Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo dividuntur potentiae animae, et in quibus potentiis habent esse virtutes. Cap. I.
Liber I, Pars II — Quomodo dividuntur potentiae animae, et in quibus potentiis habent esse virtutes. Cap. I.
After, with God's help, we have completed the first part of this first book, which deals with the governance of oneself, we show where kings and princes should place their happiness, because it is not fitting for them to set their end in wealth, nor in base power, nor in any such things, but they should use all these as instruments for happiness. Moreover, they ought to place their happiness in the act of prudence, as such an act is commanded by love; for then kings have the happiness due to their station, and fitting, when, instigated by God's love, they govern the people entrusted to them according to the law and the order of righteousness. Therefore, the happiness of kings must primarily be placed in God himself, and from the knowledge and love of him, they should order their study and their life to this end, so that, knowing and loving God, they may govern the people entrusted to them as true ministers of his according to the order of reason. Having completed these points and shown where kings should place their end according to the previously mentioned order, it remains to show that kings should possess virtues. Virtues, however, are certain adornments, and certain perfections of the soul. Therefore, it is necessary first to show how many powers of the soul there are, and in which powers virtues can exist. Consequently, it will be made clear how the virtues are to be distinguished. Afterward, we will show how many such virtues there are in number, and which of them are principal and which are secondary. Next, it will be explained individually what each of those virtues is and how it is fitting for kings and princes to possess such virtues. The powers of the soul can be distinguished as some being natural, some cognitive and sensitive, some appetitive, and some intellectual. Natural powers are those in which we share with plants and vegetative things, such as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers, and such things that also belong to trees. Cognitive and sensitive powers are sight, taste, hearing, and such things in which we share with brutes. Appetitive powers are distinguished: for a certain appetite exists in man, in which he does not share with brutes, such as the appetite that follows the intellect; while another appetite exists in which he shares with them, such as the appetite that follows the senses. The appetite that follows the senses can be called sensuality; the appetite that follows the intellect is called will; according to this way of speaking, brutes have sensuality and sensitive appetite, but they do not have will or intellect. Therefore, the virtues about which we intend to speak, which are certain praiseworthy habits, will be either in natural powers, or in the senses themselves, or in the sensitive appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, or in the intellect itself, or in all of these, or in some of them. However, they cannot exist in natural powers. This is evident in three ways. First, we are neither praised nor blamed for our natural abilities; no one is called a good person simply because they have good digestion or good growth. Second, there are no virtues in such abilities, because virtue is something according to reason, which must be proven. Third, in such powers, there are no habits or virtues that determine the powers to act well or poorly. Natural powers do not obey reason; whether someone reasons or desires, natural powers do not change in their actions, but always act according to their own nature. Thus, in such powers, there are no habits or virtues that determine them to act well or poorly. Therefore, since nature is determined to one thing, and natural powers are sufficiently determined to act, according to their nature, we are neither vicious nor virtuous in these powers, as we speak of vice and virtue; hence, such virtues cannot exist in them. Thus, by these three reasons, it has been proven that virtues do not exist in natural powers, and it can be shown that they do not exist in sensitive cognition or in sensitive powers. For just as we are not praised or blamed for our natural powers, we are also not praised or blamed for our senses. Secondly, there is no moral virtue in the senses, because just as natural powers do not obey reason—since according to the rule of reason, no one is more or less nourished or digests better or worse—so the senses do not obey reason either; for it is not in a person's power to see more clearly or less clearly. Therefore, if moral virtue is something according to reason, such a virtue should not be placed in the senses. Thirdly, there is no moral virtue in such powers, because just as natural powers are sufficiently determined to their actions by their nature, so too are the senses. For just as fire only heats as much as it can, because it is determined in its action, and is neither praised nor blamed, nor is there a moral virtue in it, so too the digestive power only digests as much as it can, and the eye only sees as much as it can; therefore, there cannot be a moral virtue in them. For through moral virtue, the power is determined to act; however, these powers are sufficiently determined to their proper actions by their nature, and therefore do not need moral virtue. If therefore there is no moral virtue in natural powers or in the senses, since beyond natural powers and senses there is only intellect and both intellectual and sensitive appetites, it is necessary that there be moral virtues in these.
Read the original Latin
Postquam auxiliante Deo complevimus primam partem huius primi libri, in quo agitur de regimine sui, Ostendentes in quo reges et principes suam felicitatem debeant ponere, quia non decet eos suum finem ponere in divitiis, nec in cvili potentia, nec in aliquibus talibus, sed omnibus his (supra plenius probatur) debent uti tanquam organis ad felicitatem. Suam autem felicitatem ponere debent in actu prudentiae, prout talis actus est imperatus a charitate: nam tunc reges habent felicitatem suo statui debitam, et condignam, quando instigante Dei dilectione secundum prudentiam regitivam, gentem sibi commissam secundum legem, et rationem sante, et iuste regant. principaliter ergo Regum felicitas ponenda est in ipso Deo, et ex cognitione et dilectione eius studium suum, et vitam suam ad hoc ordinare debet, ut cognoscentes, et diligentes Deum, tanquam veri ministri eius secundum ordinem rationis dirigant Populum sibi commissum. His ergo itaque peractis, et ostenso in quo reges ponere debeant suum finem secundum ordinem superius praetaxatum, restat ostendere virtutibus reges pollere debeant. Virtutes autem quaedam sum quidam ornatus, et quaedam perfectiones animae. Oportet ergo prius ostendere, quot sunt potentiae animae, et in quibus potentiis habent esse virtutes. Consequenter autem manifestabitur, quomodo virtutes sunt distinguendae. Postea vero ostendamus, quot sunt numero huiusmodi virtutes, et quae illarum sunt principales, et secundariae.
