Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt modi iustitiae, et circa qua iustitia habet esse, et quomodo ab aliis virtutibus est distincta. Cap. X.

Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt modi iustitiae, et circa qua iustitia habet esse, et quomodo ab aliis virtutibus est distincta. Cap. X.

The philosopher in Book 5. The Ethics distinguishes two kinds of justice: legal and equitable. Legal justice is, in a sense, a general principle and, in a way, encompasses all virtues. Equitable justice, on the other hand, is a specific virtue that gives each person what is due to them. For this reason, a person is considered legally just if they fulfill the precepts of the law. However, as it is stated in the first of the Great Moral Works, the law commands the actions of all virtues. For the law commands us to perform courageous and temperate acts, and universally all actions that are defined according to the virtues. From this, it is also stated there that legal justice is a perfect virtue. Thus also in Ethics 5. It is written that the law commands not to abandon the front, nor to flee, nor to throw down arms, which pertains to courage. And it commands not to commit adultery, which pertains to temperance. And not to strike, nor to contend, which are the works of gentleness. The law therefore universally commands to fulfill every virtue and to flee from wickedness. Therefore, legal justice, which is the fulfillment of the law, is in a way every virtue. However, equal justice is a certain special virtue, through which what is fair is given to each person, that is, what is owed to them. The distinction of these justices can thus be understood. For, as it is written in the Ethics, Justice is ordered toward another: therefore, as citizens have an order to one another, and to the commonwealth, and to the legislators or to the king himself, legal and equal Justice must exist among them. For among the citizens, from the fact that they have such an order, either the common good is sought, or a special and private good. If the common good is sought, then legal Justice exists among them. However, if a private good is sought among them, then equal Justice will exist. For the common good results from the good of all the citizens: the public matter and the whole city is better, no matter how good the citizens are. Whether the citizens are good in themselves or in relation to others, the city is always better that consists of better citizens: and the more ways the citizens are good, the better the city is. Therefore, since the laws aim at the common good, they prescribe every kind of goodness. Therefore, to be just according to the law and to fulfill legal Justice is to pursue every good, to flee every vice, and to have in some way every virtue. Legal justice is called in a certain way the virtue of all virtues because it performs the works of all virtues. However, legal justice is not simply every virtue because it is a virtue distinct from any other virtue. But it is said to be in a certain way every virtue because it does not determine a special justice for itself. This kind of justice differs from any virtue in two ways: for although the legal just person performs the same works as the brave and temperate person, nevertheless, he will perform them according to the same intention or according to the same formal reason. For whoever performs brave works, because he takes pleasure in such things, is brave, and whoever performs temperate works, because he takes pleasure in them, is temperate. But the one performing such things, not because he takes pleasure in them, but because the law commands them and he wishes to fulfill the law, is a legal just person. Therefore, the legal just person, by himself and as a man, takes pleasure in the fulfillment of the law. However, if he takes pleasure in the works of particular virtues, this is from the consequence that all such works are commanded by the law. A brave person, temperate and perfect according to other virtues, delights in works that align with those virtues that adorn him. However, if he delights in fulfilling the law, this is a consequence of doing such works, through which he fulfills the law. From this difference, a second follows: for when a brave person and a temperate person delights in the works of such virtues. According to himself, those virtues perfect the one who possesses them, and as he is according to himself. But the legal just person, because he delights in those works as he fulfills the law, does not perfect a man according to himself, but perfects him in relation to another, as in relation to the prince, or in relation to the city. Laws, however, are handed down by the very prince, and they are given to those cities subject to the authority of the prince, whose role it is to make laws. Therefore, to be perfected in relation to laws is to be perfected in relation to the prince, whose role it is to enact the law, or in relation to the whole city, to which the law is imposed. Although legal justice may perform the same works as Temperance and Fortitude, it nevertheless perfects the one who possesses it in relation to another, as in relation to the prince or in relation to the city; notwithstanding that Temperance, Fortitude, and other virtues of this kind perfect the one who possesses them according to himself. It is clear how legal justice is in a way all virtue, and that it does not determine a special justice for itself, but performs the works of special virtues. However, true justice that is equal is not all virtue, nor does it perform the works of individual virtues, but determines a special justice for itself because it aims at a special good. For a good citizen, however he may be, will result in a common good, and thus the city will be better; and however bad he may be, the city will be worse: yet not from the goodness of any one citizen in itself, and according to how the goodness of another citizen results from it; nor does the wickedness of one citizen in itself bring harm to another citizen. But if someone is bad in external goods, wanting to have more of them than is fitting for him, this will bring harm to other citizens, because if he has more, others will have less. Therefore, special justice, through which some specific evil is avoided, as harm is inflicted on another by the malice of one citizen, determines a special matter for itself and has being concerning these external goods in which citizens share. Thus this justice is called equal because it is primarily based on equality, so that each person has what is fair in such external goods. Therefore, this justice is said to give to each his own, because justice consists in a certain equality: this justice gives to each what is just or fair. Thus it is also said to give to each what is his own, because it is fair for anyone to possess what is theirs. If this special justice is called equal and aims at equality, then there will be two forms of this particular justice, since citizens can participate in external goods unequally in two ways. It happens that some participate unequally in goods during exchanges, such as in purchases, sales, exchanges, and rentals. It occurs in selling, buying, renting, lending, giving little, and receiving much, or even the other way around. This cannot exist without inequality. Again, inequality occurs in distributions, because sometimes those who work harder for the community receive less: indeed, this justice is somewhat corrupted, for most people are acceptors of persons, distributing honors to the unworthy and rejecting the deserving. Therefore, there will be two kinds of special justice: commutative and distributive. For all justice, whether legal, commutative, or distributive, always perfects the one who possesses it in relation to others. However, commutative and distributive justice perfects the possessor more in relation to others than legal justice does. But there will be a place for this elsewhere. For now, it has been stated that those three things, which were proposed at the beginning of the chapter, have been declared. It has been shown how many kinds of justice there are: some justice is general, which is called legal; and some is special, which is called equal. And this is twofold, because some is distributive and some is commutative. Again, it has been declared what justice must concern, because legal justice concerns the entire moral matter and all the works of virtue: not accepted in itself, but as it fulfills the law. Third, it has been shown how justice differs from other virtues: because other virtues perfect a person more in themselves; but justice, whether it is legal, distributive, or commutative, perfects a person in relation to others.