Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo diversimode notificari potest, quid est prudentia. Cap. VI.

Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo diversimode notificari potest, quid est prudentia. Cap. VI.

Prudence, which we intend to discuss first, can be compared in various ways, and as it is compared to different things, it receives different forms of recognition. As far as the present is concerned, we can compare prudence to five things: namely, to moral virtues, which it directs; to intellectual virtues, in relation to which it is prescriptive; to the matter it deals with; to knowledge; and to art, from which it is distinguished. For prudence is the directive of moral virtues, because moral virtues incline towards their appropriate ends, as temperance inclines towards sobriety and the rejection of lust; but it is not enough to incline towards the proper end of temperance or the ends of other moral virtues unless we know how to achieve such an end through prudence. Therefore, through moral virtues, we establish our proper ends; but through prudence, we are guided towards those ends. Let prudence receive those ends from moral virtues, and through those things that lead to the end, it rightly directs towards those ends. Thus, prudence, when compared to moral virtues, can be defined as the perfection of intellect, or as a good quality of the mind that directs towards the end of moral virtues. Secondly, prudence can be compared to intellectual virtues, in relation to which it is prescriptive: as far as the present is concerned, if we want to negotiate well regarding actionable matters, we must have three things. First, we must find various ways. Secondly, we must judge about the things discovered. Thirdly, we must prescribe that works be done according to the things discovered and judged, so that if we wish to capture some military fortress, we would know how to proceed. Firstly, there must be ways to be discovered, and methods of thinking through which that fortress could be captured. Secondly, there should be a judgment about the discovered ways, whether they are good for pursuing the intended purpose. Thirdly, it should be prescribed that works be done according to the things discovered and judged. Therefore, in our understanding, there must be three virtues. One of these is through which we may discover well and counsel well, which the Philosopher calls Ethics. 6. It is called eubulia, which means good counsel. Another form of good judgment about inventions is what the philosopher calls synesis, which means good judgment. Thirdly, we must command that actions be carried out according to the inventions and judgments, and we call this prudence. Thus, prudence is said to be directive in relation to the inventive and judgmental virtues because it commands what they discover and judge to be done. Prudence, therefore, directly guides actions to be done because it commands that they be done, just as the inventive and judgmental virtues do. Since in moral matters actions and works are said to be more important, prudence, which relates more directly to these, is superior to the inventive and judgmental virtues. Prudence, therefore, in relation to the inventive and judgmental virtues, which are intellectual virtues, can be understood as directive of inventions and judgments. Hence, it is discussed in the Ethics. It is said that just as good counsel involves discovering, and good judgment involves judging, so prudence involves prescribing. Thirdly, prudence can be compared to the matter at hand. Since prudence is thus concerned with things that can be done, it must be about particulars, applying universal rules to specific situations, as Aristotle teaches. Thus, prudence must be about particulars, applying universal rules to specific actions. It has been declared. Therefore, prudence can be described as a virtue concerning the matter at hand. Thus, prudence is a virtue according to universal maxims concerning particular actions. Such universal rules are good laws, proper customs, and other means through which we can be guided in our actions. Fourth, prudence can be compared to knowledge, from which it is distinguished: for knowledge, properly speaking, is about necessary things, according to Boethius in the first book of Arithmetic, where he states that knowledge pertains to those things that have an unchanging substance; however, prudence pertains to human actions and contingent matters that are within our power. Fifth, prudence can also be compared to art, from which it can likewise be distinguished. For art is concerned with things that can be done, and does not presuppose the rightness of the will; whereas prudence is concerned with things that can be acted upon, and presupposes the rightness of desire; for this reason, it is written in the Ethics. 6. Thus, in works that serve art, it is better to sin voluntarily than involuntarily; but in works that serve life, concerning which prudence is concerned, it is worse to sin voluntarily than involuntarily. Therefore, since no one can be prudent unless they are good and have a right will, prudence is not an art, but a virtue. Thus, prudence is compared to art, from which it is distinguished, and can be defined as the right reason of things that can be acted upon, presupposing the rightness of the will. 7. Therefore, from all of this, we can form a common definition of prudence, saying that prudence is an intellectual virtue, directing moral virtues, preceptive according to discoveries, and judged according to universal maxims, concerning particular contingent actions that are manageable, presupposing the rectitude of the will.