Liber I, Pars II — Quod reges et principes quodammodo impossibile est esse prodigos, et quod maxime detestabile est eos esse avaros, et quod potissime decet eos liberales esse. Cap. XVIII.
Liber I, Pars II — Quod reges et principes quodammodo impossibile est esse prodigos, et quod maxime detestabile est eos esse avaros, et quod potissime decet eos liberales esse. Cap. XVIII.
The philosopher says this in Book 4. The essence of generosity isn't found in the abundance of gifts, but in the disposition of the giver, that is, in their ability and willingness to give. For, as it is written there, nothing prevents someone from being less generous if they receive from those of lesser means. Therefore, generosity takes its measure from the proportion of the gifts to the possessions of the giver. Thus, the philosopher says that tyrants cannot be extravagant because they do not seem able to exceed the abundance of their possessions, gifts, and expenses. Anyone who has so much and receives so much that their gifts and expenses cannot surpass the multitude of their possessions cannot, in a sense, be considered extravagant. Therefore, kings and princes, because they are abundant in possessions, cannot only not be extravagant, but they can hardly even reach the point of being generous. Thus, they should always consider that they do less than they ought to. From this, it can be seen that it is inappropriate for them to be greedy. For if a kingdom is to be natural for someone, it must be proportionate to what we see in nature. In nature, nothing is superfluous, as the principles of physics demonstrate. Therefore, nothing in the governance of human life should be superfluous. Since human nature is content with modest things, because a single person needs only a little: if one person abounds in wealth, that wealth is idle if it is not directed toward the good of others. The more that kings and princes abound in wealth, the more detestable it is for them to be greedy. The philosopher proves this. In three ways, the ethics show that greed is worse than prodigality. Therefore, it is utterly detestable for kings and princes to be greedy, for greed is to be avoided by leaders; if they could be extravagant, it would be better for them to be extravagant than greedy. First, because it is better to be afflicted by a curable illness than by an incurable one. Extravagance, however, is a curable illness, whether due to youth or poverty. For those who are extravagant in their youth (because the elderly are greedier than the young) often find that their extravagance is mostly cured when they reach old age, and they cease to be extravagant. Extravagance can also be cured by poverty, for those who are extravagant often find themselves in need because their expenses exceed their income. Therefore, experiencing poverty leads them to stop being extravagant. Thus, according to the philosopher, extravagance is a curable vice, whether due to youth or poverty. But greed is an incurable vice: for the more one advances in greed, and the older one gets, the more greedy one becomes. If therefore the head of the kingdom, from whom the entire realm should be governed, is indecently sick according to the incurable disease of morals, it is utterly detestable for a king to be greedy, and it would be better for him to be extravagant than greedy. Secondly, this is evident: because extravagance is closer to virtue than greed is; for a generous person does not gladly receive, but gladly gives, and both actions make one extravagant; however, neither makes one greedy. Therefore, extravagance does not differ from generosity, except that an extravagant person does not give as he ought, nor to whom he ought, nor for what reason he ought. Therefore, since an extravagant person is not a lover of money, just as neither is a generous person, it is possible for someone who is slightly extravagant to become generous. If therefore it is entirely fitting for a king to be virtuous, it is all the more detestable for him to be greedy than extravagant, because greed is much more contrary to virtue than extravagance. Thirdly, this is more detestable: because a king is placed in the kingdom for the sake of the kingdom's welfare, and to benefit those who are in the kingdom. A greedy person, however, is of no benefit to anyone, because he is even worthless to himself; but an extravagant person is beneficial to many. Therefore, it is utterly detestable for a king to be greedy. It seems almost impossible for kings to be extravagant, and it's utterly detestable for them to be greedy; therefore, it remains to show that they should be generous, liberal, and communicative. This virtue, which concerns expenditures, is called generosity, liberality, and communicativeness by a certain analogy. Generosity is said to be in the likeness of vessels. For vessels that have a