Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt in quibus rex alios debet excedere, et quomodo differat rex a tyranno. Cap. VI.
Liber III, Pars II — Quae sunt in quibus rex alios debet excedere, et quomodo differat rex a tyranno. Cap. VI.
He speaks of three ways in which a king should surpass others. First, a king is appointed through an excess of good deeds. Second, a king is often appointed due to an excess of power and dignity. For it is likely that nobles and powerful people are more ashamed to commit disgraceful acts than others; thus, they are often believed to be more suited to rule, and in this way, many have obtained kingdoms in ancient times. If a king is generated and appointed from such excesses, then, if his generation is right, this excess must be found more abundantly and perfectly in the king already established in royal dignity. For we see in the natural generations that if fire is generated through rarefaction and heat, because the material ignites when it is heated and rarefied, the rarity and heat must be found more perfectly in the fire that is already generated and established. Therefore, if the excess of virtuous action and power can be the cause for someone to be rightly appointed as king, it is fitting that such excesses be found more perfectly in the monarchy itself. It is fitting for the king who wishes to rule rightly to be concerned about three things. Secondly, someone can be appointed king because of an excess of virtuous actions: for it is characteristic of virtuous goods to love the common good more than the private good; therefore, he is considered worthy to be appointed king who is believed by the people to be virtuous. Thirdly, someone is often appointed king because of an excess of power and dignity. For if the excesses of benefits, virtuous actions, and power can be the cause for someone to be rightly appointed as king, it is fitting that such excesses should be found more perfectly in the monarchy itself. If, therefore, a king is generated and appointed from such excesses, and if his generation is right, it is necessary that this kind of excess be found in a greater and more perfect manner in a king already established in royal dignity. For we see in the generations of natural things that if fire is generated through rarefaction and heat, because matter ignites when it is heated and rarefied, it is necessary that rarity and heat be found more perfectly in fire that has already been generated and is in existence. Therefore, if the excess of benefits from virtuous action and power can be the cause for someone to be rightly appointed as king, it is fitting that such excesses should be found more perfectly in the monarchy itself. For it is fitting for the king who wishes to rule rightly (as far as the present situation allows) to be concerned with three things. First, that he be loved by the people. Second, a vigilant care should promote the common good. Third, he should correct and punish those who incite seditions and disturb the people. Therefore, it is necessary for a king to have these three qualities. For if he is abundant in bestowing benefits, he will be loved by the people. If he excels in virtuous actions, he will promote the common good; for if it is a virtue to strive for good, it will be more fitting for him to aim for a greater good, which is the good of the people and the common good, which is more divine than any singular good; thus, a good and virtuous man will promote it more than any private or personal good. Third, it is beneficial for him to abound in civil power, so that he can correct those who wish to rise up and disturb the peace of the kingdom. Having seen the qualities in which a king should surpass others, it remains to show how he differs from a tyrant, as the philosopher touches upon. There are four distinctions between a tyrant and a king. The first is that a king looks out for the common good, while a tyrant seeks only his own benefit. For a kingdom is a rightful authority, but tyranny is a perverse domination. Therefore, since the good of the people is more divine than the good of an individual, he who disregards the common good and seeks his own benefit rules perversely. From this first distinction follows the second. Namely, that a tyrant's intention is focused on material gain, while a king's intention is directed toward honorable good. For just as it is inexpressible how much one delights in personal gain, so it is almost inexpressible how great the honor is that follows from seeking the common good. Thus, if a tyrant seeks his own private good, it follows that his intention revolves around material pleasure. But the intention of a king is directed toward honorable good, because he seeks the common good. From this second difference, a third follows. Namely, that the tyrant's intention is focused on pleasure. A tyrant, having disregarded the common good, cares only about his own pleasures, and thus his intention is primarily directed toward money, believing that through it he can obtain such delights. But the king's intention is directed toward virtue and to ensure that the citizens are virtuous, because from this, the honorable and common good results most significantly. From this third difference, a fourth follows: namely, that the tyrant does not care to be protected by his citizens, but rather by outsiders; whereas the king wants to be protected by his own citizens and by those born in his own kingdom. For a tyrant, since he disregards the common good, does not care except for his own pleasures, seeing himself as burdensome and tedious to those who are in the kingdom, he entrusts his entire bodily protection to outsiders; but conversely, the king, seeing that he has the greatest care for the good of the kingdom and the common good, places his greatest trust in those who are in the kingdom. Therefore, he makes sure to be protected by his own people, not by outsiders.
