Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo reges, et principes debent esse amatores honoris, et qualis est virtus illa quae dicitur honoris amativa. Cap. XXIV.

Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo reges, et principes debent esse amatores honoris, et qualis est virtus illa quae dicitur honoris amativa. Cap. XXIV.

Those who love honor are sometimes criticized and sometimes praised, as the Philosopher says. Ethics. We criticize some people, saying they don't care about their honor, and then we praise the ambitious who don't care about their honor either. Therefore, caring about one's own honor is commendable in one way, but blameworthy in another. For not caring about honor, because one does not want to act in ways worthy of honor, is blameworthy. Therefore, we should care about honor, not because we are ambitious, nor because we set our end in honors, but because we should act in ways worthy of honor. Actions worthy of honor can be considered in two ways. Or they can be seen as proportionate to us. There are two ways in which things can be worthy of great honor. For example, there are two virtues concerning expenses. Namely, generosity, which relates to expenses that are moderate, and those that are proportionate to us. And magnificence, which relates to expenses that are great, and those that are directed toward great works. Thus, concerning honors, there is a twofold virtue. One relates to mediocre honors, and those that are proportionate to us. And this is called the love of honor, as the Philosopher states. The other is that which relates to great honors, such as magnanimity. The same actions can also be those of other virtues, as well as of magnanimity. For someone who performs acts of courage and engages in battle, if they do so because they take pleasure in such actions, they are strong. But if they do this because such actions are worthy of great honor, they are magnanimous. Similarly, if someone performs acts of chastity because they take pleasure in them, they are chaste and temperate. However, if they do this because these actions are worthy of great honor, they are magnanimous. Therefore, the proper matter of magnanimity is not military dangers, but such things belong to the matter of courage. Nor are pleasures according to the senses, because temperance is concerned with such things. But the proper matter of magnanimity is said to be honor, because whatever a magnanimous person does, they do it as it is worthy of great honor. Therefore, magnanimity (as it is called in the fourth book of the Ethics) is a certain adornment of all virtues. For just as magnificence is a certain adornment of liberality, by which a magnificent person performs acts of liberality in a more excellent way, so magnanimity is a certain adornment of all virtues. For the works of all virtues are worthy of honor. Therefore, the magnanimous person will perform the works of each individual virtue. For this reason, it is said in the fourth book of the Ethics that it is not fitting for a magnanimous person to flee from something that is moving, which is an act of prudence. Nor is it right to commit injustices, which pertain to injustice. Therefore, the magnanimous person performs the works of the other virtues and does them excellently. For when honor is an excellent good among external goods, making the works of the virtues worthy of honor, it performs them in a more excellent way than if it were to act on such works merely because it delighted in them. Therefore, magnanimity is rightly said to accomplish all the greater virtues and to perfect and adorn them, because we perform the acts of all these virtues more excellently, more beautifully, and more perfectly through magnanimity. Now, let us see what magnanimity is and how it relates to other virtues; it is clear from a simple observation what kind of virtue it is that we are now discussing, which is called the love of honor. For just as the same actions can belong to other virtues and to magnanimity, so too can they belong to other virtues and to the love of honor. The actions of other virtues, which are worthy of great honor, pertain to magnanimity. But those actions that are proportionate to us and that are directed toward mediocre honors pertain to the virtue that is called the love of honor. Just as it is fitting for kings and princes to be magnificent and generous, so it is fitting for them to be magnanimous and lovers of honor. For it is fitting for kings and princes to cherish honors in the way that has been stated; namely, that they should love and desire to perform actions that are worthy of honor. For it seems that the love of honor has a relation to magnanimity, just as the beauty of the body has a relation to physical beauty. If small creatures have well-proportioned and conforming limbs, they are beautiful; however, they are not truly lovely, because beauty exists only in a great body. Thus, those who perform deeds worthy of moderate honor are called lovers of honor; yet they are truly magnanimous only when they act in ways deserving of great honor. Therefore, kings and princes should neither engage in disgraceful actions in difficult matters nor in mediocre ones; rather, they should always perform deeds worthy of honor: it is rightly said that they ought to be magnanimous and lovers of honor.