goods and shown how kings and princes should be adorned with those virtues, it remains to speak about meekness, which concerns external evils. It is blameworthy to be angry with anyone at all, to always seek revenge, and to do so over any matter, as the hot-tempered do. On the other hand, never being angry and not wanting to punish anyone in any way is not commendable, because it goes against the order of reason. Reason dictates that some punishments must be carried out and that one should be angry with the right person, at the right time, and in the right way. To be angry in the right place and at the right time is the work of virtue. Therefore, in the passions of anger, and in the desire for punishments and revenge, it can happen that one overflows or falls short: there must be some virtue present to restrain the excesses and moderate the deficiencies. This is what meekness is: just as courage is the mean between fear and recklessness, so meekness is the mean between anger, through which we desire revenge, and irritability, through which we forgive the evils done to us. The truly meek person is one who neither desires revenge for everything nor so completely refrains from punishment that they never want others to be punished, but is forgiving and punitive according to the order of reason. It's wrong to get angry at anyone and to always demand punishment for anything, as the angry do. Moreover, it's not commendable to never get angry or to want anyone punished in any way, because that goes against the order of reason. For reason dictates that some punishments should be carried out, and it determines who should be punished, when, and how. Getting angry at the right time and in the right way is the work of virtue. Therefore, in the passions of anger, and in the desire for punishments and revenge, it can happen that one overreacts or falls short; we must provide some virtue that restrains excesses and moderates deficiencies. This is what meekness is: just as courage is a mean between fear and boldness, so meekness is a mean between anger, through which we desire revenge. And it includes the ability to forgive the wrongs done to us. But the truly meek person is one who neither desires revenge for everything nor so completely refrains from punishment that they never want others to be punished; rather, they are forgiving and punitive according to the order of reason. Therefore, just as courage restrains fears and moderates boldness, so gentleness restrains anger and moderates irritability. To see what gentleness is, it is clear from a slight examination what it ought to be. For it is indeed (as has already been said) about anger and its opposite, which is irritability. However, it is primarily about anger. Gentleness primarily and chiefly aims to restrain anger; consequently, it also seeks to moderate the passions that oppose anger. For it is natural for us to desire punishment and revenge for the wrongs done to us. Moreover, since the wrong done to us seems hardly to be so slight that it should be disregarded, we are not only naturally inclined to want to punish those who inflict any harm on us, but it is also somewhat natural for us to desire punishment beyond what is deserved. For it seems to us that the harm done to us is greater than it is; we want our wrongdoers to be punished more than they should be. It is therefore very difficult to suppress anger and not desire punishments for wrongs beyond what reason dictates. Many therefore sin by desiring more: few, however, sin by desiring less. For if virtue is about what is good and difficult, meekness primarily opposes anger and intends to suppress it; consequently, it also opposes irritability and intends to moderate it, which the very name designates: for if we consider the force of the name, meekness designates the temperament of anger. However, it is inappropriate for kings and princes to be angry, since reason and understanding ought to prevail in them. For just as we see that an infected tongue cannot rightly judge flavors, so too, an appetite infected by immoderate anger or other excessive passions distorts our judgment of reason. If therefore it is inappropriate for the rule to be perverted and misled, a king, who ought to be like a mirror and a model of living, and who ought to be the rule of conduct, it is inappropriate for him to be angry, lest through anger he be perverted and misled. Likewise, if in no way he were irascible, and in no way would he be stirred to carry out punishment, it would be inappropriate: for if punishments were not carried out in the kingdom, men would become wrongdoers toward others, and the state could not endure. No one should become angry out of hatred, nor should anyone seek punishment out of hatred; rather, one should become angry for love and zeal, and punishment should be sought. Punishment is to be sought for the sake of love and zeal for justice, or for the love of the republic. For without this, the republic cannot endure. Therefore, if someone were so gentle that they would rather see justice perish than demand justice, they would not be virtuous. Thus, it is even more fitting for kings and princes to be moved to enact punishment, as it is more appropriate for them to be guardians of justice and protectors of the republic. Therefore, kings should not be irascible, and they should be moved according to the order of reason, so that punishments and retributions may occur, as this is what gentleness does; it is fitting for them to be gentle. Thus, it is necessary for them to be gentle, as this aligns with their role as leaders.
