SR
Chapter 165GilesRP.1.165

Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt quae salvant dominium regium, et quot oporteat regem facere ut se in suo principatu conservet. Cap. XV.

Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt quae salvant dominium regium, et quot oporteat regem facere ut se in suo principatu conservet. Cap. XV.

The philosopher touches on this. He speaks. There are ten things that preserve the state and the royal authority, and which the king must do to maintain himself in his principality. First, he must not allow minor transgressions in his kingdom. For many minor transgressions, as the philosopher says, lead to greater ones. They are equivalent to a large expense, just as many small expenses add up to a large total: for if many minor transgressions occur, they lead to major ones. For whoever neglects minor issues gradually falls into greater ones. Therefore, one must resist the beginnings, and prevent even minor deviations. To preserve the governance and royal authority, it's important to make good use of those who are in the kingdom, introducing them to various positions of leadership, honoring them, and not wronging them. For as the philosopher indicates in his work on politics. Using citizens well not only preserves the proper governance but also makes the authority more durable, provided there is no element of corruption present. Third, instill fear in those who are part of the governance: for corruption is more effectively addressed through fear than through reason, as citizens are more subject to their ruler and obey him more if they fear corruption. War, indeed, removes external seditions and makes citizens more united and harmonious. We have an example of this in the Romans, who, after they ceased to engage in external wars, began to fight among themselves. This caution is useful only in two types of leadership: for an established authority made up of men accustomed to war, and for a leadership where someone has recently begun to rule. For men who are warriors and accustomed to battle, who have no concern for other virtues except for courage, according to the philosopher. Political matters are like iron; while it is in constant use, it retains its shine, but if it remains unused for a long time, it rusts. Thus, those who are engaged in battle become obedient to their leader; however, those who are idle do not know how to behave properly; therefore, for such individuals, fears of war and external corrections must always be instilled. If someone begins to rule over others newly, it is easier for them to rise against such a leadership; so that the citizens do not rebel against their leader, and to ensure they obey more unanimously, fears of imminent external dangers must be instilled in them; but if the kingdom remains in that state for a long time, and the ruler is natural, to the point that he is almost forgotten in the memory of men since he and his ancestors obtained such a principality, then such caution does not seem to have much benefit. The fourth thing that seems to save the state is to guard against seditions and conflicts among the nobility; and this is done by imposing laws on them, since laws are not easily contradicted. For there are laws to be established in the kingdom so that through them the disputes among the nobility can be quelled. For when the barons disagree, seditions arise in the kingdom, and consequently, there should be a preparation to dissolve the royal principality. The fifth is to carefully observe how those whom royal majesty has honored and promoted to some office or principality or magistracy are behaving. Nothing preserves a kingdom and saves the state as much as appointing good and virtuous men and granting them dominions and principalities. Therefore, the most essential safeguard for governance is for the king to carefully consider those he appoints to various offices: if they perform well, he should increase their authority; if they perform poorly, he should reduce it; or if they are so incompetent that they should be completely removed from power, they may even deserve a capital sentence. The sixth point is that it is very important not to grant great authority to anyone without careful consideration. For great powers often corrupt the minds of men due to excessive goodness and strength, leading them to become transgressors of justice. This caution is especially useful for those individuals about whom the king has not had a clear and long-term experience. Therefore, it is crucial to be vigilant so that no one is suddenly placed in a high position of power. The seventh point that preserves the kingdom and governance is that the king or ruler should have a love and affection for the good of the kingdom and for the governance in which he rules. For whoever loves is concerned and fears that something undesirable might happen to what they love. However, fear creates a sense of caution, as it is said. The eighth principle that preserves the kingdom and the state is to have civil authority. For there is great safety where there are many counsels. Therefore, if the king loves the good of the kingdom, the kingdom will be saved; for fearing that adverse events may occur in the kingdom, he will employ many strategies to promote the good of the kingdom and to avert impending dangers. The eighth principle that preserves the kingdom and the state is to have civil authority. For, as it is said in the Great Moral Works, justice preserves cities. But justice cannot be maintained in the kingdom unless the civil authority punishes the transgressors of justice. For a king or prince who wants to maintain justice and punish the transgressors of justice must have many spies and many investigators examining the actions of the citizens, and inquiring where the citizens get what they spend, and how they can account for their living; for whoever cannot give such an account is a sign that he lives from theft or from ill-gotten gains. Thus, by doing these things, he will be able to maintain justice and preserve the kingdom from evildoers and transgressors of justice. The ninth thing that preserves a kingdom is to have a good and virtuous king. For it is said that a greater virtue is required in the guardianship of the city and the kingdom than in the leader of an army. In a leader of an army, experience is most required, but a guardian of the city and the entire kingdom must be virtuous and, as it were, more just than a mere man: it is fitting for such a one to be like a demigod, so that just as he excels others in dignity and power, he may also surpass them in goodness. For this will greatly save the kingdom and the state if the king is good and virtuous, because he will intend for the good of the kingdom and the common good. The tenth thing is that a king should not be ignorant of what kind of government he has and what can save or corrupt it. Such matters can best be understood through experience: for when someone has long been experienced in the affairs of the kingdom, he can judge lightly what corrupts or saves the good state of the kingdom. Therefore, it is fitting for a king to frequently reflect and keep in mind the past events that have occurred in the kingdom, how they were judged, and how in former times the good state of the kingdom was better preserved, so that he may know how he ought to govern and what corrupts and saves the kingdom and its governance; for without knowing these things, a king cannot govern rightly. Therefore, a king should often meditate and remember the past events that have occurred in the kingdom, how they were judged, and how in former times the good state of the kingdom was better preserved, so that he may know how he ought to govern and what corrupts and saves the kingdom and its governance; for without knowing these things, a king cannot govern rightly.

