SR
Chapter 27GilesRP.1.27

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est Fortitudo, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo possumus nos ipsos fortes facere. Cap. XIII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quid est Fortitudo, et circa quae habet esse, et quomodo possumus nos ipsos fortes facere. Cap. XIII.

Since it happens that one can sin or do good, it is necessary to have some virtue through which they can be guided in their actions. Therefore, when it comes to fears and boldness, if someone finds themselves acting rightly or wrongly, they need to have some virtue regarding fears and boldness. It happens that some people fear things that should be feared and do not fear things that should not be feared. Indeed, there are some who are so fearful that they fear even the walls surrounding them. Some, however, are so foolishly bold that they even do not fear God, which is not a sign of strength but of madness. For this reason, I. It is written about great moral matters that if someone is exceedingly fearless to the point of not fearing God, they are not strong but insane. Therefore, it pertains to the strong to fear what should be feared and to dare what should be dared. Therefore, fortitude is a certain virtue that restrains fears and moderates daring acts. For fortitude restrains fears, lest anyone be drawn back from what reason dictates. However, it moderates daring acts, lest anyone undertake what reason forbids. Having considered what fortitude is, it remains to see what such a virtue should be about. Therefore, it must be known that to fear and to dare properly regard dangers. No one fears unless he imagines danger threatening him; nor is anyone called daring unless he undertakes something terrible and dangerous. Some dangers are of war, while others arise from different causes. However, we are exposed to dangers not only in wars but also at sea, in illnesses, and in other situations where it is fitting for dangers to exist. In the face of the dangers of war, people behave in various ways. Some are afraid, while others are bold. The bold ones also act differently. Now that we understand what courage is, we need to see what this virtue pertains to. It's important to note that fear and boldness are directly related to dangers. No one fears unless they imagine danger approaching; nor is everyone called bold unless they confront something terrifying and dangerous. Some dangers are related to war, while others arise from different causes. We face dangers not only in wars but also at sea, in sickness, and in other situations where dangers are present. That the dangers of war are harder to endure than other dangers can be shown in three ways. First, because such dangers are more present to our eyes and felt more acutely than others. For we do not perceive death so clearly when we are ill, because illnesses are hidden within us; nor do we feel the dangers of the sea as we do the dangers of war. Moreover, we cannot so easily avoid dangers through flight, as we can with other dangers, because we imagine that we can easily escape them. Secondly, we find such dangers harder to endure than others, not only because they are more evident, but also because they are more painful. But we cannot so easily avoid illnesses through flight, because when illness is something existing within us, we cannot escape it by fleeing. Finally, the dangers of the sea cannot be avoided through flight as easily as the dangers of war. The dangers of the sea cannot be avoided through flight as easily as the dangers of war. Since it's harder to endure and withstand those dangers that we can avoid by fleeing, than those we must face, because we can't escape the latter; military dangers are harder to endure than others. Thirdly, such dangers are harder to endure because they make us most acutely aware of violent death, especially when that death comes through mutilation of the limbs or through the cutting of the body, which is how we most vividly perceive violent death. For dying from illness, or in some other way, doesn't seem to oppose the nature of the body as much as death in battle, through which the body is mutilated and pierced. Therefore, the virtue of courage is primarily concerned with military dangers; consequently, it also pertains to other dangers. For this reason, it is said that... In the ethics, it is said that a person is considered truly brave who is fearless in the face of a good death, especially one that occurs in battle. Yet still, even in the sea and in illnesses, the one who is brave is fearful. Moreover, although courage is primarily concerned with military dangers, in repressing fears and moderating boldness, it is more fundamentally about the repression of fears than about the moderation of boldness. For the most part, terrible dangers are sad. However, everyone naturally flees from sadness, just as they naturally pursue what is delightful. Since we naturally flee from sadness, it is difficult to suppress the fears through which we flee from sadness. However, it is not as difficult to moderate boldness, through which we confront sadness. Therefore, if virtue is primarily about what is difficult, it has been rightly said that fortitude is primarily about the repression of fears rather than the moderation of boldness. Moreover, it is commonly stated that fortitude is primarily in enduring rather than in attacking, and it can be pursued in three ways. First, because to attack is the task of the stronger; to endure, however, is the task of the weaker. However, the attacker is compared to others, just as to the weaker. But to endure is, like to the stronger: it is harder to lean against the stronger than against the weaker. For this reason, it is harder to endure a fight than to attack those who are fighting. Secondly, it is harder because the attacker imagines the evil as something future, but the one who endures has the evil before their eyes, and as present. However, it is harder to stand firm and to bear oneself bravely against present evils than against future evils. Thirdly, this is harder because attacking can happen suddenly, but enduring requires perseverance and time. It is indeed harder to maintain oneself bravely and steadfastly in enduring battles, which requires durability and time, than in attacking, which can happen suddenly. Hence, the Philosopher says. From the Ethics. It is said that courage is about fears and boldness. However, it is more difficult to confront fears than to manage boldness. Therefore, it has been established what courage is about: it remains to be declared how we can make ourselves strong. It should be noted that although virtue opposes two vices, one of which overflows and the other is lacking, generosity opposes prodigality, which overflows in spending, and avarice, which is lacking. Courage opposes boldness, which overflows in aggression, and fear, which is lacking; yet virtue always opposes one vice more than another. But because it is more difficult to suppress fears than to moderate boldness, courage insists more on suppressing fears than on moderating boldness, and it resists and contradicts fear more than it does boldness. Since we cannot precisely find a middle ground between boldness and fear, we must lean towards boldness, which resists courage less than fear does, if we want to make ourselves strong. Therefore, those three things that were proposed at the beginning of the chapter have been declared. It has been shown what fortitude is: it is the virtue that restrains fears and moderates boldness. Again, it is clear what fortitude is: it is primarily concerned with warlike dangers, restraining fears, and enduring the fight. Consequently, it also relates to other dangers, moderating boldness and attacking combatants. Thirdly, it has been declared how we can make ourselves brave: we will do this most effectively by turning more toward boldness, which does not oppose fortitude as much as fear does.

