Liber I, Pars II — Quod absque iustitia nequeunt regna subsisitere. Cap. XI.
Liber I, Pars II — Quod absque iustitia nequeunt regna subsisitere. Cap. XI.
It was said in the previous chapter that there are two kinds of justice: one general and the other special. However, both kinds of justice are necessary for kingdoms to endure and remain peaceful. Indeed, without general justice, kingdoms cannot endure, and we can investigate this in two ways. The first is taken from the nature of general justice itself. The second, from the kingdom itself, in which such justice ought to be observed. The first way is clear: for (as was said in the previous chapter) legal justice is in a way the essence of all virtue. To have this kind of justice is to fulfill the law. Therefore, if the law commands every good and forbids every evil, fulfilling the law is to be perfectly virtuous. Therefore, it is said in the first chapter of the Great Moralists about justice that legal justice is a perfect virtue. Therefore, from the opposite standpoint, legal injustice is ungrateful and perfect malice. In no case is it possible to observe the laws, and if citizens do not participate in any legal justice, they are wholly and perfectly evil. But (as it is said in Ethics). 4. cap. Regarding meekness, evil destroys itself: and if it is whole, it will be unbearable. Therefore, that kingdom would be unbearable, and that city could not endure, whose citizens would be wholly evil and in no way would want to fulfill the law, nor would they want to participate in any legal justice. The second way to investigate this is taken from the standpoint of the kingdom itself. For a kingdom and every polity is a certain order and a certain principate. Since the order and principate of those who are subject to the laws and to the prince, who has the authority to enact laws, is established in relation to the laws: if citizens do not participate in legal justice, neither order nor respect for the laws or the prince would be preserved in them. Therefore, there would be no further order preserved in them, nor would there be a kingdom. It is therefore easy to show that without legal justice, kingdoms cannot endure. But it can be declared that without a special justice, which is divided into commutative and distributive justice, a kingdom cannot subsist. For any kingdom and any congregation is likened to a certain natural body. Just as we see the body of an animal consists of diverse limbs that are connected and ordered to one another, so every kingdom and every congregation consists of diverse persons that are connected and ordered to one thing. Therefore, so that it may be allowed to speak figuratively, in the limbs of the same body there is in a way a twofold justice, commutative and distributive. For true justice, when taken in its proper sense, exists only in relation to another and is only found among different persons. Metaphorically, and in a certain way, there is a justice of the same kind directed toward itself, and in the members of the same body, we can somewhat contemplate justice. For the members of one body have an order in relation to one another, and they are arranged toward one thing, like the heart, from which they receive motion and vital influence. Therefore, as the members have an order in relation to one another, there is in them a kind of commutative justice. But as they are arranged toward the heart, there is in them, in some way, a distributive justice. For among some, commutative justice exists; because one person abounds in one thing, in which another is lacking, and lacks in another, in which that person abounds. Therefore, so that each one might provide for their own needs, commutative justice was established. For it happens that one person abounds in money, in which another is lacking, and lacks in grain, in which that person abounds. Through commutative justice, this kind of superabundance and deficiency is brought to equality: because one gives the money he has in abundance and receives the grain he needs. The other, however, receives the grain that flows abundantly and takes the money that he lacks. Therefore, commutative justice is when one arranges his goods for the benefit of another, and vice versa. We find this, moreover, in the members of the same body. For the eye is powerful in the sharpness of sight; however, it lacks the power of movement, because it cannot proceed. The foot, however, abounds in the power of movement; yet it lacks in vision, because it sees nothing. Therefore, the eye, according to the vision in which it abounds, assists the foot's need, because it guides it. The foot, however, through the power of movement it possesses, assists the eye's need, because it carries it. If the members do not support each other's needs, like when a hand cleans an eye, and an eye directs a hand, or when feet carry the head and the head directs the feet, a natural body cannot stand. Similarly, since no person can sustain themselves alone, citizens must support each other through commutative justice, sharing what one has in abundance with another who is in need, or else the city cannot endure. Thus, just as in the members of the same body, where