Liber I, Pars II — Quid est humilitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges, et principes esse humiles. Cap. XXVI.
Liber I, Pars II — Quid est humilitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges, et principes esse humiles. Cap. XXVI.
It's clear from experience that humility differs from magnanimity. For although the same virtue can restrain excesses and moderate deficiencies, these two cannot equally pertain to the same virtue. Thus, it follows that magnanimity aims to suppress despair, so we don’t lose hope in difficult matters, and it also seeks to moderate our expectations, so we don’t strive for things beyond reason. However, magnanimity primarily acts to suppress despair, so we don’t withdraw from difficult tasks; and consequently, it moderates our hopes, so we don’t pursue them beyond reason. Therefore, magnanimity primarily suppresses despair, so we don’t retreat from challenging endeavors, and in turn, it moderates our hopes, so we don’t strive for things beyond reason. On the other hand, humility is fundamentally different, as was discussed earlier. Therefore, since this virtue is distinct from that one, we need to understand what this kind of virtue is that we call humility. Thus, just as it is fitting to both excel and fall short regarding magnanimity, so it is also fitting to have a similar approach regarding humility. For as is clear from what has been said, magnanimity is a virtue that does not push us forward, so that we are not drawn back by the difficulty of the task, and thus we do not pursue works worthy of great honor. Therefore, some people are excessive, like the presumptuous, pursuing great things more than they ought; others, however, are deficient, like the timid; thus, magnanimity is the mean between presumption and timidity. It is important to note that while a virtue tends to restrain rather than push us forward, it primarily opposes excess, through which we are driven, and consequently, it also opposes deficiency, through which we are held back. In this way, some are excessive, like the proud, pursuing excellence and honors beyond what they should. However, some are deficient, who bring themselves low beyond what they should, like those who neither seek honors nor pursue works worthy of honor; this is not humility, but rather it is more akin to baseness and misery. Thus, humility will be the mean between pride and dejection, just as magnanimity is the mean between presumption and timidity. Seeing what humility is, one can discern what it properly pertains to. For a humble person intends to restrain pride and moderate dejections. Therefore, humility concerns pride and dejection, but it is not equally focused on these. For humility primarily aims to restrain pride and, consequently, to moderate dejection. This is notably important to consider, because while virtue tends to restrain more than to compel, it primarily opposes excess, which drives us, and consequently, deficiency, which pulls us back. But since virtue is more compelling than restraining, it behaves oppositely: for then it primarily opposes deficiency, which pulls us back, and consequently it opposes excellence, which drives us forward. Therefore, magnanimity, because it is a virtue that compels us toward great goods, opposes cowardice more, which is a deficiency pulling us away from such goods, than it opposes presumption, which is an excellence pushing us toward them. But humility, on the contrary, because it is a virtue that restrains, prevents us from pursuing excellence and honors beyond reason, and thus it primarily opposes pride, which abounds in such matters, and consequently it counters dejection. For in seeking works worthy of honor, one can fall into sin not only through pride but also through dejection. For if someone requires more than their own status allows, beyond reason, and thus falls into disgrace, that person would either be worthless, dejected, and like a beast, because they do not recognize their own state; or they would be proud and boastful. Some seek greatness and boastfulness from this, pushing themselves beyond what is fitting. Hence, it is written in the same place that... Ethic. He refers to a certain Greek people, namely the Lacedaemonians, as boastful and arrogant: because they dressed themselves in a way that was beneath their status, believing that they were rising to a certain honor and excellence. Therefore, it is written there that boastfulness and great deficiency are a kind of arrogance. Considering what humility is, since it primarily concerns the repression of pride, and consequently the moderation of dejection, it remains to see what is fitting for kings and princes to be humble. We can prove this in two ways. The first is taken from the aspect of magnanimity. The second point comes from the aspect of good works. It was said above that no one is truly magnanimous unless they are good and humble, and that humility is always attached to magnanimity; therefore, if it is fitting for kings and princes to be magnanimous, it is also fitting for them to be humble. For kings should seek worthy works in such a way that they do not go beyond what reason dictates, but in a manner appropriate to their status, which humble people do; however, they should not place their happiness in excellence and honor, as the proud do. They should perform good works that are worthy of honor, not to show themselves off, but so that they may be seen to excel. Secondly, it is fitting for them to be humble in light of their works. For the proud, seeking their own excellence beyond what they ought, tend most often toward those things that excel by their own strength. Therefore, it is fitting for people to be humble, so that, considering their own shortcomings or abilities, they do not strive for lofty things beyond what they ought. For the proud, seeking their own excellence beyond what they should, often expose others to dangers, unable to fulfill what they begin. Therefore, kings and princes should remove pride from themselves, as much as it is worse to expose common goods to danger. For a proud lord often becomes a great danger to the people.
