Liber I, Pars II — Quid sit Temperantia, et circa quae habet esse, et quae sunt species, et quomodo nosipsos possumus facere temperatos. Cap. XV.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid sit Temperantia, et circa quae habet esse, et quae sunt species, et quomodo nosipsos possumus facere temperatos. Cap. XV.

Temperance holds the last place among the cardinal virtues. For prudence and justice are more important than the moral virtues; because prudence is in the intellect, and justice is in the will. However, the moral virtues are found in the sensitive appetite, such as in the irascible and concupiscible parts. The sensitive appetite, however, falls short of the will and the intellect. Therefore, prudence and justice are the principal virtues. However, prudence is more principal than justice; because it is the guiding principle of all the other virtues. Strength and temperance, although they are not as principal as prudence and justice, are still counted among the principal virtues. For the virtues that moderate passion serve reason in two ways, as passions oppose reason in two ways. Passions either resist reason and entice us toward what reason forbids, or (as was said above) they oppose it because they pull us away from what reason dictates. Among other things that can pull us away from the good of reason are the fears of war and the dangers of death, concerning which there is Fortitude. Similarly, among other enticements that lead us to what reason forbids are pleasures of the flesh and delights according to taste, concerning which there is Temperance. Therefore, Fortitude and Temperance should be counted among the principal virtues. Fortitude is indeed more principal than Temperance, because Fortitude is more oriented toward the common good, such as the protection of the kingdom and the defense of the homeland. Temperance, on the other hand, is more oriented toward the individual good, such as self-moderation. However, the common good is more divine than the individual good. Therefore, after we have spoken about Prudence, which is more principal than Justice; and about Justice, which is more principal than Fortitude; and about Fortitude, which is more principal than Temperance. Now, we need to talk about Temperance, which holds the last place among the principal virtues. It should be noted that just as Courage is the mean between fears and boldness, because someone who fears everything is not brave, nor is someone who dares everything; rather, the brave person fears what should be feared and dares what should be dared. In the same way, Temperance is the mean between pleasures and insensibility. We call someone insensible and rustic who flees from all bodily pleasures. Insensibility, therefore, is to go beyond what reason dictates by fleeing from sensible bodily pleasures. Therefore, whoever pursues all pleasures is intemperate. However, whoever flees from all pleasures is insensible and rustic. But whoever flees what should be fled and pursues what should be pursued is virtuous and temperate. It is possible to sin not only by pursuing sensory pleasures, but also by fleeing from them. For someone who would abstain so completely from food and drink, and from lawful pleasures, could not maintain their nature with such abstinence, since right reason dictates the opposite, cannot be called virtuous. Therefore, it is clear what temperance is. Just as courage restrains fears and moderates boldness, among which courage itself has its being, so temperance restrains sensory pleasures and moderates insensibilities, among which it has its being. If, therefore, temperance restrains sensory pleasures, we must consider which sensory pleasures it pertains to. Some sensory pleasures are strong, some are weak; some attract us more, and some less. Although there are five senses, and we can be delighted by the things of all the senses, stronger pleasures are found in taste and touch than in sight, hearing, and smell. This is evident in two ways. First, the more we are drawn to pleasures, the more intensely and eagerly we enjoy them. We are more drawn to the pleasures of taste and touch than to those of the other senses. For we can see, hear, and smell things from a distance, but we cannot taste or touch them unless they are close to us. Therefore, we are more ardently and eagerly delighted by such sensory experiences. Secondly, this is evident because the pleasures of taste and touch seem to be more directly and immediately related to our preservation: the delights of taste are ordered for the preservation of the individual, while the delights of touch, like marriage, are ordered for the preservation of the species. Thus, nature has placed such great delight in the pleasures of taste and touch, so that the individual does not perish and the species is preserved. Therefore, if virtue pertains to what is good and pleasurable, temperance should primarily be concerned with those pleasures from which it is more difficult to abstain. Thus, temperance is specifically concerned with the pleasures of taste and touch. However, when it comes to the pleasures of other senses, this is incidental: because other senses perceive the delights of taste and touch only by chance. This kind of virtue (as the Philosopher says) is. Ethic.) It concerns those delights in which other animals participate. Other animals