Liber III, Pars II — Quod melius est regimen regni et principatus ire per haereditatem et succesisonem filiorum, quam per electionem aliquam. Cap. V.
Liber III, Pars II — Quod melius est regimen regni et principatus ire per haereditatem et succesisonem filiorum, quam per electionem aliquam. Cap. V.
It might seem better and more worthy for royal and princely rule to come through election rather than through inheritance. For if we consider the truth of the matter superficially, one might doubt whether it is better for royal dignity to come through election or through inheritance. If someone is appointed king through election, it seems that such a kingdom is not subject to chance and fortune, but is established through skill, since the one appointed will be better and more industrious. But if this is done through inheritance, the kingdom will be exposed to chance and fortune, for it is uncertain what kind of son will inherit the royal dignity. Therefore, speaking absolutely, it is better for a prince to be established through election than through inheritance. However, since most people have a corrupt appetite, considering the actions and conditions of people, which we see experimentally, it seems that it is more expedient for a kingdom or city that a lord be appointed through inheritance rather than through election. We can, however, show in three ways that, considering the conditions of people, it is better for such governance to come through inheritance. The first way is taken from the part of the king himself who governs the people. The second consideration is from the perspective of the son who is to succeed in the inheritance. The third consideration is from the perspective of the people who should be governed by such a regime. The first way is thus considered. For according to the Philosopher, this is indeed difficult. It is beyond description how much love a father has and how much it differs to bear something of one's own; for what is natural cannot be idle or vain; naturally, everyone has affection for themselves: therefore, a king is all the more inclined to care for the good of the kingdom, as he believes that the kingdom is more truly his own good: thus, if a king sees that he ought to rule over the kingdom not only for his life but also through inheritance in his own children, he will regard the good of the kingdom as his own good and will be more ardently concerned about such good. Indeed, because the father's entire hope rests in his children and the fathers are moved with great ardor toward the love of their children, therefore, with every care they can muster, they will be moved to ensure the good state of the kingdom if they consider that it will come to the dominion of their children. The Philosopher, however, states this in his Politics. Politics. When discussing this matter, he says that it is difficult. That is to say, fathers can pass on the rule of the kingdom to their own sons. He implies that this is akin to a divine virtue and exceeds human capability. But perhaps this is why the philosopher said that in ancient times kings often turned into tyrants and did not last long, so that sons could succeed to their father's inheritance in this way. Or it is simply said that this is divine, because unless it happens that sons reign after their fathers, if the sons reign, they will scarcely or never be able to have their own sons reign. Therefore, from the king's perspective, we can argue that it is beneficial for royal rule to pass to sons through inheritance. The second way to investigate this same matter is taken from the perspective of the son, to whom it pertains to take on the care of the kingdom. For just as the morals of recent dictators are generally worse than those of the wealthy who have been around since ancient times, so too the morals of recent powerful figures and the new elite through the acquisition of civil power are worse than those of others. They don't know how to bear such fortunes. Recently, being exalted to the position of king seems to be a kind of ignorance of royal dignity. Such people often become tyrants, ruling with inflated egos and ignorance. But if royal governance is to proceed through inheritance. The sons do not become arrogant or overly proud because of this. For they do not consider it great if they possess what their fathers had; therefore, from the perspective of the sons who ought to succeed to their father's inheritance, it is beneficial for the kingdom that they are not ruled by ignorance, and that royal governance does not turn into tyranny, so that royal dignity may be passed down through inheritance to their descendants. A third way is taken from the perspective of the people who ought to be governed by such a regime. For custom is like a second nature; therefore, regimes established by custom are seen as almost natural. Therefore, if the people have obeyed their fathers, sons, and grandsons for a long time, they naturally tend to obey voluntarily; thus, since everything voluntary is less burdensome and difficult, the people will obey the king's commands more willingly and easily, so it is beneficial for the royal dignity to be passed down through inheritance. Therefore, determining the house and lineage from which the king is to be chosen settles disputes, removes tyranny, and establishes a kind of natural dominion. It calms disputes because often conflicts arise among those who are chosen due to the election of a leader, which disturbs the peace of the kingdom. It removes tyranny because those who dominate through election do not care for the good of the kingdom as much as those who inherit their position; and because to be a tyrant means not to intend the good of the kingdom, such individuals more easily become tyrants. This natural dominion also exists because the people tend to obey the commands of such a king almost instinctively. From this, it can be understood that it is not only beneficial for the kingdom to determine the lineage from which the ruler is to be chosen, but it is also necessary to determine the individual who should lead from that lineage. For just as disputes and conflicts arise if it is unclear from which