Liber I, Pars II — Quod humilitas dici debet honoris amativa, et quod omnis magnanimus est humilis. Cap. XXV.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod humilitas dici debet honoris amativa, et quod omnis magnanimus est humilis. Cap. XXV.

Philosopher 4. A person who seeks honors in a moderate way is not called magnanimous, but temperate. Since having temperance in honors is the same as having humility, that virtue which brings moderation of the soul and a certain humility of spirit, which the Philosopher calls honor-loving, can be considered a kind of humility because it aims at moderate honors. But if we say this, certain doubts arise. For every magnanimous person is honor-loving, just as every magnificent person is generous; therefore, if honor-loving were a kind of humility, every magnanimous person would be humble, which seems to be the opposite in nature, because a humble person respects others, while a magnanimous person (as it is said). Ethics) despises others. Therefore, it should be understood that unless every magnanimous person is humble, we would not provide a fitting document to princes, because we would teach them to be without virtues, since without humility, virtues cannot exist. To fully declare the truth, it must be shown that without humility, no one can be magnanimous. Magnanimity and humility, along with similar moral virtues, relate to the soul according to reason, because they moderate our passions so that we don't stray from what is good according to reason. But the passions can lead us away from what reason dictates in two ways. First, as the passions incline us toward things that reason forbids. Second, as they draw us away from what reason prescribes. Therefore, when our passions lead us toward something contrary to reason, we need the virtue that restrains us, as is evident in temperance, through which we are held back from sensual pleasures. But when our passions draw us away from what reason dictates, we do not need the virtue that restrains us; rather, we need one that urges us forward, as is clear in courage, which pushes us more toward the dangers of battle than it holds us back from them. Since restraining and urging are somewhat opposite and formally differ, it follows that the virtue that restrains and the one that urges us are not the same; nor is the virtue that primarily moderates our passions the same as the one that drives us away from what reason forbids. Therefore, if one and the same thing can draw us in different ways, we will need to establish two virtues regarding it. We need one virtue that pushes us forward and another that pulls us back. We see that magnanimity is concerned with great honors. A great honor is, in a way, a great good. A great good, in the sense that it is great, holds us back so that we don't pursue it due to the difficulty involved. As a good is truly good, it draws us to pursue it. Therefore, concerning great honors and great goods, it is possible to sin in two ways. First, if we pursue them beyond what reason dictates, as they are good. Second, if we hold back from them when reason dictates that we should pursue them because they are arduous and difficult. Therefore, we need a double virtue regarding such matters. One virtue pushes us forward, so that we are not held back by difficulty, and this is magnanimity; the other virtue holds us back, so that we do not pursue those things beyond reason, and this is humility. Thus, a magnanimous person is humble. For it is impossible to be magnanimous without a good that exists, as the philosopher proves. Ethics. However, no good can exist if one pursues honors beyond what reason dictates; necessarily, when magnanimity urges us toward great goods, humility must be attached to it, so that we do not tend toward those goods beyond what reason allows. Otherwise, it would be vicious. Therefore, striving for great honors and great goods can come from magnanimity and humility, but not according to the same reason. As we strive for those good things without being held back by the difficulty, we are magnanimous; but when we do not pursue them beyond what reason dictates, we are humble. Therefore, magnanimity differs from humility in two ways. First, because magnanimity primarily drives us forward; and consequently, it restrains. Thus, the magnanimous person is said to despise others, not because they wrong others in a vicious manner, but because they possess a heart of such worth that they are moved by virtue to despise the actions and words of men rather than to give up virtuous deeds for them. Humility, on the other hand, primarily holds us back; consequently, it drives us forward. For this reason, a humble person is said to revere others, because they consider their own shortcomings and revere others in lawful and honorable matters. Secondly, this differs from that, because magnanimity primarily moderates despair, so that no one, in light of difficulties, may despair or tend toward actions worthy of great honor. However, humility primarily moderates hope itself, so that no one, overly hopeful about the good itself, may pursue great honors beyond reason. Therefore, every magnanimous person will be humble in the way that has been said. And humility is in some way the same as a moderate love of honor, because a person is called humble who, while moderating their hope for attaining great honors, tends moderately toward those honors. Is humility simply the same as loving moderate honors, or is it truly the same as that virtue which the Philosopher distinguishes from magnanimity and calls a love of honor? It is not a matter of present speculation. But if it were to happen that we were to discuss further matters in the Moral writings, we would show that the virtue the Philosopher speaks of is not in any way the same as humility, because that which the Philosopher speaks of, which (as has been said) tends toward moderate honors, is more in the sensitive appetite, while humility is more in the intellectual.