Liber I, Pars II — Quod bonarum dispositionum, quaedam sunt virtutes, quaedam supra virtutes, quaedam sunt ancillantes virtutibus, et quaedam praeparationes ad virtutem. Cap. IIII.

Liber I, Pars II — Quod bonarum dispositionum, quaedam sunt virtutes, quaedam supra virtutes, quaedam sunt ancillantes virtutibus, et quaedam praeparationes ad virtutem. Cap. IIII.

We've distinguished in the previous chapter that there are twelve virtues: one is in the intellect, like Prudence; one is in the will, like Justice; and four are in the irascible part, like Fortitude, Gentleness, Magnificence, and Magnanimity. And there are six in the concupiscible part, like Temperance, Generosity, Honor-loving, Truth, Affability, and Wit, which we also listed in the previous chapter. So that no one might think there are no other good dispositions besides the listed virtues, we decided to show that some of these good dispositions (speaking of the good dispositions that philosophers have discussed, since we do not intend to establish a treatise on others at present) are virtues, some serve virtue, some are preparations for virtue, and some are above virtue. For by broadly accepting virtue, all such good dispositions can be called virtues. However, some good dispositions serve virtue, such as being able to counsel well and judge well about those being counseled; these are subordinate to Prudence: therefore, whoever is well disposed to this is fit to be prudent. Some good dispositions, however, are not complete virtues, or they are dispositions toward virtue, like Perseverance and Continence, which (as the philosopher speaks of them) are not complete virtues but dispositions toward virtue. For he is said to persevere who does not fall, even if he is not tempted; however, even those who are not virtuous sometimes have this, who are not passionate and do not fall. A person is called continent who suffers and has strong passions, yet he controls himself and does not yield to passion, but to reason; therefore, a continent person is not fully virtuous, because due to strong passions, even if he acts well, it is not delightful for him to act well. Therefore, while both Contemplation and Perseverance are considered good dispositions, they are not virtues; rather, they are preparations for virtue. There are also certain good dispositions that are above virtue, such as divine virtue, or heroic and superlative virtue. And. For just as some people are like beasts and are wicked beyond the measure of humanity, so some are almost divine and are good beyond measure, which is why they can be called super-virtuous. Such divine virtue, which is in some way above virtue, should especially be possessed by kings and princes, who, as has been said, ought to be like demigods. Fourth, there are certain good dispositions that are themselves virtues, such as Prudence, Justice, and others, which we mentioned in the previous chapter. Therefore, we will speak about all these four in their proper place. Thus, we will also discuss the virtues, showing how kings and princes ought to possess them. We will also determine about those things that support virtue, and about the dispositions toward virtue, and about those that are above virtue, showing how kings and princes ought to be adorned with such qualities. But first, we must speak about the very virtues themselves.