Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo distinguuntur virtutes: et quomodo esse habent in intellectu et appetitu. Cap. II.

Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo distinguuntur virtutes: et quomodo esse habent in intellectu et appetitu. Cap. II.

It has been shown that there are no virtues in natural powers or in the senses; now it remains to show how virtues are distinguished and how they exist in appetite and intellect. Therefore, we must distinguish between virtues and these kinds of powers, for some virtues are intellectual, some are moral, and some are intermediate between the intellectual and the moral. Intellectual virtues are those that exist in speculative intellect, such as speculative sciences like natural philosophy, geometry, metaphysics, and other similar subjects. Moral virtues, on the other hand, are those that exist in appetite, whether that appetite is sensitive or intellectual, such as justice, temperance, fortitude, meekness, and other similar virtues that we will discuss in detail. The intermediate virtues between the intellectual and the moral are those that exist in practical intellect, such as prudence and other related virtues. Prudence, according to the commentator on the Ethics, is the middle ground between moral and intellectual virtues; it can be counted among moral virtues, for prudence exists only in good people, just as moral virtues do; for wicked people, even if they can be knowledgeable, cunning, and crafty, cannot be prudent, as will be made clear in its proper context. Therefore, it is said that 6. Ethic. It's impossible for a prudent person to exist without goodness. Therefore, having dismissed these kinds of intellectual virtues, just as we have dismissed speculative sciences, we must discuss prudence and moral virtues. We have undertaken this present work, not so that we may know, but so that we may become good; which goodness cannot exist in us without prudence and moral virtues. These virtues can indeed exist in the intellect and appetite. It has been said that virtue is something according to reason; therefore, there must be a rational power in which virtue can exist. However, the rational power is twofold according to the Philosopher, through essence and through participation. The intellect, however, is rational by essence. But appetite is through participation. For although appetite is not itself intellect or reason in essence, it is said to participate in reason because it is naturally inclined to obey reason. However, natural powers and senses are not rational by essence, since they are not reason itself; nor do they participate in reason, because in themselves and as such, they do not obey reason. Therefore, in senses and natural powers (as was said above), virtues do not have existence, but they only exist in intellect and appetite. In us, however, there is a twofold appetite: intellectual and sensitive. For just as the natural appetite follows the form it has naturally acquired, so the cognitive appetite follows the form through the knowledge it has grasped. For as heavy things, because they have the form of heaviness, follow a certain natural inclination and a certain natural appetite to desire to be downward, so those that have knowledge, as they have the form they have grasped within themselves, follow a certain inclination and a certain appetite according to that form. Therefore, just as in us there is a twofold knowledge, sensitive and intellectual, so there is also in us a twofold appetite, namely, sensitive, which follows the form grasped through sense, and intellectual, which follows the form grasped through intellect. The sensitive appetite, however, is twofold. Since animals are above inanimate things, if nature has given a double power to elements and inanimate objects, one by which they tend toward their proper rest, and another by which they resist and act against prohibitions and oppositions, much more has nature given this double power to animals, which are more perfect than those. For we see that fire is naturally hot and light, and by its lightness tends to its proper place and to a rest that is suitable for it; but by its heat, it acts against oppositions. So that fire would not be hindered by any opposing forces, nor would it rest in its proper place due to its lightness, nature has given it a heating power, so that through it it can resist and act against corrupting oppositions. If therefore nature has given fire and inanimate objects a double power, one by which they attain their proper rest, and another by which they act against prohibitions and oppositions, much more has it given this to animals. Therefore, it has granted them a double sensitive appetite, one by which they pursue their proper rest and their own delight, as the concupiscible; and another by which they resist and act against prohibitions, as the irascible. Thus, the concupiscible appetite is like lightness or heaviness, in light things and heavy things. The irascible appetite, however, is like heat or cold in them. For just as heavy things recede from a place upwards as if from an unsuitable location, and tend downwards to a suitable and conforming place, so too do they resist oppositions through coldness, lest they be corrupted by their own nature and abandon their proper places and their own rest. Thus, animals flee from sad evils through their appetitive desire and pursue delightful goods. Through their irascible nature, they confront oppositions that could prevent them from enjoying such delights. Just as a lion pursues food as something delightful through its appetitive desire, it also confronts those animals that would prevent it from obtaining that food through its irascible nature. For it is rightly said that the appetitive desire looks to good and evil according to its nature, while the irascible nature looks to good and evil in terms of their difficulty and challenge. For when good is defined as something to pursue and evil as something to flee from, the appetitive desire, which seeks rest and delightful goods, flees from sad evils, having as its object both evils and sensible goods considered in themselves. The irascible nature, by which we confront and resist those things that are harmful, tends toward both good and evil, not considered in themselves, but as they present challenges and difficulties; for difficulty and challenge are primarily oppositional and prohibitive, preventing us from achieving good and avoiding evil. Therefore, nature would have acted imperfectly if it had given animals an appetitive desire through which they could avoid evils and pursue goods, without also giving them an irascible nature to confront the obstacles to that delight; thus, animals have an irascible nature that allows them to resist and confront the impediments to that delight. Thus, the sensitive appetite is dual: irascible and appetitive. The intellectual appetite, which is called will, remains undivided. Since the intellect regards its object in a more universal way than the senses do, the intellectual appetite, which follows the intellect in this universal manner, is directed toward good, more so than the appetite according to the senses; and because the more something is understood in a universal way, the more it extends itself to many things, although the sensitive appetite is different and distinct, according to which we pursue delightful things and attack terrible things, the intellectual appetite, however, is one and the same, directed toward every intelligible good. Therefore, there is no other intellectual appetite, according to which we pursue delightful goods through the intellect and attack arduous goods, just as there is another sensitive appetite, according to which we pursue delightful sensible goods and attack terrible things. Therefore, if every moral virtue is either in the intellect or in the appetite, and one appetite is intellectual, like the will, while the other is sensitive, and this is twofold, namely irascible and concupiscible, it follows that every moral virtue must either be in the intellect, in the will, in the irascible, or in the concupiscible. Taking moral virtue broadly, as prudence is called a certain moral virtue, we can say that according to these four powers of the soul, in which virtue has its being, four Cardinal Virtues have been taken: namely, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. For Prudence is in the intellect, Justice in the will, Fortitude in the irascible, and Temperance in the concupiscible.