Liber I, Pars I — Quis modus procedendi in regimine principum. Cap. I.

Liber I, Pars I — Quis modus procedendi in regimine principum. Cap. I.

It is necessary that the breadth of speech in each matter be according to the requirement of that matter, and not more or less, as the philosopher wills. Metaphysics. Therefore, if we intend to convey the art and knowledge of ruling princes or kings, so that no further discourses are made than this present work requires, we must first see what the manner of proceeding in this art is. It must be known, therefore, that in the whole moral matter, the manner of proceeding according to the philosopher is figurative and coarse; for in such matters, it is necessary to pass through in a type and figuratively, because moral deeds do not fully fall under narration. However, we can hunt out in threefold manner what the way of proceeding in this science must be, which should be figurative and coarse. The first way is taken from the part of the matter around which this kind of art revolves. The second is from the part of the end. Which is intended in this art. The third aspect, from the perspective of the listener who is to be instructed through such a method. The first method is clear. Since the teaching about the governance of princes concerns human actions and falls under moral matters, because moral material (as has been said) does not allow for subtle investigation, but pertains to individual affairs. The matters of ethics have a great uncertainty due to their variability. Because this is the case, the individual acts, which are the subject matter of this work, indicate that one must proceed figuratively and in type. This reasoning seems to be addressed by the Philosopher in Book 1. The Philosopher says that it will be adequately discussed concerning moral matters if the manifestation occurs according to the subject matter. From this, it is stated that for the instructed, it is to such an extent to inquire about certainty according to each kind, inasmuch as the nature of the thing receives it. It seems that the nature of moral matters is entirely opposed to mathematical activity. For mathematical demonstrations are certain at the first degree of certainty, as the Commentator says. 2. Met. However, moral reasons are superficial and crude. Therefore, for the geometer, it is not to persuade, but to demonstrate; for the rhetorician and the politician, it is not to demonstrate, but to persuade. On account of this, I. Ethic. It is written that sin is accepted through mathematical persuasion, and that rhetorical demonstrations are sought. The second way is taken from the end that is intended in this art. For, as it is written, Ethics. We undertake moral work not for the sake of contemplation, nor to know, but to become good. Therefore, the end intended in this knowledge is not the understanding of one's own business, but action; it is not truth, but goodness. Since subtle reasons illuminate understanding more, while superficial and gross ones move and inflame the emotions more: in speculative sciences, where the illumination of the intellect is primarily sought, one must proceed demonstratively and subtly in moral matters, where the rectitude of the will is sought, and to become good, one must proceed persuasively and figuratively. From this, It is written that the moral task of the ethicists is to speak about such matters and from such matters, and about those things which are, as is more frequently shown, in a coarse and figurative way. The third way is taken from the side of the hearer, who is to be instructed in this art. For although this book is entitled about the instruction of princes, the whole people must be instructed through it. Of the rhetoricians, it is said that the greater the people, the more remote is their intellect. Therefore, the hearer of moral business is simple and coarse, as is shown in the first. Of Rhetoric. Since the whole people cannot grasp subtle things, one must proceed in moral business in a figurative and coarse manner. Rather, because (according to the Philosopher in the Politics) what the lord must know to prescribe, the subject must know to do: if through this book princes are instructed on how they ought to conduct themselves and how they ought to command their subjects, it is necessary to extend this teaching even to the people, so that they know how they ought to obey their princes. And because this cannot happen (as has been mentioned) unless through superficial and sensible reasons, the manner of proceeding in this work must be coarse and figurative.