lineage the king should be chosen, so too do disputes arise if it is not determined which person from that lineage should be the leader. Determining such a person does not pose any difficulty. If the royal dignity is passed down through inheritance to descendants, it must be transferred to the sons, because according to the line of blood, sons are most closely connected to their parents: moreover, such dignity should be transferred more to males than to females, since a male is superior to a female in reason, more courageous in heart, and less driven by passions. Among males, such dignity should be granted more to the firstborn than to others, because, as the philosopher says in his Politics, it is fitting for younger ones to obey their elders. In fact, fathers generally love their firstborns more; thus, it is better for the king to care for the good of the kingdom, establishing the kingdom to succeed to the firstborn, so that the father may take greater care for the good of the kingdom, knowing that it will pass to the more beloved son. And if it happens that he is given to love the younger ones more, It is easy to respond to such objections, because human actions and particular deeds do not fall under a strict rule or certain narrative: therefore, it suffices to probabilistically navigate such matters and to establish laws that generally contain the truth. However, what was mentioned earlier, namely that to go through inheritance for royal dignity, is to expose it to fortune, since it is unknown what kind of royal son will be in the future. It must be said that there are hardly any human deeds that are not exposed to dangers in some way. Yet those things that are exposed to many dangers should be avoided more. We see, however, through experience that many evils arise in cities and kingdoms where there is no natural lord: for it sometimes happens that they lack a governor for a long time, and when they do have a governor, they are mostly tyrannized over; indeed, we have seen many such evils in these kinds of governments, which would take a long time to enumerate individually. Therefore, we can say that it is beneficial for the kingdom for a son to succeed in the governance of his father: and if there is any defect in the royal son, to whom royal care should reach, it can be supplemented by wise and good men, whom the king should join to himself as hands and eyes in society; however, kings and princes are very blameworthy if they are not overly concerned that their sons are imbued from infancy with discipline and good morals; since the common good and the good of the entire kingdom depend on this. Nor is it enough that the firstborn alone should reign, so that diligent care is given only to him: for it is unknown what divine providence has determined, and it is not known to whom the kingdom will pass among the sons. Therefore, lest the common good be endangered, diligent care must be taken for all the king's sons.
Read the original Latin
Videretur forte alicui omnino esse melius et dignius dominationem regiam et principarum ire per electionem quam per haereditatem. Nam superficialiter considerata veritate quaesiti, dubitans An melius sit regiam dignitatem ire per electionem, an per haereditatem: dubitare videtur, an melius sit constituere dominium arte, vel forte. Nam si per electionem praeficiatur aliquis in regem, videtur tale egnum non esse expositum casui et fortunae, sed factum esse per artem, eo quod praeficietur melior et industrior. Sed si per haereditatem hoc fiat, exponentur regnum quasi forti, casui, et fortunae: nam incertum est qualis debeat esse filius, ad quem spectabit habere regiam dignitatem. Absolute ergo loquendo, melius est principem praestituendum esse per electionem, quam per haereditatem. Tamen quia ut plurimum homines habent corruptum appetitum, consideratis gestis et conditionibus hominum, quas esperimentaliter videmus, videtur esse censendum magis expedire regno vel civitati, ut dominus praeficiatur per haereditatem, quam per electionem. Possumus autem triplici via ostendere, quod consideratis conditionibus hominum melius est, huiusmodi regimen per haereditatem ire. Prima via sumitur ex parte ipsius regis regentis populum.
Secunda ex parte filii, qui debet in haereditatem succedere. Tertia ex parte populi, qui debet per tale regimen gubernari. Prima via sic putet. nam secundum Philosophum 2 Politic. inenarrabile est quantam dilectionem habeat, et quantum differat patare aliquid proprium: nam quod est naturale, ociosum et vanum esse non potest; naturaliter autem quilibet habet amicitiam ad seipsum: naturale est igitur tanto regem magis solicitari circa bonum regni, quanto credit ipsum regnum magis esse bonum suum et bonum proprium: quare si rex videat debere se principari super regnum non solum ad vitam, sed etiam per haereditatem in propriis filiis, magis reputabit bonum regni esse bonum suum, et ardentius solicitabitur circa tale bonum. Immo quia tota spes patris requiescit in filiis et nimio ardore moventur patres erga dilectionem filiorum: ideo omni cura qua poterit movebitur ad procurandum bonum statum regni, si cogitet ipsum provenire ad dominium filiorum. Philosophus tamen 3. Politic.
ubi de hac materia determinat, ait, quod hoc est difficile. videlicet quod sic patres possint tradere regimen regni propriis filiis. Innuit enim hoc esse quasi virtutis divinae, et excedere humanum modum. Sed forte ideo hoc Philosophus dixit, quia antiquitus ut plurimum reges convertebantur in tyrannos et non diu durabant, ut filii hoc modo succederent in haereditatem paternam. Vel simpliciter dicitur hoc esse divinum, quia nisi contingit filios reganre post patres: et si regnant filii, vix aut nunquam reganbunt filii filiorum. Ex parte ergo regis ut magis solicitetur circa bonum regni, arguere possumus, quod expediat regale regimen in filios per haereditatem succedere. Secunda via ad investigandum hoc idem, sumitur ex parte filii, ad quem spectat suscipere curam regni. Nam sicut mores nuper ditatorum ut plurimum peiores sunt moribus eorum, qui fuerunt divites ab antiquo: sic mores nuper potentum et de novi elevatorum per adeptionem civilis potentiae, peiore, sunt moribus aliorum.