Deinde autem declarabitur singulariter, quae sit unaquaeque illarum virtutum, et quomodo decet reges, et principes tales virtutes habere. Potentiae autem animae sic distingui possunt, quia potentiae animae quaedam sunt naturales, quaedam cognitivae sensitivae, quaedam appetitivae, et quaedam intellectivae. Naturales potentiae sunt illae, in quibus comminicamus cum vegetabilibus, et plantis, ut potentia nutritiva, augmentativa, generativa, et talia quae etiam ipsis arboribus competunt. Potentiae vero cognitivae sensitivae, sunt visus, gustus, auditus, et talia, in quibus communicamus cum brutis. Appetitivae vero distinguuntur: nam quidam appetitus est in homine, in quo non communicat cum brutis, ut est appetitus sequens intellectum: quidam vero in quo communicat cum eis, ut appetitus sequens sensum. Appetitus autem sequens sensum potest nominari sensualitas: sequens intellectum nominatur voluntas: secundum quem modum loquendi bruta habent sensualitatem, et appetitum sensitivum, sed non habent voluntatem, et intellectum. Virtutes ergo, de quibus loqui intendimus, quae sunt quidam habitus laudabiles, vel erit in potentiis naturalibus, vel in ipsis sensibus, vel in appetitu sensitivo, vel in appetitu intellectivo, vel in ipso intellectu, vel in omnibus his, vel in aliquibus horum. In potentiis autem naturalibus esse non possunt.
quod tripliciter patet. Primo, quia ex naturalibus nec laudamur, nec vituperamur: nullus enim dicitur bonus homo ex eo quod habeat digestivam bonam, vel bonam augmentativam. Secundo, in talibus non habent esse virtutes: quia virtus aliquid secundum rationem, ut probari habet 2. Ethic. Potentiae autem naturales (secundum quod huiusmodi) rationi non obediunt: nam sive quis ratiocinetur, sive velit, non propter hoc (per se loquendo) potentiae naturales variantur in actibus suis, sed semper secundum modum sibi possibilem suas actiones efficiunt. Tertio, in talibus potentiis non sunt habitus, et virtutes, qui habitus sunt ad determinandum potentias, ut bene vel male agant. ut per habitus votiosos determinatur potentia ad agendum male, per virtuosos ad agendum bene: cum ergo natura sit determinata ad unum, et potentiae naturales sufficienter determinentur ad agendum, ex natura sua secundum eas nec sumus vitiosi, nec virtuosi, ut hic de vitio, et virtute loquimur: quare in eis huiusmodi virtutes esse non possunt. His ergo tribus rationibus, per quas probatum est virtutes non esse in potentiis naturalibus, probari potest eas non esse in cognitione sensitiva, sive in potentiis sensitivis.
Nam sicut non laudamur, nec vituperamur ex potentiis naturalibus: sic non laudamur, nec vituperamur ex sensibus. Nam sicut nullus laudatur tanquam bonus homo, ex eo quod bene digerit, vel bene crescit: sic non laudatur ex eo quod acute videt, vel subtiliter audit, nisi forte hoc esset per accidens, ut si quis ex superflua comestione, vel ex nimia potatione incurrisset ophthalmiam oculorum, ne bene videret, vel debilitatem stomachi, ne bene digereret: increparetur ille, non quia male digerit, vel quia non clare videt, quia clarem videre, et bene digerere (per se loquendo) non est in potestate hominis: sed increparetur ex nimio potu, vel ex superfluo cibo, nam erat in potestate sua, ut posset uti potu, et cibo moderate. Secundo in sensibus non est ponenda virtus moralis, quia sicut potentiae naturales non obediunt rationi, quia secundum regulam rationis nullus magis, vel minus augetur, vel magis, et minus digerit: sic nec sensus obediunt rationi, non enim est in potestate hominis videre clarius, vel minus clare: quare si virtus moralis est aliquid secundum rationem, huiusmodi virtus in sensibus poni non debet. Tertio in talibus non est moralis virtus, quia sicut potentiae naturales sufficienter determinantur ad actiones suas per suam naturam: sic et sensus. Nam sicut ignis tantum calefacit, quantum potest calefacere, propter quod, quia determinatus est in actione sua, nec laudatur, nec vituperatur, nec est in eo virtus moralis: sic quia potentia digestiva tantum digerit quantum potest digerere, et oculus tantum videt quantum potest videre, in eis virtus moralis esse non potest. Nam per virtutem moralem determinatur potentia ad agendum: haec autem sufficienter determinantur ad actiones proprias per naturam: non ergo indigent virtute morali. Si ergo nec in potentiis naturalibus, nec in sensibus est virtus moralis, cum praeter potentias naturales, et sensus non sit nisi intellectus, et appetitus intellectivus, et sensitivus, oportet esse in talibus virtutes morales.
De Regimine Principum (On the Rule of Princes) companion
A prince read his portion daily. So can you.
Chosen Portion delivers a short daily reading from historic works like this one, free on iOS.
Princes were formed by scheduled daily instruction from this manual; Chosen Portion schedules the same kind of daily formation reading for you.
- One daily reading in under 3 minutes, in modern readable English
- Selections from De Regimine Principum and 77 other royal devotional works
- Finish the 10-day course, then keep a daily formation habit without planning it yourself