Liber I, Pars II — Quod exprobrabilius est esse intemperatum, quam timidum: et quod maxime decet reges, et principes esse temperatos. Cap. XVI.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod exprobrabilius est esse intemperatum, quam timidum: et quod maxime decet reges, et principes esse temperatos. Cap. XVI.

The philosopher proves this in Book 3. This is found in the Ethics. For four reasons, being intemperate is more blameworthy than being timid. First, the more someone sins willingly, the more blameworthy they are. Moreover, the more easily someone can do good, if they fail to do so, the more they are to be detested and blamed. Therefore, the intemperate person is more to be detested and blamed, both because they sin more willingly and because it is easier for them to do good and acquire temperance than to acquire courage. This can be shown in two ways: the intemperate person sins more willingly than the timid one. First, because pursuing intemperate desires is pleasurable; however, fleeing and fearing is distressing. A person acts more willingly when they do something with pleasure than when they do it with sadness. Therefore, a person who sins through intemperance acts more willingly and poorly than someone who sins out of fear. Secondly, this is evident: because, as the philosopher says, fear stupefies and renders nature immobile and astonished, which pleasure through intemperance does not do. But when someone is in a stupor, they are as if outside themselves, and they do not act willingly and deliberately in what they do. It is therefore more tolerable to sin out of fear than through intemperance, since the former is more voluntary than the latter. It is clear, therefore, that a person who is intemperate is more to be reproached than one who is timid, because they act more willingly and poorly. Similarly, it can be shown in two ways that a person is more to be reproached: because they can more easily do good. For it is easier to acquire temperance than fortitude. For as was said in the previous chapter, we acquire temperance by abstaining and withdrawing ourselves from sensory pleasures; however, we can acquire courage by confronting terrifying things and experiencing battle. On the other hand, withdrawing from pleasures can be done without any danger, but confronting terrifying things and experiencing war cannot be done without danger. Therefore, it is greatly blameworthy to lack temperance, since it can be acquired without danger; but one is not so greatly blameworthy for lacking courage, because that virtue is difficult and is acquired with greater danger. Again, temperance can be acquired more easily than courage, because we experience many such things in life; indeed, many pleasures often come to us, from which, by abstaining, we are disposed to be temperate. However, it is not the same with courage: for not every act of war makes us strong unless those wars are just. But perhaps throughout a person's entire life, no just war occurs for them. Therefore, we cannot become accustomed to the works of courage as we can to the works of temperance; hence, it is more blameworthy for us to be intemperate than not to be strong. If, therefore, it is blameworthy for a king not to be manly and not to be steadfast in spirit, it is clear that it is even more blameworthy for him to be intemperate and a follower of passions. We can, however, present new reasons showing how detestable it is for a king to be intemperate. The philosopher touches on this in his third work. Ethics. There are three aspects of intemperance from which three reasons can be drawn, showing that it is most fitting for kings and princes to be temperate. Intemperance, as mentioned above, is a vice that is especially bestial, childish, and shameful or disgraceful. It is clear that this is a vice that is especially bestial. For, as was said above, temperance and intemperance relate to the pleasures of touch and taste, according to which it is common for us and for beasts to take pleasure. Therefore, it is evident. Ethics. It is said that because temperance and intemperance relate to pleasures that other animals share, the intemperate are therefore servile and bestial. A beast, because it lacks intellect, is naturally something servile. If it is therefore indecent for a king, whose role is to dominate others, to be bestial and servile, it is also indecent for him to be intemperate. Secondly, intemperance is a vice that is especially childish. Children, because they do not have the use of reason, do not live according to reason but according to passion. Therefore, we see them especially pursuing pleasures and being followers of their passions. Hence, the Philosopher says. The force of desire, according to the Ethics, resembles the vice of intemperance as a child does: for just as a child should be governed by a tutor, so the desire must be governed and regulated by reason. If it is indecent for a king to behave like a child and not follow reason but rather passion, then it is also indecent for him to be intemperate. Thirdly, it is indecent for a king because such a vice is especially shameful and contemptible. Indeed, people who are intemperate desire base and shameful things; therefore, if they are in positions of power, they are especially despised, because everyone is indignant at a king who is intemperate and does not follow reason but rather passion. Therefore, if it is fitting for a royal person to present themselves as worthy of reverence and honor, it is especially indecent for them to be intemperate. We have an example of this in King Sardanapalus, who, being entirely effeminate and given to intemperance (as Justin the Historian recounts in Book I), did not go outside to have conversations with the barons of his kingdom; rather, all his discussions were in the chambers with women, and he sent letters to the barons and leaders about what he wanted them to do. It happened that when a certain duke of the army had served him for a long time and faithfully, that king, wanting to please that duke, commanded that he be brought to him. However, that duke, accustomed to military affairs, seeing his king to be entirely effeminate and bestial, immediately held him in contempt; and indignant at his shamefulness, he wanted to attack him. The king, fearing, fled; and because he believed he could not escape the hands of that Duke, he shut himself in a certain house, and with all his treasure and furnishings, he burned himself up. For we see that those who are given over to sensual pleasures are despised. Rather, because the intemperate are wronged by others, especially in close relationships, like with wives and daughters, they provoke others against themselves. And because kings and princes must especially be feared, lest the fury of the people be stirred up against them, it is most expedient for them to be temperate.