narrow opening do not pour out abundantly what is inside them. Therefore, one who is abundant in expenditures and gifts is called generous, because he pours out abundantly what he contains, like a generous vessel. Since it is fitting for a source to have a wider opening, so that many can partake from it, it is all the more fitting for a king to be generous, as his influence should extend to many more than that of others. Secondly, this virtue is called liberality because those who possess it are like free people. Greedy people are not free; rather, they are slaves to money. Therefore, if it is inappropriate for kings and princes to be servants, it is fitting for them to be generous. Thirdly, this virtue is called generosity because through it people share their goods, by which communication they are especially loved by others; for generous people are most lovable. Therefore, if it is especially fitting for kings and princes to be loved by those who are in the kingdom, it is especially fitting for them to be generous. However, it pertains to the generous person first to consider the amount given, so that they do not give less or more than they should. Secondly, they should consider to whom they give, so that they do not give to those to whom it is inappropriate. Thirdly, it must be considered for whose sake they give, so that they give for the sake of the good, not for some other reason. For kings and princes can hardly deviate from generosity in giving more, because the magnitude of expenses can hardly exceed the multitude of revenues. Indeed, if it happens that a generous person gives more than is fitting, as the philosopher says, they will be moderately saddened. A generous person is more burdened if they give less than they should or if they don't spend where they ought, than if they spend where they shouldn't. However, kings and princes deviate from generosity when they give to those they shouldn't or for reasons that aren't appropriate. For they give (as the philosopher says) to actors, flatterers, or others to whom they shouldn't give, because it would be better for them to be poor than rich. So too, they give for reasons that aren't appropriate. For they don't give for the sake of doing good, but rather they give to be praised and for empty glory or for some other reason. Therefore, it is fitting for kings to be generous; and to be generous, they must benefit the good and for the sake of the good.
Read the original Latin
Vult Philosophus 4. Ethicorum liberalitatem non esse in multitudine datorum, sed in habitu, idest in facultate et voluntate dantis. Nam (ut ibidem scribitur) nihil prohibet minora dantem, vel liberaliorem esse, si a minoribus recipiat. Liberalitas igitur mensuram recipit ex proportione datorum ad possessiones dantis. Ideo Philosophus ait Tyrannos non esse prodigos: quia non videntur posse superabundare multitudine possessionis, dationis, et expensis. Quicunque enim tot habet, et tanta recipit, quod dationes et expensae multitudinem possessionum superare non possint, quodammodo prodigus esse non potest. reges igitur et principes quia multitudine possessionum superabundant, non solum non possunt esse prodigi, sed vix possunt attingere ut sint liberales. Semper ergo cogitare debent, quod minora faciunt, quam deceat.
Ex hoc autem apparere potest quod indecens sit eos esse avaros. Nam si regnum alicuius debet esse naturale, proportionari debet his quae videmus in natura. In naturalibus autem nihil est ociosum, ut probant physica dicta. ergo nec in regimine vitae humanae aliquid ociosum esse debet. Quare cum natura humana modicis contenta sit, quia uni personae modica sufficiunt: si una aliqua persona multitudine divitiarum superabundat, ociosae sunt divitiae illae si non ordinantur ad bonum aliorum. Quanto igitur reges et principes pluribus divitiis seperabundant; tanto detestabilius est eos avaros esse. Probat Philosophus 4. Ethicorum triplici ratione, quod avaritia peior est prodigalitate.
propter quod omnino detestabile est reges et principes esse avaros: tam enim fugienda est avaritia a principibus quod si possent esse prodigi, melius esset eos esse prodigos quam avaros. Primo enim, quia melius est infirmari morbo curabili, quam incurabili. Prodigalitas autem morbus est curabilis, vel ab aetate, vel ab egestate. nam qui prodigi sunt in iuventute (quia senes avariores sunt iuvenibus) cum veniunt ad senectutem, ut plurimum curatur eorum prodigalitas, et desinunt esse prodigi. Curari etiam potest ab egestate: nam qui prodigi sunt, ut plurimum egent, quia expensae superabundant redditibus. experiendo ergo indigentiam, inducuntur ut non sint prodigi. Est ergo secundum Philosophum prodigalitas moribus curabilis, vel ab aetate, vel ab egestate. Sed avaritia est moribus incurabilis: quia quanto quis procedit in avaritia, et quanto plus senescit, tanto magis avarus efficitur.