Read the original Latin
Philosphus 5. Politic. narrat tria, in quibus rex alios debet excedere. Dicit enim, quod antiquitus reges a triplici excessu constituebantur. Primo ab excessu beneficii. nam quia populus non percipit nisi sensibilia bona, quos videt esse liberales et beneficos, nimis ardenter monetur in eorum amorem, et optat eos habere in dominos. Inde est quod antiquitus plures sic praeficiebantur in reges. nam si aliquis fuerat primo beneficus, gens illa tracta ad amorem eius praeficiebat ipsum in regem.
Secundo potest aliquis praefici in regem ab excessu virtuosarum actionum: nam quia bonorum virtuosorum est diligere bonum commune potius quam privatum, ideo reputatur dignus ut praeficiatur in regem qui a populo creditur virtuosus. Tertio consuevit praefici aliquis in regem ab excessu potentiae et dignitatis. nam quia probabile est nobiles et potentes, magis verecundari operari turpia quam alios: et quia tales ut plurimum vel sunt vel creduntur esse magis apti ad principandum, ideo pluries per hunc modum antiquitus aliqui regna obtinuerunt. Si ergo ex talibus excessibus rex generatur et praeficitur, si recta sit generatio eius, oportet huiusmodi excessum per amplius et perfectius reperiri in rege iam in dignitate regia constituto. Sic enim videmus in generationibus naturalium, quod si generatur ignis per rarefactionem et caliditatem, quia materia tunc ignitur cum calefit et rarefit, oportet raritatem et calorem perfectius reperiri in igne iam generato et in esse constituto. quare si excessus beneficii actionis virtuosae et potentiae possunt esse causa ut rite aliquis constituatur in regem, decens est tales excessus in ipsa monarchia perfectius reperiri. Decet enim ipsum regem volentem recte regere (quantum ad praesens spectat) ad tria solicitari. Primo, ut ametur a populo.
Secundo, ut cura pervigili procuret commune bonum. Tertio, ut castiget et puniat moventes seditiones et turbantes populum. Quare expedit regem habere praedictos tres excessus. Nam si abundet in beneficiis tribuendis, diligetur a populo. Si excellat in actionibus virtuosis, procurabit commune bonum: quia si virtutis est, tendere in bonum, eius erit magis tendere in maius bonum, bonum ergo gentis et commune quod est divinius quam aliquod bonum singulare, magis procurabit vir bonus et virtuosus, quam bonum aliquod proprium et privatum. Tertio expedit eum abundare in civili potentia, ut possit corrigere volentes insurgere, et turbare pacem regni. Viso in quibus rex alios debet excedere: restat ostendere, quomodo differat a Tyranno, Tangit autem Philosophus 5. Politicorum quatuor differentias inter tyrannum et regem.
Prima est, quia rex respicit bonum commune: tyrannus vero bonum proprium. Nam regnum est principatus rectus, tyrannis vero est dominium perversum. Cum ergo bonum gentis sit divinius bono unius, perverse dominatur qui spreto bono communi intendit bonum proprium. Ex hac autem differentia prima sequitur secunda. videlicet quod tyrannus intendit bonum delectabile: rex vero bonum honorificum. Nam sicut inenarrabile est quanto quis delectatur in bono proprio, sic quasi inenarrabile est quantus honor sequitur, et quanto honore est dignius intendens commune bonum. Quare si tyrannus intendit bonum proprium et privatum, sequitur quod eius intentio versetur circa bonum delectabile. Sed intentio regis versatur circa bonum honorificum, eo quod ipse intendat commune bonum.
Ex hac autem secunda differentia sequitur tertia. videlicet quod intentio tyrannica est circa pecuniam. Tyrannus quia spreto communi bono non curat nisi de delectationibus propriis, maxime versatur sua intentio circa pecuniam, credens se per eam posse huiusmodi delectabilia obtinere. Sed regis intentio versatur circa virtutem, et ut cives sint virtuosi: quia ex hoc maxime resultat bonum honorificum, et commune. Ex hac autem differentia tertia sequitur quarta videlicet quod tyrannus non curat custodiri a civibus, sed ab extraneis: rex vero vult custodiri ab ipsis civibus, et a genitis in proprio regno. Nam tyrannus eo quod spreto communi bono non curat nisi de delectationibus propriis, videns se esse onerosum et tediosum ab iis qui sunt in regno, totam suam custodiam corporis committit extraneis: sed rex econverso eo quod videat se maximam curam habere de bono regni et communi, maxime confidit de his qui sunt in regno. Ideo facit se custodiri a propriis, non ab extraneis.
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