Read the original Latin
Postquam determinavimus de virtutibus respicientibus exteriora bona, et ostendimus quomodo reges et principes decet ornari virtutibus illis, restat dicere de mansuetudine, quae respicit exteriora mala. Dicebatur enim supra, quod, quia circa quaecunque contingit peccare, et bene agere, vel contingit abundare, et deficere, oportet ibi dare virtutem aliquam, per quam dirigamur ad bene agendum, reprimentem defectus, et moderantem superfluitates. In vindicando autem exteriora mala ab aliis facta, aliqui superabundant, ut iracundi nimis, facientes vindictam. Nam ex hoc, ira provenit, quod appetimus vindictam. Qui enim propter mala aliqua illata vindictam aut punitionem appetit, dum hoc vehementer desiderat, accenditur eius sanguis circa cor, quo accenso irascitur. Quidam ergo sunt irascibiles et superabundant in cupiendo vindictam. Quidam autem sunt irascibiles, omnem iniuriam dissimulantes. Quorum neutrum bonum est.
Irasci enim cuilibet, et semper, et de quolibet vindictam exposcere, quod faciunt iracundi, vituperabile est. Rursum, nunquam irasci, et in nullo modo velle aliquem puniri, non est laudabile, quia est agere praeter ordinem rationis. Ratio enim dictat punitiones aliquas esse faciendas, et quod est irascendum, cui debet, et quando, et quomodo. Irasci enim loco et tempore, est virtutis opus. Quare in passionibus irae, et in appetendo punitiones et vindictas, contingit superabundare et deficere: oportet ibi dare virtutem aliquam reprimentem superabundantias, et moderantem defectus. Haec autem est mansuetudo: quia sicut fortitudo est media inter timores et audacias, sic mansuetudo est media inter iram, per quam cupimus vindictam. et irascibilitatem, per quam condonamus mala nobis illata. Ille vero mitis est, qui nec de omnibus cupit vindictam, nec in tantum deficit a punitione quod nullo modo velit alios puniri, sed est condonativus, et punitivus secundum ordinem rationis.
Quare sicut fortitudo reprimit timores, et moderat audacias. sic mansuetudo reprimit iras, et moderat irascibilitates. Viso quid est mansuetudo, de levi patet circa quae habet esse. Est enim (ut iam dictum est) circa iras, et circa oppositum irae, ut circa irascibilitatem. principalius tamen est circa iras. Mansuetudo enim principaliter et primo intendit reprimere iras, ex consequenti autem intendit moderare passiones oppositas irae. Nam nautrale est nobis ut ex malis nobis illatis appetamus punitionem, et vindictam. Rursus, quia malum proprium vix potest esse ita modicum, quin videatur nobis multum, non solum naturaliter inclinamur, ut velimus puniri inferentes nobis aliqua mala, sed etiam quodammodo naturale est nobis appetere punitionem ultra condignum.
Nam quia malum nobis illatum videtur nobis maius esse, quam sit; iniuriatores nostros plus puniri volumus, quam puniendi sint. Difficile est ergo valde reprimere iras, et non appetere punitiones iniuriarum ultra quam dictet ratio. Plures ergo peccant in appetendo plus: pauci vero delinquunt in appetendo minus. Propter quod si virtus est circa bonum et difficile, mansuetudo principaliter opponitur irae, et indendit iras reprimere: ex consequenti autem opponitur irascibilitati, et intendit eam moderare, quod ipsum nomen designat: si enim vim nominis consideremus, mansuetudo nominat temperamentum irae. Quod autem deceat reges et principes esse iracundos, cum in eis maxime vigere debeat ratio et intellectus. Sicut enim videmus quod lingua infecta per coleram, vel per alios humores, non recte iudicamus de saporibus: sic infecto appetitu per immoderatam iram, vel per alias immoderatas passiones, pervertitur nostrum iudicium rationis. Si igitur inconveniens est regulam perverti et obliquari: rex, qui debet esse quasi speculum et forma vivendi, et qui debet esse regula agendorum, inconveniens est quod sit iracundus, ne per iram pervertatur et obliquatur. Sic etiam, si nullo modo esset irascibilis, et nullo modo commoveretur ad punitionem faciendam, indecens esset: quia si punitiones non fierent in regno, homines fierent iniuriatores aliorum, et politia durare non posset.
Nullus igitur debet irasci per odium, nec debet punitiones appetere propter odium, sed propter amorem et zelum est irascendum, et sunt punitiones appetendae. Appetenda est enim punitio propter amorem et zelum iustitiae, vel proter amorem Reipub. quia sine ea Resp. durare non posset. Quare si quis in tantum esset mitis, quod potius vellet iustitiam perire, quam iustitiam exposcere, virtuosus non esset. Tanto ergo magis decet reges et principes moveri ad punitionem faciendam, quanto magis spectat ad ipsos esse custodes iustitiae, et conservatores Reip. Quare se reges non debent esse iracundi, et debent in moveri secundum ordinem rationis, ut fiant punitiones et vindictae, cum hoc faciat mansuetudo, decet eos mansuetos esse.
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