Read the original Latin
Satis est per habita manifestum, humilitatem a magnanimitate differre. Nam licet una et eadem virtus reprimet superabundantias, et moderet defectus: nunquam tamen aeque principaliter haec duo eidem virtuti competere possunt. Spectat igitur ad magnanimitatem reprimere desperationem, ne desperemus de bonis arduis, et spectat ad ipsam moderare spem, ne ultra quam ratio dictet in tendamus illa. non tamen aequae principaliter operatur utrunque: nam cum magnanimi sit tendere in magnum, magnanimitas magis est virtus impellens in magna, quam retrahens ab illis. principalius ergo magmanimitas reprimit desperationem, ne retrahamur ab arduis: et ex consequenti moderat spem, ne praeter rationem tendamus in illa. Humilitas autem est e contrario se habet, ut supra diffusius dicebatur. Quare cum distincta sit virtus haec ab illa, videndum est quid sit huiusmodi virtus, quam humilitatem vocamus. Sciendum igitur quod sicut circa magnanimitatem convenit abundare et deficere: sic et circa humilitatem esse habet.
Nam ( ut patet ex dictis) magnanimitas est virtus non impellens, ne ratione difficultatis retrahamur, ut non prosequamur opera magno honore digna. Qia igitur in hoc aliqui superabundant, ut praesunptuosi, prosequentes ardua magis quam debeant: quidam vero deficiunt, ut pusillanimes: ideo magnanimitas est media inter preasumpitiones, et pusillanimitates. Sic etian ex dictis patet, quod humilitas est virtus nos retrahens, ne ratione bonitatis et delectabilitatis, quae est in rebus honorificis, prosequamur ea, ultra quam ratio dictet. In hoc ergo aliqui superabundant, ut superbi, prosequentes excellentias, et honores, ultra quam debeant. Aliqui vero deficiunt, qui se deiiciunt ultra quam debeant, ut illi, qui nec quaerunt honores, nec quaerunt opera honore digna: quod non est humilitatis, sed magis est vilitatis et miseriae. Erit ergo humilitas media inter superbiam, et deiectionem: sicut magnanimitas est media inter praesumptionem, et pusillanimitatem. Viso quid est humilitas, de leui videri potest circa quae habet esse. Intendit enim humilis reprimere superbias, et moderare deiectiones.
Erit ergo humilitas circa superbias, et deiectiones: non tamen est circa haec aeque principaliter. Nam humilitas principaliter intendit reprimere superbias, ex consequenti vero moderare deiectiones. Est enim hoc notabiliter attendendum, quod cum virtus magis sit retrahens quam impellens, principaliter opponitur superabundantiae, per quam impellimur, et ex consequenti defectui per quem retrahimur. Sed quum virtus magis est impellens quam retrahens, e contrario se habet: quia tunc principalius opponitur defectui, per quem retrahimur: ex consequenti vero opponitur excellentiae, per quam impellimur. Magnanimitas ergo, quia est virtus impellens in ardua bona, magis opponitur pusillanimitati, quae est defectus nos retrahens e talibus bonis, quam opponatur praesumptioni, quae est excellentia expellens nos in illa. Sed humilitas e contrario, quia est virtus retrahens, ne ultra rationem prosequamur excellentias et honores, principalius opponitur superbiae, quae superabundat in talibus, ex consequenti vero contrariatur deiectoni. Inquirendo enim opera honore digna, non solum contingit peccare per superbiam, sed etiam per deiectionem. Nam si quis ultra quam suus status requirat, praeter rationem et notalilter se deiiceret: iste vel esset vilis, deiectus, et bestia, quia suum statum non cognosceret; vel esset superbus, et iactator.
Nam aliqui ex hoc quaerunt excellentiam et iactantiam, deiiciendo se ultra quam deceat. Unde Philosophus 4. Ethic. quandam gentem Graecam, Lacedaemones scilicet, iactatores et superbos appellat: quia ultra quam eorum status requireret, vilius induebantur: credentes ex hoc in quendam honorem, et in quandam excellentiam iam consurgere. Unde ibidem scribitur, quod superabundantia, et valde defectus, est quid iactativum. Viso circa quae est humilitas, quia principaliter est circa repressionem superbiae, ex consequenti vero circa moderationem deiectionis: restat videre quod decet reges et principes esse humiles. quod duplici via probare possumus. Prima sumitur ex parte magnanimitatis.
Secunda vero ex parte operum fiendorum. Dicebatur enim supra, quia nullus est vere magnanimus, nisi sit bonus et humilis, et quod semper magnanimitati est annexa humilitas: quare si decet reges et principes esse magnanimos, decet esse humiles. Debent enim reges sic quaerere opera honore digna, non ultra quam ratio dictet, sed ut decet eorum statum, quod faciunt humiles: quod tamen suam felicitatem non ponant in excellentia et honore, quod faciunt superbi. Debent enim agere bona opera et honore digna boni gratia, non ut ostendant se, et ut videantur excellere. Secundo decet eos esse humiles ratione operum fiendorum. Nam superbus quaerens suam excellentiam ultra quam debeat, ut plurimum tendit ad ea quae proprias vires excellunt. Ideo decet homines esse humiles, ut considerato proprio defectu vel propria facultate, non tendant in ardua ultra quam debeant. ut plurimum enim superbi, et ultra rationem excellentiam querentes, sed et alios exponunt periculis, non valentes adimplere quod inchoant.
Tanto ergo reges et principes debent a se superbiam removere, quanto peius est communia bona periculis exponere. Superbus enim Dominus, ut plurimum periclitator efficitur populorum.
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