nesciunt enim tales fortunas ferre. nuper enim esse exaltatum in regem, est quasi quaedam ineruditio regiae dignitatis. tales quidem ut plurimum tyrannizant, et inflati corde et inerudite regnant. Sed si regale regimen per haereditatem vadat. filii ex hoc non inflantur nec efficiuntur elati. quia non reputant magnum, si illud habeant quod patres possiderant: quare ex parte filiorum debentium succedere in haereditatem paternam, expedit regno ne inerudite regatur, et ne regale regimen convertatur in tyrannidem, ut regia dignitas per haereditatem tranferatur ad posteros. Tertia via sumitur ex parte populi qui debet per tale regimen gubernari. nam consuetudo est quasi altera natura: propter quod regimina ex consuetudine efficiuntur quasi naturalia.
Populus ergo si per diuturnam consuetudinem obedivit patribus, filiis, et filiorum filiis, quasi naturaliter inclinantur ut voluntarie obediant: quare cum omne voluntarium sit minus onerosum et difficile, ut libentius et facilius obediat populus mandatis regis, expedit regiae dignitati per haereditatem succedere. Determinare igitur domum et prosapiam, ex qua assumendus est rex, sedat litigia, tollit tyrannidem, efficit quasi dominium naturale. Litigia enim sedat, quia multotiens inter eligentes dissensiones oriuntur propter electionem principis: propter quod turbatur pax regni. Tyrannidem tollit, quia dominantes per electionem (ut patet per habita) non sic diligunt bonum regni sicut haereditarie principantes: et quia hoc est esse tyrannum, non intendere bonum regni, tales facilius tyrannizant. Facit etiam hoc dominium naturale, quia populus quasi naturaliter inclinatur ut obediat iussionibus talis regis. Ex hoc autem patere potest, quod non solum expedit regno determinare prosapiam, ex qua praeficiendus est dominus, sed etiam oportet determinare personam. Nam sicut oriuntur dissensiones et lites, si ignoretur ex qua prosapia assumendus sit rex: sic etiam litigia oriuntur, si non determinetur quae persona in illa prosapia debeat principari. talem autem determinare personam, difficultatem non habet.
nam si dignitas regia per haereditatem transferatur ad posteros, oportet eam transferre in filios, quia secundum lineam consanguinitatis filii parentibus maxime sunt coniuncti: oportet autem talem dignitatem magis transferre ad masculos quam ad foeminas, quia masculus est foemina ratione praestantior, corde animosior, passionum minus insecutor. Inter masculos autem oportet talem dignitatem tribuere magis primogenito quam aliis: quia (ut ait Philosophus in Politiis) decet iuniores senioribus obedire. Immo quia patres plus communiter primogenitos diligunt; ut magis sit curae regi de bono regni, expedit statuere regnum succedere primogenito: ut pater ampliori solicitudine curet de bono regni, sciens ipsum pervenire ad filium plus dilectum. Et si ei datur quod contingit aliquando magis diligere minores. Talibus obiectionibus de facili respondetur: quia facta humana et gesta particularia omnino sub recta regula, et sub certa narratione non cadunt: sufficit ergo in talibus pertransire probabiliter, et leges statuere quae ut in pluribus continent veritatem. Quod vero superius tangebatur, videlicet quod ire per haereditatem, dignitatem regiam, est exponere fortunae, eo quod ignoretur qualis regius filius sit futurus. Dici debet quod vix sunt aliqua gesta humana, quae ex aliqua parte non exponantur periculis. Illa tamen magis cavenda sunt, quae pluribus periculis exponuntur.
Videmus autem per experientiam plura mala oriri in civitatibus et regnis, ubi non est dominus aliquis naturalis: nam contingit ea aliquando diu carere gubernatore, et cum gubernatorem habent ut plurimum tyrannizant: plura enim huiusmodi mala in talibus regiminibus vidimus, quae enumerare per singula longum esset. Dicere ergo possumus quod expedit regno, filium succedere in regimine patris: et si aliquis defectus esse: in filio regio, ad quem deberet regia cura pervenire, suppleri poterit per sapientes et bonos, quos tanquam manus et oculos debet sibi rex in societatem coniungere: valde tamen reprehensibiles sunt reges et principes, si non nimia cura solicitentur quod filii ab ipsa infantia et disciplina et bonis moribus sint imbuti; cum bonum commune et totius regni in hoc consistat. Nec sufficit quod quia solus primogenitus regnare debet, ut de eo solo cura habeatur diligens: ignoratur enim quid divina providentia statuit, et nescitur cui filiorum succedat regnum. Ideo ne periclitetur bonum commune, de omnibus filiis regis cura diligens est habenda.
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