Liber III, Pars II — Quibus rationibus ostendi potest, quod appareat melius esse civitatem aut provinciam regi pluribus quam uno, et quomodo solvi possunt rationes illae. Cap. IV.

Liber III, Pars II — Quibus rationibus ostendi potest, quod appareat melius esse civitatem aut provinciam regi pluribus quam uno, et quomodo solvi possunt rationes illae. Cap. IV.

The philosopher mentions three reasons. It seems that in politics there are three reasons that can be presented to show that it is better for a city or province to be ruled by many rather than by one. For it seems that a ruler needs three essential qualities to govern the people entrusted to him well. First, he must have a clear understanding. Second, he must have the right intention. Third, he must possess perfect stability. From these, three paths can be drawn, from which we can conclude that it is better for many to govern than just one. The first path is clear. For many eyes see more than one, and many hands can do more than one, and many minds surpass one in understanding: therefore, if many govern, the reasoning will be clearer there, because they will know more than if only one were in charge. The Philosopher says that many people in leadership together constitute one person with many eyes and many hands. Thus, this leadership will be better because a person so constituted and a multitude leading will be more effective in governing. The second way to investigate this same point is drawn from the right intention required in a leader. For a leader has a right intention if they do not seek their own good but the common good; therefore, the worse the common good is intended, the worse the leadership will be. But if one person were to govern alone, and they sought their own good, then the good of one would be like a completely private good, thus seeking it would lead them to recede from the common good. Therefore, it is worse to govern as one than as many. The third way is drawn from the stability required in a leader. It is fitting for a leader to be a just and stable rule, so that he is not corrupted or perverted by anger, desires, or other passions. But (as the philosopher says) one person is more easily corrupted than many; therefore, it is better for many to rule than for one. Therefore, it should be understood that this doubt, as the philosopher states, is significant. The philosopher explores this in his Politics, questioning many reasons why it is better for a multitude to rule; later in the same work, he elaborates further. He touches on certain points through which such objections can be resolved. For it is not to be understood simply that the philosopher intended to say that the rule of many is more commendable than that of one, as long as both are just; for he repeatedly states in his political writings that a kingdom is the most worthy form of rule: among just forms of rule, the rule of one, which is called a kingdom, is the best; among unjust forms, however, the rule of one, which is commonly referred to as tyranny, is the worst. But this will be discussed further below: for it will be shown that just as royal monarchy is the best, so too, because a greater good is opposed by a greater evil, tyrannical monarchy is the worst. To rule many with a just dominion is not more worthy than to rule one; for many can never rightly rule unless they hold the place of one, and as they have mutual concord and unity: but (as was said above) for that which each one is and that which is more. Therefore, if ruling over many is right and worthy only to the extent that they hold the place of one, then ruling one and establishing a monarchy, if done properly, will be altogether more just and worthy. It must therefore be considered that the kingdom is the most worthy principality, and according to what is right, it is better to rule one than many. But to resolve the aforementioned objections, it should be understood that because many know more than one, and one is more easily corrupted than many, and many cannot deviate from the intention of the common good as easily as one might: therefore, if a monarchy is established and one prince or one king rules over the entire principality or kingdom, that prince or king (according to the Philosopher) must be considered to have the advantage. The prince must associate many wise men with himself, so that he has many eyes and many good and virtuous people, so that he has many feet and many hands: and thus he becomes one man with many eyes, many hands, and many feet. Therefore, it cannot be said that such a monarch does not know many things; for as far as the governance of the kingdom is concerned, whatever all those wise men know, the king himself is said to know in full. Nor can it be said that he can be easily corrupted or perverted; for if the king desires to rule rightly, it is not possible for him to be perverted unless the entire council and all the wise and good men he has associated with himself were to become corrupt: for such a person primarily intends the common good; therefore, if he behaves in this way, he is entirely worthy of ruling. However, if he were to behave otherwise, for example, if he disregarded counsel and dismissed the society of wise and good men, and wanted to follow his own head and private desire, he would no longer be better than many; indeed, his rule would be the worst, because (as is evident from the habits, and as will be shown more clearly below) tyranny is the worst principality.