Liber I, Pars I — Quanta sit utilitas in dicendis. Cap. III.

Liber I, Pars I — Quanta sit utilitas in dicendis. Cap. III.

Since (as has been said) we have undertaken this work for the education of princes, no one can be fully educated unless they are kind, teachable, and attentive: after we have established the royal majesty as benevolent in the first chapter, showing what needs to be said, we will easily handle it; and in the second, we have made it docile by narrating the order of what is to be said: now it remains for us to make it attentive in this third chapter by explaining how useful it is to speak. For since people generally dislike a scrutinized discourse, most listeners are kind to those who present easy and superficial sermons. But if in other sciences this is a corruption of desire, in moral matters, however, where the nature of the subject requires a figurative and substantial tradition, it is not a corruption of desire, but rather a proper and rightful order. In such an art, therefore, from the ease of teaching, a listener becomes kind; but from the order of what is to be said, they become teachable; for who becomes most teachable, that is, most capable of grasping doctrine, if they are presented with what is to be said in a certain series and order? From the usefulness of what is to be said, a listener becomes attentive, for anyone listens attentively if they hope to hear something useful. From what is to be said, if it is rightly understood and duly observed, the royal majesty follows (as far as the present moment is concerned) four things that everyone ought to love and desire most. First, indeed, it will gain the greatest goods. Second, it will gain itself. Thirdly, others. Fourthly, he will attain, so that he may have God himself and eternal happiness. Indeed, goods are distinguished in one way: because some are lesser goods, some are intermediate, and some are greater. The lesser goods are external goods. The intermediate goods are internal goods, which can be common to both the good and the bad: such are the industry of the mind, natural talent, and the powers of the soul; for even the bad partake of these goods. But the greatest goods are the internal goods, which the bad cannot partake of: such are the virtues, which according to the saints, and also according to philosophers, no one can use badly. A rhetorician, because they are the only virtues which one cannot use badly. In another way, goods are distinguished, as is clear through the philosopher, both in great moral matters and also in ethics, because some are delightful, some useful, and some honorable. However, honorable goods are the highest goods: for in these goods (according to him) delightful and useful goods are included. For if goods are honorable, they have within themselves great delight, and they include the goodness of useful goods. Since this book aims to show how royal majesty becomes virtuous, and how those whom it governs are led to honesty and virtue, there is great benefit in speaking about these things, because by observing them, the greatest and most honorable goods will be obtained. Secondly, there is the greatest benefit in speaking about these things, because from them not only will one gain the greatest goods, but one will also gain oneself. For it is a moral business (as many have noted) that we become good: a good man has himself, but a bad man lacks himself. Thus, we ought to imagine, because just as in a city and in a kingdom many are arranged under one leader and one king, so in one and the same man the powers that are rational are arranged through participation towards the intellect, which is rational by essence. For just as a king is not said to have a kingdom, nor a leader to have a city, if in the kingdom or city there are some who do not obey the king or the leader, so a singular man is said not to have himself if his appetites dissent from reason, and if the rational part through participation does not obey the rational part by essence. For a man (according to the Philosopher). Understanding and reason are essential: when reason does not govern what is within a person, that person does not govern themselves, nor do they truly possess themselves; rather, one desires one thing through reason and acts on another through passion, being drawn and inclined in different directions. Therefore, if a wicked person does not possess themselves, a good person, through this endeavor, which is to become good, gains possession of themselves. Third, they gain others: for by rightly governing oneself, one becomes worthy to be a ruler and lord over others. For a wise person, endowed with moral virtues, of which this book will speak, is worthy to lead; but if they lack this, even if they are placed in a position of civil authority, they are more deserving to be subjected than to lead, and they are more naturally a servant than a master. Fourth, by observing these things, of which we will gain knowledge in this book, we will achieve that we may have God Himself and eternal happiness. For God Himself is the essence of unity and goodness, because He is supremely one and supremely good; therefore, the more someone approaches unity and goodness, the more they conform to the first principle and possess God more perfectly. But wicked people are not united at all; for their entire kingdom is scattered. For the kingdom of any person is based on the fact that the powers of the soul are governed by reason and understanding. Therefore, when reason dictates one thing and desire follows another (which happens in those who have a corrupt soul), then a person is not united, but has dissension within themselves, for which reason they are deformed from the first principle. But those who are rich in virtues and abundant in good deeds, because they follow the rule of reason and pursue good things simply, not according to the senses, have unity and goodness within themselves; therefore, they are said to be conformed to the first principle and to possess God himself. Therefore, there is such great usefulness in what is to be said that, if we observe these things, we will gain the greatest goods, ourselves and also others; and we will have God himself, and consequently eternal happiness. But because those things of which we will hand down knowledge cannot be observed without divine grace, it is fitting for any man, and especially for royal majesty, to implore divine grace. For as much as royal majesty stands in a higher place, it needs divine grace all the more, so that it can exercise the works of virtue and lead its subjects to be strong in virtue.