Si ergo caput regni, a quo totum regnum dirigi debet, indecens est aegrotare secundum mores morbo incurabili, omnino detrestabile est regem esse avarum, et quod melius esset ipsum esse prodigum, quam avarum. Secundo hoc idem patet: quia prodigalitas magis est propinqua virtuti, quam avaritia: nam liberalis non libenter recipit, et libenter dat: quorum utrunque facit prodigus: neutrum tamen facit avarus. Non ergo differt prodigalitas a liberalitate, nisi quia prodigus non dat ut debet, et quibus debet, et cuius gratia debet. Quare cum prodigus non sit amator pecuniae, sicut nec liberalis, de levi quis cum sit prodigus, fieri poterit liberalis. Si ergo omnino decens est regem esse virtuosum, tanto detestabilius est ipsum esse avarum, quam prodigum: quanto avaritia plus contrariatur virtuti, quam prodigalitas. Tertio hoc est detestabilius: quia rex positus est in regno propter salutem regni, et ut prosit iis in regno sunt. Avarus autem nulli prodest, quia etiam sibiipsi nequam est: prodigus autem multis prodest. Omnino ergo detestabile est, regem esse avarum.
Viso quod quasi impossibile reges esse prodigos, et quod omnino detestabile est eos esse avaros: restat ostendere, quod deceat eos esse largos, liberales, et communicativos. Haec enim virtus, quae est circa sumptus, per quandam similitudinem dicitur largitas, et liberalitas, et communicabilitas. Largitas enim dicitur ad similitudinem vasorum. Vasa enim habentia os artum, non abunde emittunt quod in eis est. Abundans ergo in sumptibus, et dationibus, dicitur largus: quia ad modum largi vasis abunde emittit quae continet. Cum ergo tanto deceat fontem habere os largius, quanto ex eo plures participare debent: tanto decet regem largiorem esse, quanto influentia eius ad plures extendenda est, quam influentia aliorum. Secundo huiusmodi virtus dicitur liberalitas: quia pollentes ea sunt ad similitudinem liberorum. Avari non sunt liberi, sed sunt servi pecuniae.
Quare si indecens est reges, et principes esse servos, conveniens est eos esse liberales. Tertio huiusmodi virtus dicitur communicabilitas: quia per eam homines communicant sua bona, per quam communicationem ab aliis potissime diliguntur: nam liberales sunt potissime amabiles. Quare si maxime decet reges et principes, ut sint dilecti ab iis qui sunt in Regno, maxime decet eos liberales esse. Spectat autem ad liberalem primo respicere quantitatem dati, ut non det minus, vel plus, quam debeat. Secundo debet respicere quibus det, ut non det quibus non oportet. Tertio videndum est cuius gratia det, ut det boni gratia, non propter aliquam aliam causam. reges enim et principes vix possunt deviare a liberalitate in dando plus, quia magnitudo expensarum vix potest excedere multitudinem reddituum. Imo si contingat liberalem dare plus quam deceat, ut vult Philosophus, moderate tristabitur.
Nam magis gravatur liberalis, sit det minus quam debeat, vel si non expendat ubi oportet, quam si expendat ubi non oportet. Deviant autem a liberalitate reges, et principes in dando quibus non oportet, vel cuius gratia non oportet. Dant enim (ut Philosophus ait) histrionibus, adulatoribus, vel aliis, quibus non oportet dare: quia magis deceret eos esse pauperes, quam divites. Sic etiam dant cuius gratia non oportet. non enim dant boni gratia, sed magis dant ut laudentur, et propter inanem gloriam vel propter aliquam aliam causam. Decet igitur reges esse liberales: et ut liberales sint, oportet eos beneficiare bonos, et boni gratia.
De Regimine Principum (On the Rule of Princes) companion
A prince read his portion daily. So can you.
Chosen Portion delivers a short daily reading from historic works like this one, free on iOS.
Princes were formed by scheduled daily instruction from this manual; Chosen Portion schedules the same kind of daily formation reading for you.
- One daily reading in under 3 minutes, in modern readable English
- Selections from De Regimine Principum and 77 other royal devotional works
- Finish the 10-day course, then keep a daily formation habit without planning it yourself