delight in taste and touch by their own nature; in other senses, however, they delight only incidentally. For this reason, it is said in the same book that dogs do not rejoice in the scents of hares, but in their food. If they rejoice in their scent, it is because they believe they are being fed by them. Therefore, they do not rejoice in the voice of an ox, nor in the sight of a deer, except inasmuch as they recognize through sight and hearing that they are near and believe they will be satisfied by them. Therefore, temperance is primarily concerned with the pleasures of touch and taste, because in these, people are more intensely delighted. This (as it seems) happens reasonably. For the pleasures of nourishment that come through taste are ordered toward the preservation of one's own person; but the marital pleasures that come through touch are ordered toward procreation and the preservation of the species. If, therefore (as has been said many times), the common good is more divine than the private good, it seems reasonable that nature acted: if it placed more intense pleasures in marital acts than in acts of nourishment. Or perhaps nature did this because each person is more concerned about their own good than about the good of another. Therefore, it was not necessary to place such intense pleasures in nourishment, which is ordered to one's own good and to the preservation of the individual, as in marriage, which is ordered to the good of another and to the preservation of the species. If, therefore, it is more difficult to fight against something, it is more important to insist on it, so that through temperance we may restrain the pleasures of lust that come through touch more than those of nourishment that come through taste. Indeed, in the very pleasures of nourishment, we are more delighted by touch than by taste. When we eat and drink (as everyone experiences), we find pleasure in the tongue where taste rules, and in the throat where there is no taste, but touch. And (as we clearly experience) we enjoy it more when food or drink touches the throat than when it connects with the tongue. For it must be believed that in such matters, the judgment belongs to the gluttonous. However, the philosopher recites from the Ethics. About a certain man named Phyloxenus, who, when he was a glutton, prayed that his throat would be longer than that of a crane. For he did not pray that his tongue would be broader than a cow's tongue, so that he might enjoy taste more, but that his throat would be longer than a crane's throat, so that by eating and drinking he might enjoy touch longer. Thus, as is evident from these habits, temperance primarily concerns touch, and consequently, taste; however, it is incidentally about the pleasures of other senses. Moreover, we can take up the aspects of temperance concerning lighter matters. For if it concerns temperance to restrain pleasurable experiences related to food and sexuality, we can suppress the pleasures of food if we are sober and abstinent; and we can suppress sexual pleasures if we are chaste and modest. Thus, there will be four parts of temperance, or four kinds of it: namely, sobriety, abstinence, chastity, and modesty. For if we want to suppress the pleasures of food, we must be temperate in our drinking and eating. By being temperate in our drinking, we remain sober; just as those who exceed in drinking become drunk. By being temperate in our eating, we remain abstinent. Therefore, abstinence and sobriety serve to restrain the pleasures of food. But chastity and modesty restrain sexual pleasures. For one must truly be temperate to not engage in sexual acts or gestures. Thus, as one abstains from sexual acts, one is said to be chaste. However, as one recoils from gestures that provoke lust, a person is said to be honorable or chaste. It becomes clear how we can make ourselves temperate by observing these things. For Temperance and Fortitude stand in contrast to each other. For Fortitude is about confronting terrifying challenges, while Temperance is about withdrawing from those things that are pleasurable. Just as Fortitude is more aligned with boldness, if we want to be strong, we must be more daring than timid; likewise, Temperance is more aligned with insensibility. Therefore, if we want to make ourselves temperate, we must lean towards that aspect of avoiding sensory pleasures. It is better to avoid some permissible pleasures than to pursue illicit ones. Thus, those four things that were proposed at the beginning of the chapter have been clarified. First, it was shown what Temperance is: it is the virtue that restrains sensory pleasures and moderates insensibility. Second, it was declared about what it has to do with: primarily it concerns touch, consequently taste; accidentally, it pertains to other senses. Third, it was made clear what and how many its species are: there are four. Two of them moderate nutritional pleasures, such as sobriety and abstinence. And two restrain sexual pleasures, such as chastity and honesty or modesty. Fourth, it was declared how we can make ourselves temperate: for we will do this most effectively by abstaining from pleasures. For, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, we must. We should endure this, as the elders of Troy endured, saying to Helen: 'Let us cast her off, that is, let us not look upon her.'