Liber I, Pars II — Quod maxime decet reges, et principes esse iustos, et in suo Regno iustitiam observare. Cap. XII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod maxime decet reges, et principes esse iustos, et in suo Regno iustitiam observare. Cap. XII.

The previous chapter sufficiently persuades princes and kings to be just and to observe justice, since without it cities and kingdoms cannot endure. However, we can pursue this truth in fourfold ways, according to the four aspects of justice mentioned in Aristotle's Ethics. Of Ethics. The first way is taken from the royal person's side. The second comes from justice itself. The third is from the perfection of goodness, which is known through justice. And the fourth arises from wickedness, which comes from injustice. Thus, the first way is clear. For if the law is a rule of action, as can be seen from the fifth book of the Ethics, the Ethics. The first way is taken from the nature of the royal person. The second is from the nature of justice itself. The third is from the perfection of goodness, which is revealed through justice. And the fourth is from the very malice that arises from injustice. The first way is clear. To doubt whether a king should be equal and just is to doubt whether the rule itself should be regulated. If the rule fails to be based on equality, nothing will be regulated, since everything is governed by a rule. So if kings are unjust, they arrange their kingdom so that justice is not observed in it. Therefore, they ought to strive especially not to be unjust and unequal, because their injustice and inequality take away their royal dignity. For unjust kings, even if they rule through civil power, are nevertheless not worthy to be kings. Since it is fitting for the rule to be straight and equal, the king, because he is a certain animated law and a certain animated rule of actions, ought especially to preserve justice as part of his royal person. Secondly, we can investigate this same matter from the perspective of justice itself. For justice is a certain great and splendid good. For it perfects a man in relation to another. Then our goodness shines forth especially when it extends to others. Whence 5. Ethics. It is said that Injustice seems to be the most distinguished of virtues: neither the Evening Star nor Lucifer is as admirable as she. For the Evening Star and Lucifer are one and the same star, which is very beautiful and bright; and because of its beauty and charm, it is commonly called Venus. This star sometimes precedes the sun, and then it appears in the morning, and is called Lucifer. Sometimes, however, it follows the sun, and then it appears in the evening, and is called Hesperus. Therefore, the intention of the Philosopher is to say that Venus, which is such a beautiful star and is sometimes called Lucifer and sometimes Hesperus, is not as beautiful nor as distinguished as Justice. The beauty of the stars is not as admirable as His beauty. For indeed, the stars shine with bodily beauty and illuminate us with their light; but Justice shines with honorable and spiritual beauty, and adorns us with a certain virtuous perfection. Therefore, just as spiritual beauty surpasses bodily beauty, so the beauty of Justice and its splendor is more admirable than the brightness of the stars. If it is fitting for kings and princes to possess the most renowned virtues from the side of Justice, which is a certain most renowned virtue, it can be proven that they ought to observe Justice. Thirdly, this can be proven from the very perfection of goodness, which is made known through Justice. For Justice is not only a perfect virtue in itself, but if it exists in kings and princes, it shows them to be perfectly good. Thus, we see in other things that each one is perfect when it can produce something similar to itself and when its action extends to others: just as something is perfectly hot when it can heat other things, and when its action extends to others. And then someone is perfectly knowledgeable when they can teach others, and when their knowledge extends to others. Therefore, it is written. Metaphysics. The sign of one who knows is to be able to teach. Therefore, similarly, a person is perfectly good when their goodness extends to others. Thus, it follows that perfect goodness in people is not recognized unless they are established in some form of leadership. For as long as someone can only govern themselves, their true nature is not fully revealed, nor is their goodness perfectly known. But when someone is placed in a position of authority over others, it is necessary that their goodness extends to others, and then their true nature becomes clearer because their actions reach outward. If, therefore, we are more aware of external matters, the greater the authority someone holds, because their actions extend to more people, the clearer their true nature becomes. Therefore, it is said in the fifth book. The leadership of ethics reveals a man. For this reason, it is proverbially said, "If anyone wants to know a man, let him place him in some position of authority." Therefore, from justice (since it is directed toward others) perfect goodness becomes known. For except for prudence, which is superior to other virtues because it directs them, all other moral virtues, which perfect a person in themselves, seem to have justice as their aim, which perfects a person in relation to others, just as subjects, who in a way only have authority over themselves, relate to a ruler whose goodness and authority extend to others. Just as in a ruler the perfection of goodness is more evident than in others, so from justice the perfection of goodness is more evident than from other moral virtues. Therefore, it is fitting for kings and princes to be just, both because they ought to be a standard for actions, and because justice is a noble virtue, and also because from it the perfection of goodness becomes manifest. Fourth, this is fitting for kings and princes because of the magnitude of the evil that arises from injustice. For it is said in the Ethics. It shows that a man is revealed in his leadership. Just as a better man is one who is not only good in himself, but whose goodness extends to others, so a worse man is one who is not only bad in himself, but whose wickedness also extends to others; and the more his wickedness extends to many, the worse he is considered. Therefore, kings and princes ought to strive with great effort to preserve justice and avoid injustice, since the greater their justice, the greater the evil they can bring about, and they can inflict harm on more people. It should be further explained how kings and princes can acquire justice and how they ought to observe justice. But in the third book, where it will be discussed how the kingdom ought to be ruled justly, it will be shown more fully.