Liber I, Pars I — Quis sit ordo dicendorum. Cap. II.

Liber I, Pars I — Quis sit ordo dicendorum. Cap. II.

Since all teaching and all discipline arise from pre-existing knowledge, as it is said, I. Of later things, it is well suited to narrate the order of what is to be said, so that some pre-knowledge about them may be had. With this pre-knowledge provided, the understanding of what is to be said will be grasped more easily. Therefore, it must be known that we intend to divide this whole book into three partial books. In the first of these, it will be shown how each person ought to govern himself. In the second, it will be made clear how he ought to govern his own household. In the third, it will be declared how he ought to preside over the city and the kingdom. Therefore, the first book will serve either the Ethics or the Monastic. Secondly, Household Management. Thirdly, Politics. This order is both rational and natural. Indeed, rationality is evident since those things that relate to others originate from those that pertain to ourselves. Whence 9. Ethics. It is written that friendly things, which are toward friends, seem to have come from those that are toward oneself. For he seems to be a friend who behaves toward a friend as he does toward himself. What has been said about friendship also holds true for the very nature of governance: if someone wants to be industrious in ruling others, they must first be industrious in governing themselves. This order is not only rational but also natural. Nature always proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; a person is naturally imperfect and immature before they become perfect and mature. In the same way, in the realm of observable things, we always move from the imperfect to the perfect, so that first one has knowledge and an imperfect understanding, and later achieves perfection; thus, by engaging in contemplation, one continually perfects their knowledge until they have a complete understanding according to what is possible for them. What has been said according to the natural order about observable things is also true for the things that can be acted upon. For just as in observable things imperfect knowledge naturally precedes perfect knowledge, so in the realm of actions, imperfect cleverness precedes perfect skill. Since such effort is not required to govern oneself as is needed in the governance of a household, nor is so much wisdom required in managing a household as in governing a city or a kingdom, it is reasonable that a royal authority should first know how to govern themselves, secondly how to manage their household, and thirdly how to rule a kingdom and a city. In the first book, where the governance of oneself will be discussed, four points need to be clarified. First, it will be shown in what the royal majesty should place its purpose and happiness. Second, what virtues it should possess; third, what passions it should follow. Fourth, which morals it should imitate. For since one cannot live well and govern oneself well unless one dedicates oneself to good actions and good works regulated by reason, anyone wishing to discuss self-governance must first impart knowledge about all these things that the philosopher desires. Ethics. It seems beneficial to investigate how to conduct moral business and to examine what pertains to actions. Our actions seem to arise and diversify from four sources, as far as the present is concerned: from purposes, habits, passions, and morals. For since the end of our actions is the beginning of them, according to what purpose one sets for oneself, one acts in various ways. To understand what we should do, it seems most beneficial to determine what end we ought to set for ourselves. Again, because (as it is said) the sign of generated habits in ethics is pleasure and sorrow arising from actions, according to which we delight in different habits in different actions. Third, actions and works are diversified not only according to ends or habits, but also according to passions. For people with different passions act differently. We see that fear and despair are not the same passion as hope; those who fear and despair about victory act shamefully, letting down their guard and fleeing from battle, while those who hope to win charge into combat and confront the enemy. Therefore, what has been said about hope and fear must also be understood in relation to other passions; for each affection and passion produces some inclination in us, leading us to perform different actions. Fourth, our very habits seem to diversify our actions. For those who have the ways of the elderly act differently than those who have the ways of the young. Older people, as will be shown in due time, are naturally skeptical and greedy, while young people, on the other hand, are naturally generous and trusting. These four seem to have some kind of analogy. For from different impulses arise different passions: from different passions come different habits: from different habits arise different ends. Just as the ways of the young and the old are different, so too are the affections and passions in both. And just as there are different affections for good and evil, so there are different habits for each. Again, from different habits, we set for ourselves different ends. For it is said that... Ethics. As each person is, so their end seems to them: just as in the intemperate person it seems that the ultimate end and great happiness is to indulge in sensual pleasures, so those with different dispositions are inclined to set an end that conforms to their own disposition. In the first book, then, we will discuss all four of these topics, namely, the end, or the happiness of princes, their virtues, and their passions and morals. First, however, we will speak about the end itself, or about happiness itself, because the end, in relation to things to be done, is more fundamentally the beginning than any of the others.