Read the original Latin

Quia circa quodcunque contingit peccare, et bene agere, oportet dare virtutem aliquam, per quam regulentur in agendo. Cum igitur circa timores, et audacias contingat aliquem se habere recte, et non recte, oportet dare virtutem aliquam circa timores, et audacias. Accidit enim aliquos timere timenda, et non timenda. Sunt enim aliqui adeo pavidi, quod circunstantes muros timent. Aliqui vero adeo fatue audent, ut etiam Deum non timeant, quod non est Fortitudinis, sed insaniae. Propter quod I. Magnorum moralium scribitur, quod si quis valde impavidus existat, quod Deum non timeat, non est Fortis, sed insanus. Spectat igitur ad fortem timere timenda, et audere audenda.

Erit igitur Fortitudo virtus quaedam reprimens timores, et moderans audacias. Reprimit enim Fortitudo timores, ne per eos quis retrahatur ab eo, quod ratio dictat. Moderat autem audacias, ne quis audendo aggrediatur, quod ratio vetat. Viso quid est Fortitudo, restat videre circa quae esse habeat talis virtus. Sciendum igitur, quod timere, et audere, proprie respiciunt pericula. Nullus autem timet, nisi imaginetur sibi periculum imminere: nec omnis dicitur audax, nisi aggrediatur aliquod terribile, et periculosum. Periculorum autem quaedam sunt bellica, quaedam autem ex aliis causis. Exponimur autem periculis non solum in bellis, sed etiam in mari, et in aegritudinibus, et in aliis circa quae convenit esse pericula.

Rursus in periculis bellorum homines diversimode se habent. Nam quidam timent: quidam audent. Audentes etiam diversificantur. Nam quidam de levi aggrediuntur bellorum pericula: sed, cum aggressi sunt ea, si invenerit resistentiam, non sustinent, sed fugam arripiunt. Quidam autem non de levi aggrediuntur bellum, sed cum aggressi fuerint, sustinent, et tolerant pericula bellorum. Cum igitur virtus sit circa bonum, et difficile (quia difficiliora, et terribiliora sunt pericula bellica, quam alia: et etiam quia in periculis bellicis difficilius est reprimere timores, quam moderare audacias: rursus quia in audendo non tam difficile est aggredi pugnam, sicut tolerare, et sustinere pugnantes.) Fortitudo, quae est virtus circa pericula, principalius est in reprimendo timores contingentes circa pericula talia, quam in moderando audacias circa ipsa. Sic etiam principalius est huiusmodi virtus in sustinendo pugnantes, quam in aggrediendo eos.

Quod autem pericula bellica sint difficiliora ad sustinendum, quam pericula alia: triplici via ostendi potest. Primo, quia huiusmodi pericula sunt magis prae oculis, et magis sentiuntur quam alia. Non enim sic aperte apprehendimus mortem, cum agrotamur: quia aegritudines intrinsecus latent; nec sic sentimus pericula maris, sicut pericula bellica. nec ex tactu aquae sic sentimus et imaginamur laesionem, sicut ex tactu gladii, pericula ergo bellica tum quia manifesta sunt, tum etiam, quia maxime sentiuntur, et imaginamur ea maxime dolorem inferre, difficiliora sunt ad sustinendum, quam alia. Secundo, talia difficilius sustinemus, quam alia, non solum, quia sunt magis manifesta, et doloris illativa. sed quia imaginamur quod per fugam ea de facili vitare non possumus. Non enim sic per fugam vitare possumus aegritudines: quia cum aegritudo sit aliquid in nobis existens, per fugam eam vitare non possumus. pericula etiam maris non sic per fugam vitari possunt, sicut pericula belli.