Read the original Latin

Tangit autem Philosophus 5. Polit. decem quae politiam salvant, et quae oportet facere regem ad hoc ut se in suo principatu praeservet. Primo est, non permittere in suo regno transgressiones modicas. nam multae modicae transgressiones (ut ait Philos.) aequantur uni magnae, sicut multae parvae expensae aequivalent uni magno sumptui: parvae enim transgressiones si multae sint, disponunt ad transgressiones magnas. Nam qui minima negligit, palulatim defluit in maiora. principiis ergo est obstandum, et inhibendae sunt obliquitates, etiam modicae.

Secundum praeservans politiam et regnum regium, est bene uti iis qui sunt in regno, introducendo eos ad alioquos principatus, honorando eos, et non iniuriando eis. Nam ut innuit Philosophus in Poli. bene uti civibus non solum praeservat politiam rectam, sed etiam principatus ex hoc durabilior redditur, dato quod in ipso sit aliquid obliquitatis ad mixtum. Tertium est, incutere timorem iis qui sunt in politia: nam corruptiones longe secundum rem, prope autem secundum timorem politiam salvant: cives enim magis sunt subiecti principi et plus ei obediunt, si ex timoribus corruptionem timeant. Guerra enim exterius tollit seditiones intrinsecas, et reddit cives magis unanimes et concordes. Exemplum huius habemus in Romanis, qui postquam defecerunt exteriora bella, intra seipsos bellare coeperunt. Est autem haec cautela utilis solum duobus principatibus: ut principatui constituto ex hominibus assuetis ad bella, et principatui in quo quis noviter principari coepit. Homines enim bellatores et assueti ad proelia, quibus non fuit curae de virtutibus aliis nisi de fortitudine, secundum Philosophum 7.

