Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt considerabilia, et circa quae oportet consilia adhibere. Cap. XVI.

Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt considerabilia, et circa quae oportet consilia adhibere. Cap. XVI.

As mentioned above, there are four things to consider in the governance of a city. These are namely the ruler, counsel, the governing body, and the people. Therefore, with God's help, we have determined the nature of the ruler, distinguished the various types of governance, identified which are just and which are unjust, and declared that a kingdom is the best form of governance while tyranny is the worst; we have also clarified what the duties of a king are and what he must do to govern his people rightly: we have shown that a king should take diligent care to avoid becoming a tyrant, and finally, as far as the present matter is concerned, we have sufficiently discussed what needs to be said about the ruler. Therefore, it remains to discuss the matters that need to be addressed regarding him. But, as the philosopher says, Ethic. A person will certainly seek counsel not from those who are foolish and insane, but from those who are wise and have understanding. Therefore, first, we must see what matters require counsel and what should be addressed, so that we do not, like the ignorant, seek counsel on matters that do not require it. We can touch on six matters, as far as the present situation is concerned, which do not fall under counsel. First of all, anything that is unchangeable escapes our counsel. For this reason, we deliberate in order to regulate our actions, to avoid evils, and to achieve good things; therefore, those things that cannot be avoided and those that do not undergo change do not fall under counsel. Thus it is said 3. Ethi. No one deliberates about eternal matters, that is, about unchangeable things: for no one seeks counsel about the diameter if it is commensurable with the ribs, or about any unchangeable thing. Secondly, anything that is mobile is not subject to counsel if it moves uniformly and constantly. For those things that always move uniformly (as such) have a certain necessity: however, things subject to counsel are not necessary but contingent. Therefore, it is said in the Ethics. No one seeks counsel about things that are always in motion, such as the movements of the sun or the rising of the stars: for although the stars may be moved, since they are always in motion, their courses cannot be changed by our actions; therefore, there is no counsel to be given about such matters. If, however, counsel pertains to such matters, it is not in itself, but as it relates to our actions; for some human actions are more suitable in warm weather, while others are better in cold: the courses of the stars, which influence according to different times, can affect warmth and coldness, not by themselves, but accidentally, so that we may know when certain actions should be performed. Thirdly, those things that happen frequently are also not subject to counsel if they occur by nature. Therefore, there is no counsel regarding the rains that always occur in winter, or the droughts that often happen in summer, because such things are natural and do not depend on our actions; thus, we do not seek counsel about them unless they serve our actions. Therefore, this is how counsel is given regarding these matters, just as it is regarding the courses of the stars and any other matters that serve human actions. Thus, it is rightly said in the Ethics. That there is no counsel regarding droughts and rains. Fourth, those things that happen rarely and are contingent on chance are not subject to counsel. For anyone who seeks counsel intends to achieve something either by choice or intention; therefore, those things that happen outside of intention cannot be subject to counsel. Thus, it is stated in the Ethics. It is not appropriate to give counsel about things that are determined by chance, such as the discovery of treasures. Fifth, not all human actions are subject to counsel, because they do not fall under our counsel regarding those actions of others that cannot be changed by our deeds. Thus, it is stated in the Ethics. No one from Lacedaemon gives counsel on how the Scythians should best conduct themselves, nor do any Gallic people counsel on how the Indians should best live. Therefore, things subject to counsel are not immutable, nor always uniform, nor those that come from nature, nor those that come from chance, nor all human actions fall under counsel; rather, we only give counsel about those things that can be acted upon by us: for as it is said in the Ethics. Individuals, however, deliberate about those things that can be accomplished through their own actions. Sixth, not everything that can be done by us is subject to deliberation. For whatever we ultimately intend to achieve through our actions does not fall under deliberation. For deliberation is not about the end itself, but about the means to that end; we must presuppose the intended outcome in deliberation, and not deliberate about the end itself, but about the means through which we can achieve it. For a physician, since he ultimately intends to restore health, does not deliberate about whether he should heal the sick, but accepts this as certain and known: that the sick person must be healed; and he deliberates about the ways through which he can heal him more easily and effectively. Similarly, the ruler of a city or kingdom does not deliberate about whether citizens should have peace among themselves, or whether the kingdom ought to be in a good state; he accepts these as certain and known, and deliberates about how they can be achieved better. Therefore, those things that depend on our actions are subject to deliberation, and they are not ultimately intended, nor do they exist as ends; but as means to the ends.