Liber I, Pars II — Quod virtutum quaedam sunt principales, quaedam Cardinales, quaedam vero annexae. Cap. V.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod virtutum quaedam sunt principales, quaedam Cardinales, quaedam vero annexae. Cap. V.

We have listed twelve virtues above; however, not all of these twelve are equal in perfection, nor are they all equally principal. It has been customary among the Saints and even among philosophers to distinguish between virtues, as some are cardinal and principal, while others are annexed. The cardinal virtues are four: namely, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. The other eight virtues are annexed and not principal, of which we have made mention above. We can investigate that these four virtues are cardinal and principal in three ways. The first way is taken from the matter concerning which they pertain. The second is from the subject in which they exist. The third is from the conditions that are required for the virtues. The first way is clear: for every virtue is either related to reason, or to passions, or to actions. Since it can happen that we reason correctly or incorrectly, we need some virtue that provides a right reason through which we can make correct judgments about what is actionable. Again, since it can happen that we act rightly or wrongly, we need a virtue that guides us in reasoning about what is actionable, and we need a virtue that directs us in performing those actions. Moreover, since it happens that we are moved by our passions either rightly or wrongly, we need to cultivate certain virtues through which we can be guided in our passions. When certain passions lead us toward evil, such as the passions of desire, since we are inclined to act on them, and when other passions draw us away from good, such as the passions of anger, we need to develop a virtue that prevents our passions from leading us to what reason forbids, and we need another virtue that prevents our passions from pulling us away from what reason dictates. Therefore, every virtue either corrects our reasoning, equalizes our actions, or modifies our passions so that they do not lead us to what reason forbids, or it modifies them so that they do not draw us away from what reason dictates. And since Prudence primarily corrects our reasoning, Justice primarily equalizes our actions, Temperance primarily modifies our passions so they do not lead us to what reason forbids, and Fortitude primarily modifies them so they do not draw us away from what reason dictates, these four virtues are called cardinal and principal because they pertain to the matter of human life. The second way to investigate whether these are cardinal and principal virtues can be taken from the aspect of the subject in which they exist. As has been stated above, the virtues we are discussing exist in four powers of the soul, namely, in the intellect, in the will, in the irascible, and in the concupiscible; therefore, since in practical intellect the principal virtue is Prudence, in the will (when speaking of acquired virtues) the principal virtue is Justice, in the irascible the principal virtue is Fortitude, and in the concupiscible it is Temperance, these four virtues, namely Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance, are said to be principal and cardinal. The third way is taken from the conditions required for any virtue. For every action, if it is to be virtuous, it must be done wisely, justly, bravely, and temperately; therefore, these four virtues are called principal and cardinal. In other virtues, there can be some principal quality, as magnanimity has a certain principal quality over other virtues, according to the Philosopher. In the Ethics, magnanimity seems to be a certain adornment of all other virtues. Similarly, magnificence has a certain principal quality due to the magnitude of expenditures, around which it revolves. Therefore, other virtues have a certain principal quality, but these four are simply called principal and cardinal; how this is, will be shown more fully in discussing them individually. If therefore these four are principal and cardinal in relation to others, we must first speak of these four. Again, since wisdom is more principal than all others, as it is the guiding principle of all other virtues, and justice is more principal than courage and temperance, as justice pertains to the exchanges of things and the distributions of goods, and to those things which principally govern our lives; and because courage is more principal than temperance, since courage is more directed toward the good of the nation and the common good than temperance itself, therefore this order must be maintained. First, we'll discuss what prudence is and what it means for kings and princes to be prudent. Secondly, we'll determine what Justice itself is, showing that it is fitting for kings and princes to be just. Then, we'll determine about Fortitude and Temperance, declaring that it is fitting for kings and princes to be brave and temperate. Consequently, we'll treat Greatness and Magnificence, and other virtues, demonstrating how it is fitting for kings and princes to embody such virtues perfectly.