they have a relationship with one another and support each other's needs, there exists a certain commutative justice without which a natural body cannot endure; so too, when citizens of the same city or kingdom have a relationship with one another and satisfy each other's needs through a certain exchange, there exists commutative justice without which a city or kingdom cannot stand. Secondly, there is a certain distributive justice in the members, as they relate to the heart. For the heart, according to its proportion and dignity, imparts vital spirit and motion to each member, so that the principle of life and the principle of movement is in the heart, just as the principle of sensation is in the brain. Likewise, in citizens, there is distributive justice as they are ordered towards a common good, such as towards a king or a leader, who must justly bestow honors and goods upon them according to their virtue and dignity. Just as a natural body would not endure unless a certain distributive justice were reserved within it, so a kingdom or city cannot stand unless this distributive justice is preserved, so that the king or prince justly distributes honors and goods. It should be noted carefully that just as not every inequality causes sickness and weakens the body, so not every injustice completely corrupts a kingdom or state; however, any injustice weakens and predisposes a kingdom or state to corruption. It is clear that just as citizens have an order toward one another, there is in them a commutative justice. However, just as they have an order toward the king or the prince, there is in them a distributive justice. Just as they fulfill the laws, there is in them a legal justice. In whatever way justice is taken, without it a city or kingdom cannot endure. Well, it has been said that it is said in I. Of the great moralists, chapter. Concerning justice, what is just is a certain proportionable thing, and it contains civic communities. For just as the soul holds together the body, because when it departs, the body is dissolved and withers, so justice holds together civic communities, that is, cities and kingdoms, because without it a city is dissolved, and kingdoms cannot endure. Therefore, the kingdom and the king are greatly wronged if justice is not observed. If justice is the highest good of the king and the kingdom, then the king ought to strive with great effort to ensure that justice is upheld in his kingdom, not only for those who are born in the kingdom but also for foreigners and newcomers. To whomever justice is denied, a clear injury is inflicted upon the king and the kingdom.
Read the original Latin
Dicebatur in praecedenti capitulo duas esse Iustitias, unam generalem, et aliam specialem, Ad hoc autem ut regna subsistant et pacifice maneant, utraque Iustitia est necessaria. Quod quidem absque Iustitia generali regna durare non possint, duplici via investigare possumus. Prima sumitur ex parte ipsius Iustitiae generale. Secunda, ex parte regni, in quo debet talis Iustitia observari. Prima via sic patet: nam (ut in praecedenti capitulo dicebatur) legalis Iustitia est quodammodo omnis virtus. Habere enim huiusmodi Iustitiam, est implere legem. Si ergo lex iubet omne bonum, et prohibet omne malum: implere legem, est esse perfecte virtuosum. Ideo primo Magnorum moralium, capitulo de Iustitia, dicitur, quod legalis Iustitia est perfecta virtus.
ergo per locum ab opposito, legalis Iniustitia est ingrata, et perfecta malitia. In nullo ergo observare leges, et cives non participare in aliquo legalem Iustitiam, est eos esse integre et perfecte malos. Sed (ut dicitur Ethic. 4. cap. de mansuetudine) malum se ipsum destruit: et si integrum sit, importabile sit. Importabilia igitur esset illud regnum, et durare non posset illa civitas, cuius cives integre essent mali, et in nullo vellent implere legem, nec vellent in aliquo participare legalem Iustitiam Ex parte igitur ipsius legalis Iustitiae, quae est perfecta virtus, cuius oppositum est perfecta malitia, probari potest quod absque legali Iustita non valent regna subsistere. Secunda via investigandum hoc idem sumitur ex parte ipsius regni.
Regnum enim et omnis politia est quidam ordo, et quidam principatus. Cum igitur ordo, et principatus sit ipsorum subditorum per respectum ad leges, et ad principem, cuius est leges ferre, ut declarari habet in Politicis: si cives non participarent legalem Iustitiam, non reservaretur in eis ordo nec ad leges, nec ad principem. Non ergo ulterius reservaretur in eis politia, nec esset ulterius regnum. Facile est ergo ostendere, quod absque legali Iustitia regna durare non possunt. Sed quod absque Iustitia speciali, quae dividitur in Iustitiam commutativam, et distributivam, non subsistat regnum, sic declarari potest. Quodlibet enim regnum, et quaelibet congregatio assimilatur cuidam corpori naturali. Sicut enim videmus corpus animalis constare ex diversis membris connexis, et ordinatis ad se invicem: sic quodlibet regnum, et quaelibet congregatio constat ex diversis personis connexis, et ordinatis ad unum aliquid. Ut ergo liceat figuraliter loqui, in membris eiusdem corporis est quodammodo duplex Iustitia, commutativa, et distributiva.
