Liber I, Pars II — Quid est liberalitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo possumus nosipsos liberales facere. Cap. XVII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est liberalitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo possumus nosipsos liberales facere. Cap. XVII.

Earlier, twelve virtues were mentioned, among which (as was said) four were cardinal and principal: namely, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. Therefore, after we have spoken about these four virtues, we will show how it is fitting for kings and princes to be adorned with these virtues. Next, we must move on to the other virtues. Other virtues either pertain to external goods or to external evils. If the external goods are good, they are either good in themselves or in relation to something else. First, then, we will speak about the virtues that pertain to external goods in themselves. Later, we will determine the virtues that pertain to external goods in relation to something else. External goods can either be useful, like money and wealth, and all things that can be measured by coin, or they can be honorable, like honors. First, we will discuss the virtues that concern useful goods, and afterward we will address those that concern honorable goods. Our understanding begins with the senses. Since useful goods are more tangible than honorable ones, we must first determine the virtues that concern useful goods. Regarding useful goods, we must determine how they are to be understood. Ethics. It is a dual virtue. Liberalitas and magnificence. These two virtues concern expenditures and money, but not in the same way: for liberalitas (which is also called largitas) is said to regard moderate expenditures, while magnificence is said to regard great expenditures. How this should be understood will become clear as we proceed. If, then, it is fitting to fall short in making expenditures, which is what greed does, and to go overboard, which is what extravagance does, since both are against the right rule of reason, we must establish a virtue that is a mean between greed and extravagance; this virtue is called liberality. It is clear, then, what liberality is. For just as courage is a mean between fear and boldness, so liberality is a mean between greed and extravagance; thus, it is a virtue that restrains greed and moderates extravagance. This virtue consists in the right use of money. Three things are required for the right use of money. First, that one does not accept it from where one should not. Second, that one accepts it from where one should. Third, he should spend money as he ought. It pertains to a generous person not to usurp others' income and to take care of his own. For although a generous person does not love money for its own sake, he should organize it to meet necessary expenses; however, in order to make necessary expenses, he should not waste his own income. Therefore, not usurping others' income, having proper care for his own, and making necessary expenses from it: these are the three things that seem to define generosity. However, these three things are not equally principal and primary. For concerning spending and making necessary expenses, that is primarily and chiefly what generosity is. However, taking care of one's own income and not accepting what belongs to others is secondary. For one who usurps useful goods and does not accept them as he ought, seems too greedy for money. The philosopher states in his Ethics that, for every action, there is a reason. Ethics. He says that usurers, pimps, those who live off prostitution, grave robbers, and gamblers earn disgraceful profits, and he calls all such people uncharitable. A gambler and every player of dice is uncharitable: they profit from friends, from whom they ought to do good. Therefore, charity is not primarily about not taking what one should not; however, it is not primarily about these things. For those who take what they should not are more unjust than uncharitable, as the philosopher wishes. Ethics. Therefore, charity is not primarily about not taking what one should not, nor about taking what one should: rather, it is primarily about how one should spend. For this reason, everything is such, and that is more so. If a generous person preserves their own income and receives what they should, they do this so they can use their own resources to cover necessary expenses and spend as they ought; thus, generosity is primarily about spending and doing good for others; consequently, it also involves safeguarding one's own income and not usurping what belongs to others. For the philosopher proves this. According to the five reasons in ethics, generosity is more about spending and benefiting others than about safeguarding one's own income. Generosity, as has been said, should be about the proper use of money. Using money means spending it and giving it to others. However, safeguarding one's own income is not using money; rather, it is more about acquiring and generating it. For this reason, it is clear that generosity is more about spending and giving money to others than about safeguarding one's own income. Secondly, this is also clear. Because it primarily pertains to virtue to do greater good. However, it is a greater good to do good than to suffer well, and to act well than to avoid doing evil. Whoever spends wisely and gives gifts to others does well. However, one who guards their own income and receives money from their own possessions suffers well or receives well in the way they ought. Not usurping what belongs to others does not lead to doing evil. If it is better to do good than not to do evil, or to suffer well: it is better to spend well than to not steal from others or to guard one's own. Thirdly, this is also clear: because virtue consists more in that for which greater praise arises. Greater praise arises from spending well and doing good for others than from keeping one's own possessions or not taking what belongs to others. Therefore, true generosity primarily consists in spending rightly and doing good for others. Fourth, this is evident: virtue is primarily concerned with what is more difficult. However, it is more difficult to give gifts to others than to keep one's own possessions or to refrain from stealing what belongs to others. For it is not difficult to keep one's own possessions, because everyone is naturally inclined to love themselves and to safeguard their own goods. However, giving one's own goods involves difficulty, because one's own goods are something that pertains to us, and we are naturally attached to them. Indeed, the greedy are so attached to external goods, like money, that they consider what they possess as something incorporated into themselves. For it seems to them that when money is received from them, something is taken from their own body. Since our own goods are almost joined to us, while others' goods are separate, it's not so difficult not to take what belongs to others, which doesn't affect us as much because it's not connected to us; however, it's difficult to give our own, to which we are more attached because they are in a way joined to us. Therefore, liberal generosity primarily consists in spending wisely and giving goods to others, as it relates to what is more difficult. Fifthly, this is clear: because those who are generous are most loved, liberal generosity primarily consists in what is most loved when someone acts generously. However, no one is truly loved if they do not take what belongs to others, or if they keep their own possessions safe. But one is most loved if they make necessary expenditures from their own resources and give great gifts to good and deserving people. Therefore, liberal generosity consists primarily in spending well and in giving back goods to others. It is clear what liberal generosity is, because it is the virtue that restrains greed and moderates extravagance. And it is shown what it consists of, because it primarily relates to necessary expenditures and rightful obligations; consequently, it is about keeping one's own possessions safe and not taking what belongs to others: it is evident how we can become generous. For just as strength opposes fear more than it does boldness, we make ourselves strong by leaning into courage; so that we may dare more rather than less. Similarly, since generosity opposes greed more than it does extravagance, we should lean more toward generosity than toward greed, and we ought to give abundantly rather than hold back.