Cum ergo difficilius sit durare, et sustinere pericula illa quae per fugam vitare possumus, quam ad quae sustinenda necessitamur, eo quod per fugam ea vitare non possumus; difficilis sustinentur pericula bellica, quam alia. Tertio pericula talia difficilius sustinentur: quia per ea maxime apprehendimus mortem violentam, cum mors ibi illata sit per mutilationem membrorum, et per incissuram corporis, per quam maxime apprehendimus violentam mortem. Mori enim per aegritudinem, vel per aliquem alium modum, non sic videtur repugnare naturae corporis, sicut mors bellica, per quam corpus mutilatur, et inceditur. Est igitur virtus Fortitudinis principaliter circa pericula bellica: ex consequenti autem est circa pericula alia. Propter quod dicitur 3. Ethicorum, quod principaliter dicetur utique fortis, qui impavidus est circa bonam mortem, et maxime circa eam quae est secundum bellum. Sed adhuc et in mari, et in aegritudinibus intimidus est, qui est fortis. Amplius licet Fortitudo sit circa pericula bellica, reprimendo timores, et moderando audacias: principalius tamen est circa repressionem timorum, quam circa moderationem audaciarum.

Nam pericula terribilia ut plurimum tristia sunt. Trsita autem naturaliter quilibet fugit, sicut naturaliter sequitur delectabilia. Cum ergo naturaliter tristia fugiamus, difficile est reprimere timores, per quos tristia fugimus. Non autem sic difficile est moderare audacias, per quas tristia aggredimur. Quare si virtus principalius est circa difficile, bene dictum est, Fortitudinem principalius esse circa repressionem timorum, quam circa moderantiam audaciarum. Quod autem Fortitudo principalius sit in sustinendo, quam in aggrediendo, ut communiter ponitur, triplici via venari potest. Primo, quia aggrediendum, est fortioris: sustinere autem, debilioris est. Aggediens autem comparatur ad alios, sicut ad debiliores.

sed sustinens, sicut ad fortiores: Difficilius est autem inniti contra fortiores, quam contra debiliores. propter quod difficilius est sustinere pugnam, quam aggredi pugnantes. Secundo est difficilius, quia aggrediens imaginatur malum ut futurum: sed sustinens habet malum prae oculis, et ut praesens. Difficilius autem est inniti, et habere se fortiter contra mala praesentia, quam contra mala futura. Tertio hoc est difficilius, quia aggredi potest fieri subito: sed sustinere requirit diuturnitatem, et tempus. Difficilius est autem habere se fortiter, et constanter in sustinendo bella, quod requirit durabilitatem et tempus, quam in aggrediendo, quod subito fieri potest. Unde Philosophus 3. Ethicorum cap.

de Fortitudine ait, quod Fortitudo est circa timores, et audacias. magis tamen est circa timores reprimendo eos, quam circa audacias moderando ipsas (et subdit) Fortitudinem esse in sustinendo tristia. Declaratum est igitur, circa quae habet esse Fortitudo: restat ergo declarandum, quomodo possumus facere nos ipsos fortes. Notandum ergo, quod licet virtus opponatur duabus malitiis, quarum una superabundat, et altera deficit: ut largitas opponitur prodigalitati, quae superabundat in expendendo: et avaritiae, quae deficit. et Fortitudo quae opponitur audaciae, quae superabundat in aggrediendo: et timiditati, quae deficit: semper tamen virtus plus opponitur uni malitiae, quam alii. Sed quia difficilius est reprimere timores, quam moderare audacias: Fortitudo magis insistit ut reprimat timores, quam ut moderet audacias: et plus repugnat, et contradicit timor fortitudini, quam faciat audacia. Quia igitur non possumus punctualiter attingere medium inter audaciam, et timorem: declinandum est ad audaciam, quae minus repugnat Fortitudini, quam timor, si volumus nos ipsos facere fortes. Declarata ergo sunt illa tria, quae in principio capituli proponebantur.

Ostensum est enim, quid est Fortitudo: quia est virtus reprimens timores, et moderans audacias. Rursus manifestum est, circa quae est Fortitudo: quia principaliter est circa pericula bellica, et in reprimendo timores, et in sustinendo pugnam. Ex consequenti autem, est circa pericula alia, et in moderando audacias, et in aggrediendo pugnantes. Tertio declaratum fuit, quomodo possumus facere nos ipsos fortes: quia maxime hoc faciemus, declinando magis ad audaciam, quae non tantum repugnat fortitudini, sicut timor.

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