Iustitia enim propria sumpta, non est nisi ad alterum, et non est nisi diversarum personarum. Metaphorice tamen, et per quandam similitudinem, est Iustitia eiusdem ad se ipsum, et in membris eiusdem corporism possumus aliquo modo contemplari Iustiam. Unius enim, et eiusdem corporis membra habent ordinem ad se invicem; et ordinantur ad unum aliquid, ut ad cor, a quo recipiunt motum, et vitalem influentiam. Ut ergo membra habent ordinem ad se invicem, est in eis quodammodo Iustita commutativa. Sed ut ordinantur ad cor, aliquo modo reservatur in ipsis Iustitia distributiva. Ex hoc enim inter aliquos commutativa Iustitia; quia unus abundat in uno, in quo alter deficit: et deficit in alio, in quo ille abundat. Ideo ut quilibet suae indigentiae provideret, inventa fuit commutativa Iustitia. Contingit enim aliquem abundare in pecunia, in qua alter deficit: et deficere in frumento, in quo ille abundat.
Per commutativam ergo iustitiam huiusmodi superabundantia, et defectus reducitur ad aequalitatem: quia unus dat pecuniam qua abundat, et recipit frumentum quo indiget. Alter vero tribui frumentum qu affluebat, et suscipit pecuniam qua caret. Est igitur commutativa Iustitia, prout unus ordinat bona sua in utilitatem alterius, et econverso. Hunc autem modo reperimus in membris eiusdem corporis. Oculus enim pollet acumine visus: deficit tamen a potentia gressiva, quia non potest pergere. Pes autem abundat ingressiva potentia: deficit tamen in visione, quia nihil videt. Oculus igitur secundum visionem in qua abundat, subvenit indigentiae pedis, quia dirigit ipsum. Pes autem per potentiam gressivam qua pollet, subvenit indigentiae oculi, quia portat eum.
Nisi igitur membra sic suae indigentiae subvenirent: ut nisi manus purgaret oculum, et oculus dirigeret manum: et nisi pedes portarent caput, et caput dirigeret pedes: corpus naturale non posset subsistere. Sic quia nullus homo sufficit sibi ad vivendum, nisi cives per commutativam Iustitiam sibi invicem subvenirent: ut quod unus communicaret alteri illud in quo superabundat, et acciperet illud in quo deficit, civitas durare non posset. Sicut ergo in membris eiusdem corporis prout habent ordinem ad se invicem, et sibi invicem suae indigentiae subveniunt, est in eis quaedam commutativa Iustitia, sine qua corpus naturale durare non posset: sic prout cives eiusdem civitatis, vel regni habent ordinem ad se invicem, et sibi invicem secundum quandam commutationem suis indigentiis satisfaciunt, est in eis commutativa Iustitia, sine qua civitas, vel regnum non posset subsistere. Secundo in membris est quaedam distributiva Iustitia, prout habent ordinem ad ipsum cor. Nam cor singulis membris secundum suam proportionem, et dignitatem influit eis spiritum vitalem, et motum: ita quod principium vitae, et principium movendi est in corde, sicut forte principium sentiendi est in cerebro. Sic et in civibus est distributiva Iustitia, prout ordinantur ad unum aliquid, ut ad regem, vel ad ducem, qui secundum eorum virtutem, et dignitatem debet eis homores, et bona tribuere. Sicut ergo corpus naturale non subsisteret, nisi in eo reservaretur quaedam distributiva Iustitia, ut quod cor membris debite influere: sic regnum vel civitas non potest subsistere, nisi reservetur in ea distributiva iustitia, ut quod rex sive princeps debite honores, et bona distribuat. Est autem diligenter notandum, quod sicut non quaelibet inaequalitas aegrotat, et infirmat ipsum: sic non quaelibet Iniustitia corrumpit totaliter regnum, et politiam, tamen per quamlibet Iniustitiam regnum, et politia infirmatur, et disponitur ad corruptionem.
Patet igitur quod prout cives habent ordinem ad se invicem, est in eis Iustitia commutativa. Prout vero habent ordinem ad regem, vel ad principem, reservatur in eis Iustitia distributiva. Prout vero adimplent leges, est in illis Iustitia legalis. Quocunque tamen modo sumatur Iustitia, sine ea civitas vel regnum durare non potest. Bene ergo dictum est, quod dicitur I. Magnorum moralium, cap. de iustitia, quod iustum est quoddam proportionabile, et continet urbanitates. Nam sicut anima continet corpus, quia recedente ea, corpus dissolvitur, et marcescit: sic iustitia continet urbanitates idest civitates, et regna, quia sine ea dissolvitur civitas, et non possunt regna subsistere.
valde igitur iniuriatur regno et regi, qui Iustitiam non observet. Si igitur Iustitia est tantum bonum regis, et regni, summo opere rex studere debet, ut in suo Regno, servetur Iustita, non solum iis, qui in regno nati sunt, sed etiam peregrinis, et advenis. Cuicumque enim negetur Iustitia, manifeste regi et Regno infertur iniuria.
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