Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt virtutes morales, et quomodo earum numerus est sumendus. Cap. III.

Liber I, Pars II — Quot sunt virtutes morales, et quomodo earum numerus est sumendus. Cap. III.

The Philosopher discusses this at the end of Book V. Besides Prudence and Justice, enumerate ten other virtues. The moral virtues are, namely, Fortitude, Temperance, the love of honor, Magnanimity, Liberality, Magnificence, Gentleness, Truthfulness, Affability, and Wit, which we can also call versatility or sociability. Therefore, having counted Justice and Prudence, there are twelve moral virtues; about which we need to discuss what they are, how kings should possess them, and what parts they have, or associated virtues. The number of them can thus be understood. For since the subject of virtue is either intellect, will, or sensitive appetite: every moral virtue is either in intellect, like Prudence; or in will, like Justice; or in sensitive appetite, like those ten moral virtues we enumerated, which the Philosopher touches on at the end of Book II. Of the Ethics. These virtues can also be understood in another way. For virtues are certain means, and they cannot exist except in relation to things that are within our control, where we ought to establish moderation, equality, or rectitude. There are three such categories: namely, reason, passions, and external actions. Through virtues, we should have right reason, moderate passions, and balanced, measured external actions. Accordingly, right reason is derived from Prudence, while measured and balanced external actions are the essence of Justice; however, the moderate passions are understood as those ten moral virtues we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Justice, therefore, moderates passions and is the guardian and conservator of good according to reason; thus, those ten moral virtues previously numbered are understood in this way. The number and sufficiency of these can be understood in this way. For it has been said that those virtues pertain to the passions, which they have the ability to moderate and balance. Thus, from other things and objects arise other passions, and other virtues can be understood as arising from those passions according to the order of reason, where one medium or another is found. So that we may allow ourselves to pass superficially, let us say that passions arise either from good or from evil. If they arise from evil, they may come from the future or from the present. If passions arise in us from future things, they are fear and boldness: fear when we flee from something, and boldness when we confront it. Among these two passions, one virtue is taken, namely, Fortitude. Therefore, Fortitude, which is the mean between fear and boldness, will exist in the irascible part of the soul. If, however, these passions arise from present evil, which has already been inflicted upon us, we either rise up to punish, and then there is anger, which is due to a slight injury, or we desire punishment in retaliation for the inflicted harm. If we fail to act against this punishment or this vengeance, then we exhibit meekness. The mean virtue among these is the one called Meekness. However, Meekness does not properly name the mean virtue between meekness and anger; rather, it more accurately names the passion itself, which is meekness. In the Ethics, it is said that we do not have a proper name for this kind of virtue; it is referred to by the name of the deficient passion, and it is called Meekness. Meekness will be found in the irascible faculty, because in it are mildness and anger, against which this kind of virtue seems to consist. Therefore, there are two virtues existing in the irascible faculty, which are taken around the passions that arise from evil. As fortitude is around the passions that arise from future evil, so meekness is around the passions that arise from present evil. If, however, virtues are taken around the passions that arise from good, then it must be distinguished about the good; because one kind of good is in itself, while another is good in relation to others. The good of man in itself is twofold, for one kind is delightful, like food and drink and such things; another is useful, like money; and yet another is honorable, like honor, for honor itself takes its origin from honor, as it were, the status of honor. Around the passions that arise from delightful good, only one virtue is taken, namely temperance, which is in the concupiscible faculty. But around the passions that arise from useful good, two virtues are taken. For this kind of good is either moderate and common, and thus liberality is taken, which is around moderate expenses. Or it is that good which is difficult, and thus it is Magnificence, which pertains to great expenditures; for magnificence is the same as being magnificent. Therefore, there will be liberality in the appetitive part, but magnificence will be in the irascible part. If that good is honest, or honor, then that honor is either mediocre, and thus it is a certain virtue, which can be commonly referred to as the love of honor. If that honor is great, it is called Magnanimity, which pertains to honors. The love of honor will be in the appetitive part, while Magnanimity will be in the irascible part. From this, it is clear that because pleasurable goods cannot have the same measure of difficulty as useful and honorable goods, although two virtues can be derived from both useful and honorable goods—one from the appetitive part and the other from the irascible part—only one virtue can be derived from pleasurable goods, which is in the appetitive part, namely Temperance. If, however, such virtues are taken in relation to the passions that arise from good, as we communicate with others, then (as it is said in the second book of the Ethics) three virtues are derived. For when we communicate with others in words and deeds, both actions and words serve us in communicating with others towards truth, life, and play. Therefore, there are three virtues: namely, Truth, Affability, and Eutrapelia, which can be called good disposition. Truth is when someone is not a hypocrite or a braggart, but is open and shows themselves in words and actions as they truly are. Affability is when someone behaves well in their conversations about life, such that they are neither a flatterer nor a contentious person, but are affable and courteous. Eutrapelia, or good disposition, is when someone conducts themselves in games in such a way that they are not a show-off, wanting to play everything, nor are they a killjoy, wanting to play nothing; rather, they are playful and well-adjusted, engaging in games as is appropriate. All three of these virtues, since they do not pertain to anything difficult, are in the realm of desire. It is clear, therefore, that since the four powers of the soul are capable of the virtues we are discussing, there are twelve such virtues, because one is in the intellect, one in the will; four in the irascible, and six in the appetitive. In the intellect, there is prudence. In the will, there is justice. In the realm of anger, there are four virtues: Courage, Meekness, Magnanimity, and Magnificence. These are understood as follows: Courage and Meekness relate to passions arising from evils, with Courage concerning passions arising from future evils, and Meekness concerning passions arising from present evils. However, Magnificence and Magnanimity pertain to great and difficult goods, each in its own way: Magnificence relates to great useful goods, such as significant expenditures, while Magnanimity pertains to great honorable goods, such as high honors. In the realm of desire, there are six virtues: Temperance, Generosity, Honor's love, Truth, Affability, and Eutrapelia. These are understood as follows: the first three, namely Temperance, Generosity, and Honor's love, are considered according to the good of man in itself. The other three, however, are considered according to the good of man in a different order. Therefore, according to both categories of good, there are three virtues. For there are three types of good in man: some are delightful, which relate to Temperance; some are useful, which relate to Generosity; and some are honorable, which relate to Honor's love. Thus, in relation to another, these can also be considered in three ways: either as they serve us for manifestation, and thus it is Truth; or for life, and thus it is Affability; or for play, and thus it is Eutrapelia. It has been shown, therefore, how many such virtues there are and how they are distinguished.