Politicorum assimilantur ferro, quod dum est in continuo exercitio claritatem habet, sed si diu remanet inofficiosum, rubiginem contrahit. sic et tales bellantes fiunt obedientes principi: vacantes vero nesciunt debite se habere: quare talibus ut debite se habeant semper incutiendi sunt timores bellici, et correptiones extrinsecae. Rurusus, si quis super aliquos de novo principari coepit, quia contra talem principatum facilius insurgitur; ne cives insurgant in principem, et ut magis unanimiter obediant, incutiendi sunt illis timores de extrinsecis periculis imminentibus: sed si regnum diu in statu perstiterit, et dominus ille sit naturalis, ita quod quasi non sit in memoria hominum ex quo ille et antecessores sui obtinuerunt huiusmodi principatum, tanta cautela non magnam utilitatem habere videtur. Quartum autem quod politiam salvare videtur, est cavere seditiones et contentiones nobilium; et hoc ponendo eis leges, quia legibus non de facili contradicitur. Sunt enim in regno tales leges instituendae, ut per eas sedari possint contentiones nobilium. Nam baronibus dissentientibus fiunt seditiones in regno, et per consequens sit praeparamentum ut dissolvatur regius principatus. Quintum, est diligenter aspicere, quomodo se habeant, quos maiestas regia honoravit, et promovit ad aliquam praeposituram, vel ad aliquem principatum, aut magistratum. Nihil enim adeo regnum conservat et politiam salvat, sicut praeficere homines bonos et virtuosos, et conferre eis dominia et principatus.

Quare maxime salvativum politiae est, regiam maiestatem considerare diligenter quos praeficit in aliquibus magistratibus: et si bene habuerint, augere eorum dominia: si male, minuere: vel adeo male se habere possent, quod essent totaliter a dominio removendi, vel etiam capitali sententia condemnandi. Sextum est, nulli valde magnum dominium conferre. Nam magna dominia ex nimia bonitate et fortitudine ut plurimum corrumpunt mentes hominum, ut fiant transgressores iustitiae. Est autem haec cautela maxime utilis ad homines, de quibus rex certam et diuturnam experientiam non accepit. Ideo potissime observandum est, ne repente constituatur aliquis in maximo principatu. Septimum salvans regnum et politiam, est regem sive principantem habere dilectionem et amorem ad bonum regni, et ad politiam, in qua principatur. Quicunque enim amat, solicitatur, et timet, ne aliquod inconveniens accidat circa amatum. timor autem consiliativos facit, ut dicitur 2.

Rhet. ibi enim est magna salus, ubi et multa consilia. quare si rex bonum regni diligat, salvabitur regnum; quia timens ne in regno adversa contingant, adhibebit multa consilia qualiter possit bona regni promovere, et periculis imminentibus obviare. Octavum salvans regnum et politiam, est habere civilem potentiam. Nam (ut dicitur in Magnis moralibus) iustitia urbanitates conservat. Sed iustitia in regno conservari non potest, nisi per potentiam civilem puniantur transgressores iusti. Debet enim rex aut princeps si vult servare iustitiam et vult punire transgressores iusti, habere multos exploratores, et multos inquisitores investigantes facta civium, et inquirentes unde cives accipiunt quod expendunt, et quomodo possunt reddere rationem sui victus: nam qui huiusmodi rationem non potest reddere, signum est quod ex furto vel ex male ablato vivat. Sic enim faciendo ista, poterit servare iustitiam, et praeservare regnum a maleficis, et transgressoribus iusti.

Nonum maxime salvans regnum, est ese regem bonum et virtuosum. Nam ut dicitur 5. Politicorum, maior virtus requiritur in custodia civitatis et regni, quam in duce exercitus. Nam in duce exercitus requiritur potissime experientia, sed custos civitatis et custos regni totius oportet quod sit virtuosus et epiikis idest super iustus: decet enim talem esse quasi semideum, ut sicut alios dignitate et potentia excellit, sic eos bonitate superet. hoc enim maxime salvabit regnum et politiam, si rex sit bonus et virtuosus, quia intendet bono regni et communi. Decimum, est regem non ignorare qualis sit illa politia secundum quam principatur, et quae eam possunt salvare et corrumpere. Talia autem maxime sciri poterunt per experientiam: nam cum quis diu expertus est regni negocia, de levi arbitrari poteritque bonum statum regni corrumpunt, et salvant. Decet ergo regem frequenter meditari et habere memoriam praeteritorum quae contigerunt in regno, quomodo iudicata fuerunt, et quomodo temporibus retroactis melius conservatus fuerit bonus status regni, ut sciat cognoscere qualiter principari debeat, et quae corrumpunt et salvant regnum et gubernationem regni: quia his ignoratis recte regum gubernare non poterit.

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